



Master's in
Development and International Cooperation

Master's Final Work
Dissertation

International challenges of refugee crises starting in the New
Millenium

Marcela Khury Munhoz da Rocha, 158846

Lisbon, July 2024

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Abstract

The present study investigates the intricate relationship between forced displacement and human development. By examining refugee outflows from key regions, this paper seeks to comprehend the factors driving these movements and their development implications. Employing a qualitative case study methodology, the research focuses on the five main refugee outflow countries in 2023. The paper finds that, in these countries, the most relevant factors that induce displacement are political violence, especially civil conflict, and climate change. Refugee emergencies are complex and have multiple aggravating elements, like economic crises, food insecurity, and infrastructure damage. Despite not identifying strong correlations between displacement and human development (measured through HDI), except for Syria, the study reveals that these emergencies are simultaneously humanitarian and developmental challenges. Repercussions are more prominent in the Global South since it is the origin and the destination of over 70% of displaced persons. The findings reiterate the urgency for integrated policy responses that combine development and humanitarian efforts.

Keywords: development economics, refugee outflows, forced displacement

Resumo

O presente estudo investiga a complexa relação entre deslocamento forçado e desenvolvimento humano. Ao examinar as saídas de refugiados de regiões-chave, este artigo busca compreender os fatores que impulsionam estes movimentos e o seu efeito para o desenvolvimento. Utilizando uma metodologia qualitativa de estudo de caso, a investigação foca nos cinco principais países emissores de refugiados em 2023. Conclui-se que, nestes países, os fatores mais relevantes que induzem a migração forçada são a violência política, especialmente os conflitos civis, e as alterações climáticas. As emergências de refugiados são complexas e têm múltiplos elementos agravantes, como crises econômicas, insegurança alimentar e danos nas infraestruturas. Apesar de não identificar correlações fortes entre deslocamento e desenvolvimento humano (medido através do IDH), exceto para a Síria, o estudo revela que estas emergências são simultaneamente desafios humanitários e de desenvolvimento. As repercussões são mais proeminentes no Sul Global, uma vez que é a origem e o destino de mais de 70% das pessoas deslocadas. As conclusões reiteram a urgência de intervenções integradas que unam iniciativas humanitárias e de desenvolvimento.

Palavras-chave: economia do desenvolvimento, fluxos de refugiados, deslocamento forçado

List of acronyms and abbreviations

Abbreviation / Acronym	Definition
AFG	Afghanistan
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
GCR	Global Compact for Refugees
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
MDG(s)	Millennium Development Goal(s)
MROC(s)	Main Refugee Outflow Country(ies)
RQ(s)	Research Question(s)
SSD	South Sudan
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SYR	Syria
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UKR	Ukraine
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VEN	Venezuela

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1. Introduction

Refugee situations have become a major issue of the 21st century (Betts et al., 2017), as seen in the record levels of forced displacement worldwide (Loescher, 2021). During the past decades, countless individuals have been forcibly displaced for the most varied of reasons, many of which were not foreseen when the refugee regime was first established (Armiero & Bettini, 2023; Lischer, 2017; Madakoro, 2023; McDowell, 2014). This dissertation aims to investigate the relationship between forced displacement, its root causes, and human development. In light of this, the primary research questions that this dissertation investigates are: (1) How has refugee outflow evolved internationally? Which regions or countries have contributed most to this situation? (2) Does displacement, and its root causes, pose obstacles to human development? We also explore the following pertinent questions: (3) What are the main contributing factors to refugee outflows? (4) What has been the role of the UNHCR in this process? (5) What characteristics do refugee-sending countries share?

Comprehending factors that induce refugee situations can help advise better policy responses and humanitarian efforts to mitigate the negative repercussions and bring stability and peace to the most affected areas. Moreover, refugee movements have relevant economic implications for the origin and host nations (Choudhary, 2020), especially concerning development. Current refugee outflows can destabilize regions, fuel conflicts, and further displacement (Loescher, 2021; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Weiner, 1996). This master's dissertation aims to contribute to the existing literature on refugee studies and development studies, specifically addressing refugee outflow causes through the development lens. The literature does acknowledge that development and migration, forced migration included, are connected but that policy responses remain separate (Choudhary, 2020; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Zetter, 2021). There is limited awareness of the development needs and impacts of refugees, where the literature emphasizes the effects of refugee outflows to host economies and markets, such as labor, food, and housing, or demands for public services, like health and education (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002), as well as the potential for positive contributions that individual refugees can provide for host economies (Betts et al., 2017). Like other migratory phenomena, refugee outflows cause brain drains in their homelands since it deprives them of labor and skills (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Yet, development initiatives that aim to resolve the root causes of refugee outflows are often undertaken separately from humanitarian projects that assist refugees during crises. Furthermore, by examining obstacles to human development

related to refugee outflows, this research agrees with and reinforces current multidimensional approaches to development (Morgan & Bach, 2018; Thorbecke, 2019) and global goals, such as the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), further elucidating how refugee situations can be addressed in several dimensions of the 2030 Agenda. This research can also highlight lesser-known factors contributing to refugee outflows, including environmental changes and socio-economic disparities, which might be underrepresented in current discussions and policies.

A qualitative case study was conducted on the main refugee outflow countries of 2023 to ascertain an overarching pattern regarding the relationship between forced displacement and development. This methodology enables the investigation of the complexity of forced displacement, including contextual observations and dynamic processes. Despite focusing on only five countries, the narrow geographical scope of this research can limit the generalizability of the findings. This dissertation is structured as follows: first, a comprehensive literature review, on both development economics and forced migration, is explored. Second, the methodology is described and appraised. Third, the results are presented and discussed. Fifth, concluding remarks and avenues for further research are considered.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Challenges to Development

Even though development theories were already present in the works of classical economists like Adam Smith¹ (1723-1790), Karl Marx² (1818-1883), and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) and sociologists like Max Weber³ (1864-1920) (Currie-Alder et al., 2014), many defend that the development doctrine⁴ and the modern development field, in general, originated in the aftermath of World War II, and from the need for economic policies and theories that would help rebuild the West (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Taylor & Lybbert, 2020; Thorbecke, 2019). The study of development was also propelled by United States hegemony and its interest in economic opportunities with developing states and the Cold War (Currie-Alder et al., 2014). The decolonization of Africa and Asia in the mid-1900s and the creation of new independent states also marked the growing interest among scholars and policymakers in grasping the

¹ *The Wealth of Nations* first published in 1776.

² *Das Kapital*, the first of three volumes was published in 1857, while the others were completed by Engels using Marx's notes after his death.

³ *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* first published in 1904.

⁴ Defined as "the accepted body of principles and knowledge within the development community at a given time" (Thorbecke, 2019).

development process to design better development strategies and policies (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Thorbecke, 2019). There was also the need for developed countries like France, the Netherlands, and Britain, to manage their relations with their former colonies (Currie-Alder et al., 2014). There has been a long-standing dedication towards development over the last decades, but one that has encompassed different notions, meanings, and scopes (Morgan & Bach, 2018). Many demonstrate an evolutionary trend regarding development policy strategies and theories since the 1950s, which has depended on the definition of the development process, influencing the development objectives, the state-of-the-art theoretical knowledge, and the available data systems (Thorbecke, 2019).

Going back to its early years, in the 1940s and 50s (Alacevich, 2018), development challenges were perceived as macroeconomic problems⁵ (Morgan & Bach, 2018). Throughout the 1950s, economic growth -in terms of Gross National Product (GNP)- emerged as the primary policy objective for less developed states, with the belief that it would eliminate dualism and associated income with social inequalities (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Thorbecke, 2019). The period's dominant view saw growth as equal to development, emphasizing the role of large-scale investment in growth, influenced by theories such as the 'big push', 'balanced growth', and 'take-off into sustained growth' (Taylor & Lybbert, 2020; Thorbecke, 2019). Development strategies focused on industrialization as the engine of growth, with import substitution policies to foster industrial growth. During the 1960s arose the idea of “planning development”, since “development did not just happen nor was it the result of simple recipes” (Morgan & Bach, 2018). Even though development had to be planned, it was still understood as a strategy for growth with standard stages (Morgan & Bach, 2018; Taylor & Lybbert, 2020). There was much dispute regarding how and why previous theoretical approaches – like balanced vs. unbalanced growth – had not provided satisfactory countermeasures for underdevelopment (Alacevich, 2018). The development doctrine shifted towards economic dualism as an analytic framework, realizing the complementarity between the industrial and agricultural sectors in the development process (Thorbecke, 2019). Agriculture started being seen as an active sector rather than a passive one, emphasizing inter-sectoral linkages. Other than GNP growth, other development objectives were balance-of-payments equilibrium and employment. Development policies grew to include structural measures targeting inter-sectoral balanced growth, recognizing the agricultural sector's role in development, as well as fiscal

⁵ Observable through growth rates, economies of scale, employment, the reconstruction of war economies, complementarities, and discontinuities (Alacevich, 2018; Morgan & Bach, 2018).

reforms, export promotion, and foreign aid. Still, the state's key role as the agent of development – with these macroeconomic policy instruments as means of development – was barely questioned (Currie-Alder et al., 2014).

In the 1970s, the failure of the GNP-oriented strategy to address development issues in the Global South led to the re-evaluation of development objectives (Alacevich, 2018; Thorbecke, 2019). It started being acknowledged that the core traits of poor countries were fundamentally different from those of developed countries before they developed (Taylor & Lybbert, 2020) and that it called for new solutions (Currie-Alder et al., 2014). The expansion of the conceptualization of development included human and social indicators (Morgan & Bach, 2018). There were acute challenges such as rising un- and underemployment, income inequality, persistent poverty, rural-urban migration, and worsening external positions (Thorbecke, 2019). This led to the re-focusing on poverty reduction (Currie-Alder et al., 2014). Analytically, integrated rural development strategies⁶ gained traction, and the informal sector's role in fostering growth and employment regained focus, as did the relationship between economic and demographic variables (Thorbecke, 2019). Socioeconomic objectives, including employment and income distribution, were incorporated into investment criteria and project selection. Neo-Marxist underdevelopment and dependency theories emerged, challenging the existing power structure (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Thorbecke, 2019). It was also during this period that different degrees of development⁷ came into focus in the development agenda. With improvements in data availability – where surveys provided valuable information on employment, income, consumption, and savings patterns – development strategies were diversified (Thorbecke, 2019). There was a visible shift towards employment-focused approaches, like 'redistribution with growth' and 'basic needs'⁸ (Thorbecke, 2019), and institutional theories like the new institutional economics (Taylor & Lybbert, 2020).

The 1980s saw a paradigm shift due to situations like the debt crisis in Latin America, which led to the emphasis on macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment under the leadership of the Bretton Woods Institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Morgan & Bach, 2018; Thorbecke, 2019). With a greater understanding of human capital, trade, and the role of institutions⁹, theories on development

⁶ Which aimed to modernize agriculture from the bottom up (Thorbecke, 2019).

⁷ More developed countries, less developed countries, least developed countries, etc.

⁸ Basic needs strategies aimed to address poverty through structural changes and redistribution, emphasizing essential services and land reform (Thorbecke, 2019).

⁹ Within the literature, institutions are defined as "the rules, norms, and conventions that must exist for social life to be possible, and which both constrain and provide incentives for human action" (Currie-Alder et al., 2014).

evolved (Thorbecke, 2019). New frameworks to measure poverty emerged, including Amartya Sen's capabilities approach, which argued that development should be thought of as the making of conditions that enable individuals to actualize their potential (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Taylor & Lybbert, 2020). The three main elements of his framework are 'functionings'¹⁰, 'capabilities'¹¹, and 'agency'¹² (Sen, 2003; Taylor & Lybbert, 2020). In this way, the development process can and should expand people's agency and capabilities so that they can do or be things they value (Sen, 2003). The expansion of statistical systems enabled robustness in income distribution, household welfare, and poverty data (Thorbecke, 2019). Within the field of development, structural adjustment policies were widespread, emphasizing market forces and reducing government intervention. Despite the pressure to rely on private capital flows and minimize government involvement, international aid remained crucial.

During the 1990s, there was a return towards poverty reduction, socioeconomic welfare, and good governance, especially after the Asian financial crisis and the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in Eastern Europe (Currie-Alder et al., 2014; Thorbecke, 2019). This shift was associated with the growing interest in identifying institutions conducive to economic growth, as well as relevant concepts like social capital and total factor productivity growth. The factoring of good governance in the development process is derived from the earlier debates about the role of institutions in development. Research like North (1990) – and later works including North et al. (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2005), and Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) – demonstrate that institutional quality affects development, emphasizing that inclusive institutions can help foster economic growth. The 1990s saw an expansion of statistical information¹³ which provided depth into poverty and welfare dynamics (Thorbecke, 2019). The Asian Financial Crisis led to the challenging of the Washington Consensus and the re-evaluation of unrestrained capital and trade liberalization. The formal recognition of sustainable development and the combination of social dimensions alongside economic growth in this period was paramount to the progression of development economics as we perceive it today (Thorbecke, 2019). During this period also arose the need to study how economic growth “translates – or fails to translate – into human development” (UNDP, 1990). Based on the capabilities approach, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created the Human Development Index (HDI) as an alternative measure of development by incorporating

¹⁰ Functionings are the actual things individuals can be and do.

¹¹ Capabilities are the possible things individuals can be and do.

¹² Agency is a person's freedom to choose what he can be or do.

¹³ Including household expenditure, demographic and health surveys, and panel data (Thorbecke, 2019).

human development dimensions¹⁴ as indicators (Currie-Alder et al., 2014). The index and the UNDP's Human Development Reports¹⁵ aimed to ensure that people were at the center of development policies (UNDP, 1990). Overall, the 1990s were marked by the transition in development objectives, rediscovering the human and social agenda (Morgan & Bach, 2018), as well as returning to poverty reduction (Thorbecke, 2019), alongside debates over the appropriate roles of the state and the market, the effectiveness of aid conditionality, and the lessons from successful development experiences such as the East Asian miracle.

The development objectives and agenda established in the 1990s persisted to the 2000s and the present, resuming a progressive track and creating global initiatives (Morgan & Bach, 2018). From the start of the New Millennium, the conceptualization of development embraced a more multi-dimensional and holistic approach, consequently recognizing its multidisciplinary nature (Thorbecke, 2019). Still, there was a visible shift towards more micro-oriented, experimental, and evidence-based research. By expanding on Sen's capabilities approach, not only was it acknowledged that growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development but also that human development (not limited to poverty reduction) should be the main development goal (Thorbecke, 2019). Human development is multi-dimensional, encompassing education, health and nutrition, information access, political regimes, and environmental sustainability. This is what led to the creation of the 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 by the UN, which "established measurable, universally agreed objectives for tackling extreme poverty and hunger, preventing deadly diseases, and expanding primary education for all children", among other objectives (UNDP, n.d.). The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by all UN members in 2015¹⁶, replaced the MDGs and served as a further commitment to the issues addressed in the MDGs and other pressing challenges, including climate change (UNDP, n.d.). The 2030 Agenda also incorporated inclusive growth strategies (in SDG 8) (United Nations, 2023), which aim to distribute the benefits of growth across society by addressing structural barriers, ensuring social inclusion, and investing in human capital (Thorbecke, 2019). Within the goal of reducing inequality within and among countries (SDG 10), when addressing safe and orderly migration (Target 7), there is only one indicator that references refugee situations – the proportion of refugees in each country of origin's population (Indicator 4), which was introduced in 2020 (Denaro &

¹⁴ These dimensions are health (measured as life expectancy at birth), education (measured as mean years of schooling for adults and expected years of schooling for children), and income/standard of living (measured as Gross National Income [GNI] per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity)(Taylor & Lybbert, 2020).

¹⁵ First created in 1990, the Human Development Report ranks countries around the world by their HDI score.

¹⁶ As a part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Giuffre, 2022; United Nations, 2023). Despite the “Leave No One Behind” underlying objective – which prioritizes vulnerable groups including refugees, internally displaced, and other types of migrants – the 2030 Agenda has neglected displaced persons through the lack of acknowledgment in official SDG progress reports as well as national medium- and long-term development plans (Denaro & Giuffre, 2022). Nonetheless, the interconnection of all the goals, as well as their applicability to refugee situations, further demonstrates how, firstly, development is complex and entails multiple variables. Secondly, even though most progress needs to be seen in the Global South, collaboration and cooperation within the international community is paramount to the success of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

2.2. Forced Displacement and Refugees

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - or the UN Refugee Agency - was established by the UN General Assembly after World War II (UNHCR, n.d.-a). Like its predecessors – the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Refugee Organization – the Agency was supposed to have a temporary mandate in resettling and aiding those displaced by the war (FitzGerald, 2023). It was tasked with supervising international conventions that protect refugees (United Nations, 1967) and safeguarding refugee rights (United Nations, 1950). Two non-European refugee groups recognized by the global refugee regime still in the post-war period were Palestinians and Koreans (FitzGerald, 2023). At the time, separate UN bodies were created to address these refugee emergencies, namely the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. However, this led to the exclusion of these refugee groups under the UNHCR Mandate (FitzGerald, 2023). According to its Statute, the High Commissioner can adopt several measures including, promoting voluntary repatriation and refugee admission, facilitating organizations’ efforts towards refugee welfare, and supporting measures that improve refugee situations through government agreements (United Nations, 1950). It is acknowledged that to address refugee situations, measures necessitate cooperation between states and the UNHCR (United Nations, 1967).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, agrees to a set of fundamental human rights that should be universally safeguarded. While not specifically tailored for refugees, it encompasses various relevant rights, including the right to life, liberty, and security (Article 3); the right to be free from

inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 5); the right to equal protection before the law without discrimination (Article 7); the right to freedom of movement and residence (Article 13); the right to seek asylum (Article 14); the right to a nationality (Article 15); among others (United Nations General Assembly, 1948). The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, based on the essence of the UDHR, but especially on Article 14, aimed to address the 1,25 million refugees which resulted from World War II in Europe, particularly victims of the Nazi and fascist regimes (Kneebone, 2009). The 1951 Convention and, consequently, the UNHCR follow fundamental principles – non-discrimination, non-penalization, and non-refoulement¹⁷ – that guide refugee protection (Bhattacharya, 2020; United Nations, 1967). The objective of the 1967 Protocol was to eliminate the temporal and geographical constraints of the 1951 Convention¹⁸ and to urge states to adhere to its principles (United Nations, 1967). The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants is another milestone in the global endeavor to address large refugee and migrant movements (United Nations, 2018). Not only does it reiterate the significance of responsibility-sharing and comprehensive international cooperation, but it also contributed to the creation of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) (United Nations, 2018).

According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is an individual who, for justified fears of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, affiliation to a social group, or political opinion, is not able or willing to return to their homeland (United Nations, 1967). Regional organizations, including the Organization for African Unity, in 1969, broadened this definition to include those fleeing from war or events seriously disturbing public order (Lischer, 2007; Loescher, 2021), like the case of Central and South America with the 1984 Cartagena Declaration (Loescher, 2021). Authors such as Madakoro (2023) highlight how the legal definitions of refugees only capture a fraction of the diverse dimensions of displacement, even before the 1951 Convention. Others emphasize how the term refugee has expanded beyond the Convention definition, covering individuals in need of assistance and protection, including those fleeing from violence, conflicts, and public disturbances (Loescher, 2021), those who face environmental stress (Loescher, 2021; Zetter & Morrissey, 2014), and those displaced by development initiatives (McDowell, 2014). Even though the forcibly displaced share a common experience and sense of insecurity, fear, and coercion (Madakoro, 2023);

¹⁷ This principle protects refugees from being returned to a country where their life or freedom will be threatened, it is currently considered a part of customary international law (Bhattacharya, 2020; United Nations, 1967).

¹⁸ “Events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951” (United Nations, 1967).

displacement has many facets and encompasses different groups of individuals, many of which do not benefit from refugee status and, consequently, do not possess the political legitimacy that enables their international protection (Lischer, 2007). Some of these include would-be refugees (such as asylum-seekers, those who have not received refugee status, and those who had their status revoked), internally displaced persons¹⁹ (IDPs), and stateless people²⁰.

The experience of being a refugee is complex and entwined with shifting political, economic, and social factors (Adhikari, 2013; Madakoro, 2023). The refugee regime was first created to address mass displacement from interstate conflict; however, most refugee situations today are induced by civil conflict (Lischer, 2007). Loescher (2021) indicates that internal conflicts, ethnic cleansing, genocides and politicides, religious, cultural, and ethnic intolerance, severe socio-economic inequalities, conflict-induced famine, mass starvation, and climate change trigger most mass displacements today. Academics acknowledge that the causes of displacement are expanding (Bhattacharya, 2020) and that there is increasing concern about contributing factors such as climate change and the higher frequency of natural disasters (Armiero & Bettini, 2023; Zetter & Morrissey, 2014), state fragility and water insecurity (Betts et al., 2017), and increasing tensions and conflicts over resources (Loescher, 2021). Still, researchers like Armiero & Bettini (2023) and Zetter & Morrissey (2014) reiterate the importance of considering the environment within the context of social, economic, and political factors that induce or constrain people's decisions to migrate. Refugee crises frequently occur in unstable and conflict-prone regional clusters²¹, which engenders further violence, displacement, and cross-border conflict spillover (Lischer, 2014, 2017; Weiner, 1996). It is widely defended that most current mass forced displacements are related to the increase of 'complex emergencies' that combine multiple of the factors already mentioned and are marked by medical shortages, and food insecurity (Loescher, 2021). Still, many defend that political violence²², especially genocide, politicide, civil war, and ethnic conflict cause most large-scale forced displacement, both across international borders and within the country²³ (Fearon & Shaver, 2021; Lischer, 2007, 2014, 2017; Weiner, 1996).

Adapting to the evolving dynamics of conflict and the escalating challenges posed by environmental and demographic factors, the UNHCR has expanded its operational and

¹⁹ IDPs are not a new phenomenon but only started being recognized as an internationally significant issue by the UN in 1993 (Madakoro, 2023).

²⁰ Those who do possess a nationality of any country.

²¹ Referred to as "bad neighborhoods" by Weiner (1996).

²² That arise from conflict, political instability, or economic crises (Lischer, 2017).

²³ In the form of IDPs.

protective efforts – even though victims of natural disasters, failed states, or endangered migrants are not recognized as Convention refugees (Loescher, 2021). The UNHCR provides humanitarian assistance –food, water, shelter, and medical care– and cooperates with states to expand and monitor asylum and refugee policies and laws (UNHCR, n.d.-a). Over the years, its scope began to comprise the support for refugees’ return home (among other long-term solutions), IDPs, and stateless persons (Loescher, 2021; UNHCR, n.d.-a). The UNHCR is also the primary source of refugee information, providing a statistical database, reports, and other relevant information (Bhattacharya, 2020).

Most refugee populations originate from the developing world and are primarily hosted by neighboring low- and middle-income countries (Betts et al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2020; Choudhary, 2020; UNHCR, 2023, 2024a). Consequently, refugees are frequently hosted by communities that also struggle with development challenges, including food insecurity, political instability, and limited access to basic goods and services. Furthermore, most refugees today find themselves in protracted refugee situations²⁴, where the average length of exile is over twenty-five years (Betts et al., 2017; Choudhary, 2020; UNHCR, 2024a). Even though refugees and forced displacement are still seen as humanitarian challenges (Betts et al., 2017), they also affect development. Like other forms of migration, forced displacement deeply impacts both countries of origin and host or asylum countries (Betts et al., 2017; Lischer, 2017; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). This leads to much debate concerning refugee policies and the implementation of durable solutions.

3. Methodology

Qualitative research is the data collection and analysis approach that relies largely on language- and arts-based (e.g. words and images) as primary data sources (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2018; Denzin & Lincoln, 2017; Tutelman & Webster, 2020). This research methodology produces descriptive data, including individuals’ statements and observable behavior (van Bavel & Dessart, 2018). Still, it is not limited to these empirical materials, ranging from interviews and life stories to case studies to artifacts and visual texts (Denzin & Lincoln, 2017; Johnson et al., 2020; Tutelman & Webster, 2020). Furthermore, qualitative researchers can employ methods more typically associated with quantitative methods, like numbers, graphs, statistics, and tables (Denzin & Lincoln, 2017). These data types are analyzed to deepen the

²⁴ More than 25.000 refugees from the same country of origin that have been living in exile for over five consecutive years.

understanding of the research topic, based on specific experiences, observations, events, or perspectives (Johnson et al., 2020). Most frequently, this methodological approach is inductive, meaning that it builds knowledge “from the ground up”, seeking patterns from observations (Nevedal et al., 2021), without imposing pre-defined structures or expectations on the insights (van Bavel & Dessart, 2018).

Many criticize qualitative methods as subjective, unsystematic, descriptive, and not very scientific (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2018; Denzin & Lincoln, 2017), as well as resource-intensive and time-consuming (or requiring a longer timeframe) (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2018; Nevedal et al., 2021). That is not to say that qualitative methods are not relevant. In fact, they generate complexity, richness, and depth in the investigation of social issues (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2018). Researchers also raise the issue of sample size, and, thus, generalizability. Because qualitative analyses are time-consuming and data-rich, usually sample sizes are smaller, especially compared to quantitative methods (Nevedal et al., 2021). Even though small sample sizes do not imply a small data quantity (Nevedal et al., 2021), it is frequently argued that findings based on these samples are not representative of the general population being investigated (Tutelman & Webster, 2020; van Bavel & Dessart, 2018). This is why qualitative researchers often rely on “transferability rather than generalizability” to demonstrate how their findings have broader applications (Tutelman & Webster, 2020). Still, some argue that small sample size is not a limitation but a trait of this type of methodology, as the data provides a deep and rich investigation of phenomena (Tutelman & Webster, 2020). These analyses explore human behavior holistically, without reducing it to limited variables (Nevedal et al., 2021; van Bavel & Dessart, 2018). Furthermore, they recognize that humans are social creatures, that social phenomena are complex and, consequently, that behavior and other variables cannot be isolated from their social context (Nevedal et al., 2021; van Bavel & Dessart, 2018). Qualitative research is significant since it brings diverse perspectives and information, contrasting quantitative methods (Nevedal et al., 2021). It can provide insights into diverse research areas (Au-Yong-Oliveira et al., 2018; Bukve, 2019; Johnson et al., 2020; Knottnerus et al., 2020; Lanka et al., 2021; Madondo & Phiri, 2018; Nevedal et al., 2021; Tutelman & Webster, 2020), and into specific contexts as well as distinctions between them (van Bavel & Dessart, 2018). Furthermore, with the fulfillment of standards of rigor – such as peer review, triangulation, negative case analysis, and computer software – researchers can ensure the integrity, reliability, and replicability of their data analysis (Johnson et al., 2020).

This master's dissertation is based on the case study methodology focusing on the main refugee outflow countries²⁵ and uses a qualitative approach. In case studies, researchers analyze a focused social phenomenon²⁶ in the entirety of its context in a structured way (Bukve, 2019). Many data types can be used, including numbers and statistics (Bukve, 2019). For this study, forced displacement and HDI data were sourced from the UNHCR Refugee Data Finder and UNDP Human Development Report Data Center, respectively. Qualitative data on causal factors of refugee emergencies were retrieved from online media sources. Some quantitative elements, such as correlation coefficients, were included to more accurately investigate the nature of the relationship between human development and refugee flows.

4. Results and Discussion

The following section presents the results and discussion of this dissertation, which aims to investigate the relationship between the root causes of refugee flows and development. The central research questions were: (1) How has refugee outflow evolved internationally? Which regions or countries have contributed most to this situation? (2) Does displacement, and its root causes, pose obstacles to human development? Other relevant questions addressed in this study are: (3) What are the main contributing factors to refugee outflows? (4) What has been the role of the UNHCR in this process? (5) What characteristics do refugee-sending countries share?

4.1. Historical Trends in Displacement

Before analyzing recent country-specific displacement trends, we examined UNHCR data on the historical outflow of forcibly displaced persons, to identify the most relevant analysis period and answer the first part of RQ (1) and RQ (4). Figure 1 shows that, since the establishment of the UNHCR, and its data collection on refugees, there has been a considerable, almost exponential, increase in displaced persons. The uptrend intensified in the 2000s, but especially in 2006. By the end of 2023, there were a total of 117,3 million forcibly displaced persons, of which 31,6 million were refugees under UNHCR's mandate, 6 were Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate, 68,3 were IDPs, 6,9 were asylum-seekers and 5,8 of others in need of international protection (UNHCR, 2024a). It is amply recognized that the UNHCR and its volunteers provide much more than aid for crises, making large contributions to verify causes and present solutions for displacement (Choudhary, 2020). Apart from the Palestinian


²⁵ As identified in UNHCR (2024a), these countries being Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Venezuela.

²⁶ Identified as one or a few research units or cases.

refugees under UNRWA’s protection, the UNHCR provides assistance – be it humanitarian, legal, or bureaucratic– to over 110 million displaced persons (UNHCR, 2024a).

Figure 1

Historical Evolution of Displaced Persons of Concern to the UNHCR



Note. Data from UNHCR (2024b). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 1951-2023. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=T1aA6J>.


The UNHCR also prioritizes durable solutions²⁷, as a part of its mandate, the GCR and the UN Secretary-General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement. Some of the possible durable solutions include voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement to a third country (UNHCR, 2024a). UNHCR also improves refugee independence and self-reliance through education, skill development, and legal assistance (Choudhary, 2020). As of the end of 2023, the UNHCR has promoted the return of 6,1 million displaced persons (mostly IDPs and refugees), the resettlement of 158.700 refugees, and the confirmation and gain of citizenship for 32.200 stateless people (UNHCR, 2024a). However, these remain a possibility for a few displaced persons. Furthermore, UNHCR estimates a continuous increase in forced displacement in 2024, by the end of April 2024 it is likely to be over 120 million forcibly displaced (UNHCR, 2024a).

²⁷ These solutions seek to ensure the national protection of displaced persons’ civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (UNHCR, 2024a).

From Figure 2 we observe an increase in all groups of displaced persons worldwide, especially of IDPs. Notably, the sharp increase from 2005 onwards is likely due to the larger number of internally displaced. The data indicates that, currently, the largest displaced population group is IDPs – with over 60 million people – followed by Mandate Refugees – with more than 30 million people. Other than being the largest in number, IDPs are considered more vulnerable than refugees, since they are still under the protection of their homeland and are unable to benefit from international legal protection (Lischer, 2007). Many displaced population types, other than refugees, are not a new phenomenon but were only recognized by the international community recently (Madakoro, 2023). In addition, for many of these population types, data became available much later than for refugees²⁸ (UNHCR, n.d.-b). It must also be considered that despite the UNHCR’s best efforts to account for all displaced persons, the data may underestimate the real numbers of displaced populations due to lack of access to remote areas and conflict zones (especially in the case of IDPs), political and administrative obstacles, such as the underreport by governments, and because not all displaced are documented and officially registered with the UNHCR. This analysis will underscore more often Mandate Refugees, despite being the second largest group of displaced, due to the availability of historical data and greater accuracy to a certain extent on this population’s data.

Figure 2

Total Displaced Persons of Concern to the UNHCR by category



²⁸ Data was first available for IDPs in 1993, for asylum-seekers in 2000, for stateless people in 2004, and other people in need of international protection in 2018.

Note. Data from UNHCR (2024b). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 1951-2023. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=T1aA6J>.


4.2. Main Refugee Emergency Trends

In this subsection, we answer the second part of RQ (1) by analyzing UNHCR displacement data on Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela, determining any overarching trends. Figure 3 presents the distribution of displaced persons for the five main outflow countries. Notably, Afghan displaced persons are considerable and consistent from 2000 to 2023. Due to the length of the crisis, Afghanistan has a 3,839% compound annual growth rate²⁹ in displacement in this period, the lowest growth rate of the group. There have been displaced South Sudanese since it seceded from Sudan, increasing from 2013 on due to the civil conflict, where the displacement growth rate (2011-2023) has been 18,232%. Syrian displaced persons increased significantly after 2012 and remained consistently large after 2014, displaying a 41,702% growth rate of displacement from 2000 to 2023. Displaced Ukrainians surpassed 1 million in 2014 but only increased drastically in 2022, with the start of the war with Russia, reaching over 10 million in 2023, illustrating a 31,096% growth rate. A substantial increase in displaced Venezuelans started in 2018 and surpassed 10 million in 2023. From 2000 to 2024, Venezuela experienced a 52,547% growth rate, the highest of the main outflow countries. Forcibly displaced from these five countries have not been less than 10 million since 2012, and are, as of 2023, around 65,6 million. Several other refugee emergencies have significantly contributed to displacement in 2023 and previous years. Notably, considerable outflow from Sudan, due to the outbreak of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces; Palestine, due to conflict and the deterioration of living conditions in the Gaza Strip; Myanmar, due to a military takeover in 2021 and escalating violence; Democratic Republic of Congo, due to the increasing hostilities in the eastern part of the country; and Somalia, due to extreme weather events and food insecurity (UNHCR, 2024a).

²⁹ Growth rates were calculated utilizing the compound annual growth rate formula ($CAGR = \left(\frac{V_{final}}{V_{begin}}\right)^{1/t} - 1$) so that results are easily comparable, accounts for compounding effects of the period and smoothens yearly variations. Henceforward, further references to growth rates imply a compound annual growth rate.

Figure 3

Displaced Persons of Concern to the UNHCR: Main Countries of Origin




Note. Data from UNHCR (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 1990-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Figure 4 illustrates the proportion of forcibly displaced persons from the five main outflow countries. Until 2010, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela represented a minimal percentage of total displaced worldwide. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was the origin of a large proportion of total refugees since the beginning of the New Millennium, representing up to 25,8% of total forcibly displaced in 2001. South Sudan stood out only after 2013, reaching a high point of 6% in 2017. With the civil conflict in Syria, the country surpassed Afghanistan from 2013 on, representing up to 21,2% of the total displaced in 2023. Ukraine represented between 2,0 and 3,1% of the total displaced from 2014 to 2021, increasing to over 8% in 2022 and 2023 due to the war with Russia. In 2012, Venezuela represented 7,8% of the total displaced, and increased significantly in the following years, reaching 21,2% in 2023. The five main refugee outflow countries corresponded to the origin of over 30% forcibly displaced since 2013, representing 43,5% in 2023, and up to 47,2% in 2022.

Figure 4

Proportion of Forcibly Displaced Worldwide by Country




Note. Values were calculated using data from UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 2000-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Figure 5 presents the distribution of UNHCR Mandate Refugees for the five main outflow countries. Of the main refugee outflow countries, only Afghanistan is visible in the global distribution of refugees until 2011. Afghan refugees range from 2 to 3 million from 2000 to 2021, and over 6,4 million in 2023, displaying a 2,551% growth rate, the lowest of the group. South Sudanese refugees surpassed 1 million, in 2016, and reached up to 2,4 million in 2017, remaining over 2 million until 2023. From 2012 to 2023, South Sudan had a 34,635% growth rate in refugees. With the start of the Syrian emergency, refugees went from 729.011 in 2012 to 2,5 million in 2013. Syria reached its high point of 6,8 million refugees in 2021 and stood at 6,4 million in 2023. Syria experienced a 35,501% growth rate in refugees from 2000 to 2023. Between 2000 and 2021, Ukrainian refugees ranged from a couple of thousand (e.g. 5.154 in 2015) to over 320 thousand. In 2022, they drastically increased to 5,7 million and were almost 6 million in 2023. Throughout this period Ukraine displayed a 28,304% growth rate in refugees. Venezuelan refugees throughout the period remained mostly in the thousands, only reaching 347.695 refugees in 2023. Despite the smaller number of Mandate Refugees, compared to the other outflow countries, Venezuela experienced a 33,286% compound annual growth rate for refugees, 15,467% for others in need of international protection (2018-2023), and 46,056% for

others of concern to the UNHCR (2017-2023). UNHCR (2024a) reports a total of 6,1 million Venezuelan refugees. The drastic difference in values is likely due to the UNHCR’s aggregation of refugees, refugee-like situations, and others in need of international protection into a single category. Starting in 2017, over 11,5 million refugees came from Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela. As of 2023, 21,4 million refugees come from those same countries. According to UNHCR (2024a), nearly three in four refugees came from the five countries here analyzed, and 87% of refugees came from only ten countries, data that has remained consistent from previous years.

Figure 5

UNHCR Mandate Refugees: Main Countries of Origin




Note. Data from UNHCR (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 1990-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Figure 6 depicts the proportion of refugees from the five main outflow countries. Except for Afghanistan, all other countries represented a negligible proportion of refugees until 2011. From 2000 to 2013, Afghanistan was the largest refugee outflow origin of the group, representing up to 31,4% of refugees worldwide in 2001. From 2014 on, refugees from Afghanistan remained considerable, never representing less than 12%. In 2023, the country resumed as the first refugee outflow origin with 20,24%, passing Syria and Ukraine. According to UNHCR (2024a), Afghans were one in six of all UNHCR Mandate Refugees. In 2014, South

Sudan represented 4,3% of total refugees, increasing to 12,2% in 2017. Additionally, the data indicates that the majority of forcibly displaced from South Sudan were IDPs: virtually 100% in 2011, 69,6% in 2015, and 34,8% in 2023. As the proportion of IDPs decreased, that of refugees increased from 19,3% in 2012 to 64,5% in 2023. Syrian refugees jumped from 6,9% of refugees worldwide in 2012, to 21,1% in 2013, and were the largest refugee outflow origin from 2015 to 2021, representing over 30%. In 2022 and 2023, they represented roughly 20% of refugees worldwide. Before 2022, Ukrainian refugees were at most 1,99% of total refugees in 2015, meaning that most forcibly displaced until the start of the conflict with Russia did not fit into the ‘refugee’ category and definition. In 2022 and 2023, Ukrainian refugees were 19,3% and 18,8% of refugees worldwide, respectively. Interestingly, Venezuela nearly disappears as a proportion of Mandate Refugees. That may be because the Venezuelan emergency is distinct from the other four since most individuals are not displaced due to political, ethnic, and religious persecution or conflict, and, hence, do not align with the 1951 Convention or UNHCR Mandate definition. That becomes clear when observing the Venezuela data for 2023, where Mandate Refugees represent 2,95% of all forcibly displaced, compared to 52,37% who are other people in need of international protection and 33,01% who are others of concern. The five main refugee outflow countries corresponded to over 20% Mandate Refugees since 2000, representing 67,5% refugees in 2023, and up to 69,4% in 2022.

Figure 6

Proportion of Refugees Worldwide by Country



Note. Values were calculated using data from UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 2000-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.


4.3. Root Causes of Displacement

In examining the contributing factors and events reported by online media sources, we sought to address RQ (3) and (5). Figure 7 illustrates timelines for the main refugee outflow emergencies highlighting significant events for each crisis, later summarized in Table 1. Afghanistan's refugee outflow started long before the New Millennium, often associated with the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). Later developments, including civil conflicts, the American occupation, later withdrawal, and the return of the Taliban, have contributed to continuous displacement for over thirty years. The country also faces environmental risks associated with climate change, including flash floods and severe droughts that deteriorate the situation further. Afghanistan is also the only main outflow country to show that gender-based violence at the political level influences displacement – through the Taliban's clear restrictions on women's freedom and rights, forced marriages, and targeted attacks. South Sudan and its people have had a history of political violence, especially before gaining its independence from Sudan, where the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars sought the separation of the South. Not soon after independence, due to strife within the governing faction, a new civil conflict arose that still impacts displacement today. Unstable food supplies and famine – due to extensive conflict and severe drought – worsen the emergency. Syria's over thirteen-year emergency was kindled by the violent repression of pro-democracy protests, which escalated quickly into a civil conflict with foreign intervention. Other factors that have exacerbated the crisis include the economic crisis and climate change – severe chronic droughts and the recent earthquake. Despite Ukraine's refugee emergency having started more recently, with the conflict with Russia, several instances of internal tension – including pro-Russian and separatist movements – as well as territorial and resource disputes with Russia (e.g. the annexation of Crimea) have set the scene for the current situation. The Venezuelan crisis distinguishes itself from others primarily because it is the only one that does not have a larger-scale conflict. Its national income dependence on oil, tied to adverse economic conditions and a politically repressive government, has degraded living conditions and has forced people to flee. Furthermore, foreign intervention, such as the United States' several sanctions, as well as chronic water stress have deteriorated living conditions further.

Figure 7

Causal Factor Comparative Timeline: Main Refugee Emergencies

Causal Factors in the Main Refugee Emergencies: Comparative Timelines



Note. Author's own elaboration (drawing, etc.) based on information compiled from several sources, highlighting for each timeline, respectively: Concern Worldwide US. (2024, January

16). The crisis in Afghanistan, explained: Five things to know in 2024. Concern Worldwide US. <https://concernusa.org/news/afghanistan-crisis-explained/>. Concern Worldwide US. (2024, February 6). The South Sudan crisis, explained. Concern Worldwide US. <https://concernusa.org/news/south-sudan-crisis-explained/>. BBC News. (2023, May 2). Why has the Syrian war lasted 12 years? BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229>. Reuters. (2022, March 1). Timeline: The events leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/>. Kiger, P. J. (2023, August 24). How Venezuela Fell From the Richest Country in South America into Crisis. History. <https://www.history.com/news/venezuela-chavez-maduro-crisis>.

Political violence, in any form, is a relevant push factor in displacement, being present in all main outflow countries, which supports several studies (Fearon & Shaver, 2021; Lischer, 2007, 2014, 2017; Weiner, 1996). Civil conflicts, specifically, only apply to four of the main refugee outflow countries but still support studies that defend that internal conflicts are the most common cause of refugee situations today (Adhikari, 2013; Lischer, 2007, 2014; Loescher, 2021). Furthermore, environmental factors and climate change negatively impact and exacerbate displacement in almost all main refugee outflow countries. According to the Institute for Economics & Peace (2023), Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela face at least one severe ecological threat and have low levels of resilience. This coheres with several studies that stress the effects of climate change on displacement (Armiero & Bettini, 2023; Betts et al., 2017; Zetter & Morrissey, 2014), and reiterates the need for holistic approaches to solving refugee emergencies (Lischer, 2014; UNHCR, 2024a). Furthermore, the results in Figure 7 and Table 1 exemplify Loescher’s (2021) ‘complex emergencies’, where current forms of mass displacement are caused by a combination of factors, including internal conflict, economic collapse, political instability, medical and food shortages, etc. Even though overarching causes of displacement tend to be similar, how these causes and their effects manifest is conditional on local economic, political, cultural, and sociological characteristics (Choudhary, 2020), explaining the varying trends from country to country.

Table 1
Causal Factors in the Main Refugee Emergencies

	Afghanistan	South Sudan	Syria	Ukraine	Venezuela
Political repression	x	x	x	x	x

Political Violence	Genocide, politicide			x		
	Civil conflict	x	x	x	x	
	Ethnic conflict		x	x		
	Inter-state conflict ³⁰	x		x	x	
Other forms of Violence	religious, cultural, ethnic intolerance	x	x	x		
	Gender-based violence	x				
	Tension over resources ³¹		x		x	
Political Instability, State Fragility		x	x	x	x	x
Environmental stress ³²		x	x	x		x
Socio-economic stress or inequality		x	x	x	x	x
Food, Nutrition, Health ³³		x	x	x	x	x

Note. Summarizes the contributing factors in Figure 7.

4.4. Displacement and Human Development

Examining the UNDP's complete HDI time series on the five main outflow countries and investigating the correlation between the HDI and refugee outflows, we seek to answer RQ (2). Figure 8 depicts the evolution of the main refugee outflow countries' HDI values from 2000 to 2022³⁴, along with the world and main refugee-origin countries average. Afghanistan exhibits a slight positive trend until 2019 (reaching a high point of 0,492), which challenges the premise that higher refugee flows are associated with lower development. This was followed by a decrease to 0,462 in 2022, somewhat corresponding to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and the later withdrawal of American troops and the Taliban takeover. South Sudan's HDI trend demonstrates a decrease, which somewhat corresponds to the start of the civil conflict in 2013 and remains constant throughout the remainder of the period. In contrast, Syria's HDI trend shows a sharp and continuous decrease after 2011 (reaching a high point of 0,687) until 2022, corresponding to the start of the civil conflict. Ukraine's HDI trend was mostly positive

³⁰ Including proxy wars, anti-colonial wars and foreign intervention.

³¹ Including the illicit mining and trading of resources and minerals used to finance conflict (also referred to as "conflict minerals")

³² Including climate change and the higher frequency of natural disasters.


³³ Including conflict-induced famine (and the disruption of food systems), food insecurity and malnutrition, mass starvation, and medical shortages.

³⁴ Data for 2023 is not yet available.

until 2019, decreasing slightly after that. Like Syria, Venezuela’s HDI trend demonstrates a sharper decline after 2013 (reaching a high point of 0,771), which corresponds to the economic collapse triggered by the fall in oil prices and the political repression used by Maduro to consolidate his power. As of 2022, all five countries have HDI scores lower than the world average (0,739), where Ukraine scores the highest (0,734). Furthermore, the difference between the main refugee outflow countries’ average and the world average has been around 0,2 points.

Figure 8

Human Development Index: Main Refugee Outflow Countries



Note. Data from UNDP (2024). HDR23-24 Composite Indices and Complete Time Series (1990-2022) [Dataset]. In United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Reports. <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads>.

Since developing countries are the main source of refugee-like populations, due to a higher propensity for conflict, political instability, human rights violations, economic hardship, vulnerability to climate change, and poor governance, it stands to reason that there may be a clear correlation between forced displacement and human development. Since all the common characteristics that engender displacement can negatively impact development, and all main refugee outflow countries have HDI scores lower than the world average, it can be hypothesized that there is a strong negative correlation between displacement and the human

development index of the origin country. Except for South Sudan³⁵, all countries had HDI values since 1990. Regarding displacement and refugee outflow, Afghanistan and Syria had values since 1990, Ukraine and Venezuela since 1992, and South Sudan since 2011. Hence, correlations were calculated for the available corresponding data for both variables. However, that is not the case (*vide* Table 2), the only country to display a moderate negative correlation ($-0,7 < r < -0,5$) for both overall forced displacement and refugee outflow was Syria. Regarding the displacement-HDI correlation, Afghanistan and Ukraine display a positive but almost insignificant correlation ($r < 0,3$). Meanwhile, South Sudan and Venezuela have a negative but almost insignificant correlation ($-0,3 < r < 0$). Regarding the refugee-HDI correlation, Afghanistan has a weak negative correlation ($-0,5 < r < -0,3$), Ukraine has a positive but insignificant correlation, and South Sudan and Venezuela have a negative but almost insignificant correlation. The analysis reveals no specific trend regarding forced displacement and human development that can be generalized to multiple countries. Only for Syria was a clearer relationship apparent. The general weak correlation between displacement and human development can reflect the complexity of these phenomena, where multiple other factors are at play and have a greater impact.

Table 2

Correlation Coefficients: Forced Displacement and Human Development

	AFG	SSD	SYR	UKR	VEN
Displacement & HDI	0,272	-0,217	-0,564	0,178	-0,234
Refugee outflow & HDI	-0,402	-0,166	-0,586	0,011	-0,229

Note. Calculated using HDI dataset: UNDP. (2024). HDR23-24 Composite Indices and Complete Time Series (1990-2022) [Dataset]. In United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Reports. <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads>. And Displacement dataset: UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 1990-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.


³⁵ HDI values for South Sudan available from 2010.

4.5. Regional Dynamics and Policy Considerations

Considering the main outflow countries here analyzed, the relevant regions are Southern Asia, East Africa, the Middle East (West Asia), Eastern Europe, and South America. Observing the totality of displacement trends in Figure 9, the regions that stand out are Central and East Africa, West, and Southern Asia especially due to the combination of mass displaced populations, conflict zones, and climate hazard risk (UNHCR, 2024a). Apart from originating from the developing world, refugee populations tend to remain near their homeland (Betts et al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2020; Choudhary, 2020). 75% of refugee populations worldwide are hosted in low- and middle-income countries, and 69% are hosted in neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2024a). Countries suffering from refugee emergencies also frequently host neighboring displaced persons, such as Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bhattacharya, 2020; UNHCR, 2024a). Weiner (1996) highlights the existence of geographic clusters or regions responsible for considerable refugee outflows due to conflict and violence, which coincides with the data and analysis presented in this paper. Furthermore, roughly 66% of displaced persons (estimated 24.9 million refugees and others needing international protection) in 2023 were in protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2024a). Increasing refugee outflows may also be due to ‘neighborhood effects’, in which conflict spillover may frequently occur where ethnic groups are divided by international borders (Weiner, 1996).

Figure 9

Global Distribution of Climate Hazards, Conflict and Displacement



Note. From UNHCR (2024a). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023.

Like other forms of migration, forced displacement has negative consequences for countries of origin including the loss of skills, labor, and capital (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Even though migration enables remittances for those refugees who find employment, the benefits vary according to the circumstances. Remittances can benefit families and communities during crises and support post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, these usually have limited reach, and can, even if unintentionally, perpetuate crises by providing funds for armed conflicts (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Refugee outflow countries are often characterized by severe conflicts, natural or human-induced disasters and crises, acute shortages, and lack of resources (Choudhary, 2020), which negatively impacts the countries' security and stability, health, employment opportunities, livelihoods, leads to the destruction of infrastructures (such as hospitals, homes, and schools), environmental degradation and lower agricultural production, food insecurity, and malnutrition. Consequently, these countries struggle to provide an adequate and conducive environment for growth and development, where these communities cannot thrive because they must instead take care of issues that severely degrade their living conditions. Thus, these traits pose considerable barriers to human development and often hamper long-term goals of productivity and innovation.

Host countries frequently convey worry regarding the “destabilizing effects of sizeable refugee populations” (Lischer, 2017). Not only are political leaders concerned about negative public opinion associated with large refugee inflows, but also how refugee emergencies can aggravate existing tensions within the host country. Furthermore, the host states bearing the heaviest burden of refugee populations often lack assistance from wealthier states and struggle to address the needs of their citizens and displaced people (Lischer, 2017). The unequal distribution of hosting refugees is further attested in recent UNHCR reports. Firstly, the countries hosting the largest refugee and refugee-like populations are Iran (3,8 million), followed by Türkiye (3,3 million), Colombia (2,9 million), Germany (2,6 million), and Pakistan (2 million) (UNHCR, 2024a). Nearly all those hosted in Iran and Pakistan are Afghans, while almost all refugees in Türkiye are Syrians. During the last decade, refugees have mostly increased in number in these main host countries. Secondly, the UNHCR adjusted the Gini Coefficient³⁶ to assess responsibility- and burden-sharing among refugee-hosting

³⁶ A statistical index (values range between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 complete inequality) frequently used to measure inequality, especially income or wealth inequality between countries. In this case, determines inequality among host countries relative to their population size, wealth of resident population, and HDI.

countries. UNHCR (2024a) found a significant imbalance in the distribution of refugees, where a handful of poor countries bear much of the responsibility of hosting refugees. In fact, 80% of the world's refugees were hosted by countries that jointly produce less than 20% of the world's income (UNHCR, 2024a). Even though mass arrivals of displaced persons can have short-term detrimental effects on asylum countries, such as straining public services, creating labor market pressures, and infrastructure overload, it can have positive long-term effects, associated with human, social, and economic capital (Betts et al., 2017; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002).

Current global approaches to refugee policies rely, mostly, on the 2016 New York Declaration, the CRRF, and the GCR, in which the main goals are to alleviate pressures on host countries, improve refugee self-reliance, broaden access to third-country solutions, and improve origin countries' condition to provide a safe and dignified return (Denaro & Giuffre, 2022; United Nations, 2018). In parallel, several of the SDGs and their respective targets, despite not addressing directly forced migration, are still relevant and conceptually aligned with the GCR. The inclusion of indicator 10.7.4 supposedly ensures refugees are not excluded in accomplishing the 2030 Agenda (Denaro & Giuffre, 2022). Despite the lack of comparability between SDG and GCR indicators and data, they reiterate the importance of international cooperation and collaboration to address forced displacement. Refugee situations call for, at least initially, a humanitarian response to provide basic subsistence and security (Lischer, 2017). However, it can lead to long-term dependency and can legitimize many policies that socially exclude refugees (Betts et al., 2017). Loescher (2021) argues that the current refugee regime is not equipped to respond to all the drivers of displacement. Since it often does not have the authority to intervene in matters of governance, peace, security, development, and justice, it relies on other actors to affect change - like regional organizations, the United Nations Security Council, and development actors. That is why both academics and international actors defend holistic responses to solve protracted refugee situations, by providing the necessary humanitarian aid while addressing the root causes of displacement and not simply restricting refugee flows (Betts et al., 2017; Lischer, 2017; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; UNHCR, 2024a; Zetter, 2021).

As seen, refugee emergencies occur more frequently in high-conflict and unstable regions, engendering further violence and displacement (Lischer, 2017; Weiner, 1996). And, like how each emergency occurs due to a specific combination of factors, it is argued that there is no single solution to solve all types of forced displacement. Still, analyzing common traits among emergencies can be beneficial to comprehend which factors of displacement are more frequent and must be underscored. Due to the prominence of climate change in current emergencies, to

achieve durable solutions, approaches will need to integrate the strengthening of ecological adaptive capacities and provide “climate resilient” access to basic goods and services with general stability and peace responses (UNHCR, 2024a). Hence, to efficiently resolve crises, responses must be tailored and must address: the traditional and new causes of displacement, the regional security environment, and the circumstances of exile (Lischer, 2014, 2017; Loescher, 2021). Betts et al. (2017), Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002), and (Zetter, 2021) highlight that approaches to refugees should focus on their empowerment and self-reliance, acknowledging that they have capacities –skills, talents, and aspirations – that can simultaneously benefit refugees, donor countries and contribute economically and socio-culturally to host communities. Even though fostering self-reliance through development assistance can be a way to overcome protracted displacement and lead to win-win situations, most host governments refrain from such resource reallocations and perceive self-reliance to be equivalent to permanent local integration (Betts et al., 2017).

Hence, several authors defend the integration of relief and development in the efficiency of durable solutions (Betts et al., 2017; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002), especially considering how the current development agenda regards development as multidimensional (Morgan & Bach, 2018; Thorbecke, 2019). However, development aid is often performance-based, where it goes to relatively well-performing countries³⁷ that need it the least (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Whereas trouble spots³⁸ receive mostly humanitarian aid, being too unstable to receive development assistance, and countries in strained situations³⁹ receive reduced development assistance. Performance-based aid allocation hinders the prevention of such emergencies because humanitarian assistance – which by default is delivered after a crisis starts – cannot prevent or stop a conflict.

5. Conclusions

This dissertation provided an overview of the historical progression of refugee outflows since the establishment of the UNHCR to lay the groundwork for the case study of the countries that have contributed most to displacement today. The case study also investigated the factors that most contribute to these refugee emergencies, highlighting not only the combination of several factors (Loescher, 2021) but also the importance of political violence, especially civil conflicts (Adhikari, 2013; Fearon & Shaver, 2020; Lischer, 2017), and climate change

³⁷ Poor developing nations with stable economies and institutions.

³⁸ Developing countries in political, economic, and social emergencies, including failed states and conflict-affected countries.

³⁹ Developing countries that face political turmoil and economic setbacks but are not yet in crisis.

(Armiero & Bettini, 2023; Betts et al., 2017; Zetter & Morrissey, 2014) in current crises. Accordingly, it was argued that displacement and its root causes hamper human development, especially in origin countries. This is observable in these countries' common traits, which range from negative health outcomes to limited employment opportunities and economic hardship to environmental degradation. The impact on host communities is subject to debate since there are negative short-term economic effects, including labor market pressures, straining public services, and creating or aggravating tensions within the host community (Lischer, 2017). While at the individual level, many argue that refugees and displaced persons must be recognized for more than their vulnerabilities since they can provide economic, social, and human capital to host countries (Betts et al., 2017; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Still, it was also accentuated that the unequal distribution of hosting refugees among the international community leads neighboring lower-income countries to bear the heaviest burden.

Despite no confirmation of an overarching trend concerning the correlation between forced displacement and human development, except for Syria, the findings suggest the need for a more comprehensive approach to analyzing this relationship and understanding the uniqueness of each emergency. Causes of displacement cannot be investigated in isolation, since a better understanding of the interaction between root causes, regional environment, and displacement can inspire new holistic solutions and end the cycle of displacement (Lischer, 2017; Loescher, 2021; UNHCR, 2024a). To efficiently address forced migration and its causes, different types of international aid – humanitarian and development – must be used in unison, considering they serve distinct purposes. Additionally, the difficulties related to performance-based aid allocation must be recognized when implementing holistic responses. These findings support current goals in refugee policies – clear in the 2016 New York Declaration, the CRRF, and the GCR (Denaro & Giuffre, 2022; United Nations, 2018) – as well as overarching development goals like the UN's SDGs (Thorbecke, 2019; United Nations, 2023). It is imperative to cooperate and collaborate to improve burden- and responsibility-sharing among the international community, and truly leave no one behind.

Building on this study, future research should delve deeper into mapping the factors that most directly influence crisis countries' HDI, pinpointing key target areas to improve these communities' capacities, resilience, and development. Future studies can address the singularities – cultural, contextual, or otherwise – of a given refugee-origin country to guide the development of holistic interventions.

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Appendix

Table A1

Total Displaced Persons 1951-2023: by Population Type

	<i>UNHCR Mandate Refugees</i>	<i>Asylum Seekers</i>	<i>Stateless Persons</i>	<i>IDPs</i>	<i>Others of Concern to the UNHCR⁴⁰</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>1951</i>	2116011					2116011
<i>1952</i>	1952928					1952928
<i>1953</i>	1847304					1847304
<i>1954</i>	1749628					1749628
<i>1955</i>	1717966					1717966
<i>1956</i>	1767975					1767975
<i>1957</i>	1742514					1742514
<i>1958</i>	1698310					1698310
<i>1959</i>	1674185					1674185
<i>1960</i>	1656664					1656664
<i>1961</i>	1789067					1789067
<i>1962</i>	1765622					1765622
<i>1963</i>	1682403					1682403
<i>1964</i>	3079949					3079949
<i>1965</i>	3531615					3531615
<i>1966</i>	3501013					3501013
<i>1967</i>	2356991					2356991
<i>1968</i>	2463736					2463736
<i>1969</i>	2531177					2531177
<i>1970</i>	2464730					2464730
<i>1971</i>	3279710					3279710
<i>1972</i>	3251850					3251850
<i>1973</i>	2901335					2901335
<i>1974</i>	2994463					2994463
<i>1975</i>	3529434					3529434
<i>1976</i>	4270631					4270631

⁴⁰ This category represents the sum of UNHCR categories ‘Other people in need of international protection’ and ‘Others of concern’

1977	4518659				4518659	
1978	5065844				5065844	
1979	6279912				6279912	
1980	8454917				8454917	
1981	9714297				9714297	
1982	10319353				10319353	
1983	10620784				10620784	
1984	10728307				10728307	
1985	11864046				11864046	
1986	12633964				12633964	
1987	13128334				13128334	
1988	14347031				14347031	
1989	14732885				14732885	
1990	17395914				17395914	
1991	16854762				16854762	
1992	17838020				17838020	
1993	16325299	743601		4198400	21267300	
1994	15753494	644640		5322990	21721124	
1995	14895916	986458		4286690	20169064	
1996	13356861	977087		4853712	19187660	
1997	12014967	1028200		4573112	1404100	19020379
1998	11480438	977800		5063880	1378527	18900645
1999	11686760	1027400		3968648	1491142	18173950
2000	12129079	947322		5998501	1653841	20728743
2001	12116301	943383		5096502	1039510	19195696
2002	10593526	1093121		4646641	953319	17286607
2003	9592247	995567		4181701	905344	15674859
2004	9572719	884285	1455861	5426539	597042	17936446
2005	8661293	801119	2383651	6616791	960359	19423213
2006	9876879	740253	5805941	12794268	1045409	30262750
2007	11390082	739958	2938538	13740317	68615	28877510
2008	10488915	823931	6573465	14442227	166860	32495398
2009	10395713	988030	6559572	15628057	411691	33983063

2010	10548835	835969	3463073	14697804	1255578	30801259
2011	10403937	895691	3477100	15473378	1411844	31661950
2012	10497017	941497	3335772	17670368	1329600	33774254
2013	11698233	1162934	3469268	23925555	836073	41092063
2014	14384289	1794704	3492255	32274619	1052746	52998613
2015	16110276	3223460	3687759	37494172	870688	61386355
2016	17184286	2729521	3242206	36627127	803084	60586224
2017	19940566	3089507	3853982	39118516	1596125	67598696
2018	20359553	3501629	3851981	41425168	3775703	72914034
2019	20414669	4148141	4217774	43503362	7439381	79723327
2020	20661846	4184926	4179331	48557439	7801858	85385400
2021	21327285	4616134	4338192	51322623	8629527	90233762
2022	29429078	5442314	4428314	57321197	11226260	107847168
2023	31637408	6858499	4358188	63251367	11700913	117806375

Note. Data related to Figures 1 and 2, from UNHCR. (2024b). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 1951-2023. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=T1aA6J>.

Table A2

Displaced Persons 2000-2023: by Country of Origin

	<i>AFG</i>	<i>SSD</i>	<i>SYR</i>	<i>UKR</i>	<i>VEN</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>MROC⁴¹ Total</i>
2000	4486288		9598	22444	641	15677683	5051060
2001	5140545		8714	32608	798	13442995	5752701
2002	3302149		23172	90130	1304	13246196	4040411
2003	2446616		24364	96991	2614	12434695	3240164
2004	2691054		25211	92224	3933	14442355	3494091
2005	2423023		23387	86887	5397	16197058	3226155
2006	2352151		19820	67194	6188	26029541	4233209
2007	3227861		20533	28398	6840	23598569	5278941
2008	3089064		21184	30316	7319	27216436	5278962
2009	3216128		23474	26042	7787	27681245	6301818
2010	4283030		28190	26352	7323	23722587	7078672

⁴¹ Main Refugee Outflow Countries

2011	4103700	560166	48482	26411	8145	19311299	7770072
2012	4015202	451353	2778427	26457	8700	22394416	11379838
2013	3538870	476240	9039542	6791	9550	23605061	17487002
2014	3688436	2265364	11601631	1075707	12831	30007232	22991381
2015	4249831	2573283	11690802	1943754	22542	37782166	23604189
2016	4782291	3296423	12043342	2073705	52617	34606322	25979902
2017	5243370	4360293	12616278	1977256	502953	36731564	30867132
2018	5588126	4186156	12986323	1625215	3078217	41600750	31313284
2019	5982668	3916236	12888305	2502092	4964435	49315194	32691578
2020	5807434	4043953	13519788	2410587	5996996	56261756	33493657
2021	7022010	4635106	13857059	2325793	6966697	60752806	36212065
2022	10179326	4146889	13500868	12177944	9973118	67159085	64645848
2023	10671215	4179440	13793556	11368005	10162598	68654976	65568508

Note. Data related to Figure 3, from UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 2000-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Table A3

Proportion of Displaced Persons by Country of Origin: 2000-2023 (%)

	AFG	SSD	SYR	UKR	VEN	MROC Total
2000	20,517955		0,04389628	0,10264722	0,04389628	22,43226
2001	25,833128		0,04379105	0,16386719	0,04379105	27,7377126
2002	15,8060678		0,11091511	0,4314163	0,11091511	20,4858431
2003	14,3854734		0,14325406	0,57028216	0,14325406	17,3800727
2004	13,788149		0,12917356	0,47252796	0,12917356	16,5637926
2005	11,5118262		0,11111206	0,41280171	0,11111206	14,0490697
2006	7,15799387		0,06031562	0,20448272	0,06031562	8,9557065
2007	10,1895338		0,06481744	0,08964524	0,06481744	12,2472318
2008	8,9640152		0,06147289	0,08797263	0,06147289	10,482355
2009	8,82000491		0,06437579	0,07141835	0,06437579	10,9942654
2010	12,6260864		0,08310224	0,07768394	0,08310224	15,5800298
2011	11,5794124	1,5806207	0,13680168	0,07452393	0,13680168	17,1875022
2012	11,2013672	1,25915725	7,75108729	0,07380814	7,75108729	23,9862289
2013	8,26184478	1,11182975	21,1037119	0,01585427	21,1037119	33,9026421

2014	6,71259727	4,12274368	21,1138479	1,95768284	21,1138479	36,8293189
2015	6,65022655	4,02672834	18,2940173	3,04162788	18,2940173	34,8712462
2016	7,06920945	4,87279102	17,8025359	3,06536239	17,8025359	38,084135
2017	7,26102279	6,03813708	17,4710314	2,73810562	17,4710314	38,6872793
2018	7,37742623	5,52654988	17,1445024	2,14560369	17,1445024	39,7073651
2019	6,8242521	4,46713436	14,7013076	2,8540622	14,7013076	39,5754863
2020	6,23178878	4,33944853	14,5076919	2,58673091	14,5076919	38,5497799
2021	6,84008248	4,51501883	13,4980478	2,26553593	13,4980478	39,5919552
2022	7,19461434	2,93096685	20,2922677	8,60721138	20,2922677	47,1654316
2023	7,77221632	3,04403123	21,1928111	8,27971266	21,1928111	43,532579

Note. Data related to Figure 4, was calculated using data from UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 2000-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Table A4

UNCR Mandate Refugees 2000-2023: by Country of Origin

	<i>AFG</i>	<i>SSD</i>	<i>SYR</i>	<i>UKR</i>	<i>VEN</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>MROC Total</i>
2000	3587327		5868	19310	469	8516105	3612974
2001	3809763		4861	26712	464	8274501	3841800
2002	2510294		18908	85258	525	7978541	2614985
2003	2136039		20816	94141	598	7340653	2251594
2004	2414460		21430	89582	1251	7045996	2526723
2005	2166139		16395	84223	2581	6391955	2269338
2006	2107510		12327	63716	3821	7689505	2187374
2007	3057655		13684	25980	5089	8287674	3102408
2008	2833116		15206	28416	5801	7606376	2882539
2009	2887114		17915	24512	6216	7459956	2935757
2010	3054699		18451	25102	6697	7443886	3104949
2011	2664423	0	19931	25372	7575	7686636	2717301
2012	2586132	87007	729011	25248	8204	7061415	3435602
2013	2556483	114468	2468323	5154	8396	6545409	5152824
2014	2596259	616206	3887490	237617	8009	7038708	7345581
2015	2666294	778722	4873236	321399	7455	7463170	8647106
2016	2501447	1436707	5524511	239062	7543	7475016	9709270

2017	2624265	2439888	6310498	139581	9272	8417062	11523504
2018	2681267	2285301	6654374	93248	21047	8624316	11735237
2019	2727556	2234805	6615249	59844	93239	8683976	11730693
2020	2594827	2188785	6702910	35156	171112	8969056	11692790
2021	2712869	2362759	6848865	27562	199202	9176028	12151257
2022	5661717	2295082	6559736	5684177	230393	8997973	20431105
2023	6403144	2292482	6355788	5960362	347695	10277937	21359471

Note. Data related to Figure 5, from UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All

Population Types: 2000-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Table A5

Proportion of Refugees by Country of Origin: 2000-2023 (%)

	<i>AFG</i>	<i>SSD</i>	<i>SYR</i>	<i>UKR</i>	<i>VEN</i>	<i>MROC Total</i>
2000	29,5762522		0,048379601	0,15920417	0,00386674	29,7877028
2001	31,4432845		0,040119505	0,22046332	0,00382955	31,7076969
2002	23,6964916		0,17848637	0,8048123	0,00495586	24,6847461
2003	22,2683903		0,21700859	0,98142802	0,0062342	23,4730611
2004	25,222301		0,223865341	0,93580518	0,01306839	26,3950399
2005	25,0094183		0,189290444	0,97240678	0,02979925	26,2009148
2006	21,3378133		0,124806632	0,64510257	0,03868631	22,1464088
2007	26,8448901		0,120139609	0,22809318	0,04467922	27,2378022
2008	27,0105726		0,144972097	0,27091458	0,05530601	27,4817653
2009	27,7721595		0,172330652	0,2357895	0,05979388	28,2400736
2010	28,9576906		0,17491031	0,23795993	0,06348568	29,4340465
2011	25,6097572	0	0,19157171	0,24386922	0,07280898	26,1180071
2012	24,6368278	0,82887357	6,944934928	0,24052547	0,07815554	32,7293173
2013	21,8535825	0,97850675	21,09996441	0,04405794	0,07177152	44,0478831
2014	18,0492689	4,28388223	27,02594477	1,65192037	0,0556788	51,0666951
2015	16,5502689	4,83369745	30,24923968	1,99499375	0,04627481	53,6744746
2016	14,5565955	8,36058594	32,14862113	1,39116632	0,04389475	56,5008636
2017	13,1604339	12,2358011	31,64653401	0,69998515	0,04649818	57,7892523
2018	13,169577	11,2247111	32,68428339	0,45800613	0,10337653	57,6399541
2019	13,3607652	10,9470548	32,4043902	0,29314215	0,4567255	57,4620779

2020	12,5585439	10,5933661	32,44100261	0,17014937	0,82815446	56,5912165
2021	12,7201798	11,0785738	32,11315927	0,12923351	0,93402419	56,9751705
2022	19,238513	7,79868809	22,28998136	19,3148321	0,78287536	69,4248899
2023	20,2391549	7,24611194	20,0894713	18,8396028	1,09899964	67,5133405

Note. Data related to Figure 6, was calculated using data from UNHCR. (2024c). Population Figures: Totals: All Population Types: 2000-2023: All countries of Origin. In Refugee Data Finder. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=0cetDX>.

Table A6

Human Development Index: Main Refugee Outflow Countries

	<i>AFG</i>	<i>SSD</i>	<i>SYR</i>	<i>UKR</i>	<i>VEN</i>	<i>MROC Average</i>	<i>World Average</i>
1990	0,284		0,563	0,731	0,657	0,559	0,601
1991	0,292		0,568	0,724	0,668	0,563	0,604
1992	0,299		0,573	0,715	0,675	0,566	0,607
1993	0,307		0,574	0,702	0,678	0,565	0,610
1994	0,300		0,578	0,689	0,679	0,562	0,614
1995	0,318		0,580	0,683	0,685	0,567	0,618
1996	0,326		0,583	0,683	0,687	0,570	0,624
1997	0,330		0,586	0,688	0,694	0,575	0,629
1998	0,329		0,587	0,694	0,697	0,577	0,634
1999	0,337		0,586	0,696	0,695	0,579	0,639
2000	0,340		0,587	0,698	0,699	0,40133333	0,645
2001	0,344		0,595	0,713	0,704	0,40666667	0,650
2002	0,368		0,602	0,721	0,711	0,41533333	0,655
2003	0,379		0,613	0,730	0,702	0,42316667	0,661
2004	0,395		0,626	0,739	0,713	0,43216667	0,667
2005	0,402		0,639	0,743	0,722	0,43866667	0,673
2006	0,410		0,650	0,752	0,73	0,44583333	0,679
2007	0,426		0,657	0,759	0,747	0,453	0,685
2008	0,431		0,651	0,763	0,754	0,45266667	0,689
2009	0,441		0,660	0,761	0,754	0,4625	0,692
2010	0,449	0,406	0,661	0,766	0,759	0,53533333	0,698
2011	0,457	0,408	0,687	0,772	0,766	0,5455	0,704
2012	0,467	0,377	0,638	0,774	0,769	0,536	0,709

2013	0,475	0,378	0,558	0,774	0,771	0,52716667	0,714
2014	0,480	0,376	0,544	0,774	0,768	0,52866667	0,719
2015	0,479	0,381	0,552	0,764	0,766	0,53166667	0,724
2016	0,483	0,376	0,551	0,767	0,759	0,535	0,728
2017	0,485	0,378	0,558	0,771	0,75	0,54016667	0,732
2018	0,486	0,380	0,563	0,771	0,738	0,54483333	0,735
2019	0,492	0,391	0,564	0,774	0,72	0,55083333	0,739
2020	0,488	0,386	0,561	0,762	0,691	0,54816667	0,736
2021	0,473	0,381	0,558	0,755	0,69	0,54016667	0,735
2022	0,462	0,381	0,557	0,734	0,699	0,53716667	0,739

Note. Data from UNDP. (2024). HDR23-24 Composite Indices and Complete Time Series (1990-2022) [Dataset]. In United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Reports. <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads>.