

Foundations of Financial Economics

Bernardino Adao

Final Exam

Total time: 1:30 hours. Total points: 20

Instructions:

Please sit in alternate seats. This is a closed-book, closed-note exam. Please get rid of everything but pen/pencil. In your answer explain all the steps in your reasoning. Keep answers short; I don't give more credit for long answers, and I can take points off if you add things that are wrong or irrelevant.

Formulas:

If  $x$  and  $y$  are random variables then

$$E(xy) = ExEy + cov(x, y)$$

$$\sigma^2(x) = Ex^2 - (Ex)^2$$

If  $x$  is normal distributed then  $\exp(x)$  is lognormal, and

$$E \exp(x) = \exp(Ex + 0.5\sigma^2(x))$$

Brownian motion

$$z_{t+\Delta} - z_t \sim N(0, \Delta)$$

Differential

$$dz_t = \lim_{\Delta \searrow 0} (z_{t+\Delta} - z_t)$$

$$dz_t^2 = dt, dz_t dt = 0, dt^\alpha = 0, \text{ if } \alpha > 1$$

$$E_t(dz_t) = 0, var_t(dz_t) = E_t(dz_t^2) = dz_t^2 = dt$$

Ito's Lemma

$$\begin{aligned} df(x, t) &= f_t dt + f_x dx + \frac{1}{2} f_{xx} dx^2 \\ &= \left( f_t + f_x \mu_x + \frac{1}{2} f_{xx} \sigma_x^2 \right) dt + f_x \sigma_x dz \end{aligned}$$

(4 pts) 1. What is a complete market? Explain how we can complete the market with options.

Answer:

In a complete market all contingent claims are tradable. A contingent claim is an asset that pays one unit in a particular state of nature and zero in all the other states. Suppose the states of nature are indexed to the possible payoffs of a particular asset and the payoffs are discrete, specifically:

$$S_T = \{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, M\}.$$

Then, the contingent claim that pays 1 unit when  $S_T = 3$  and zero when  $S_T \neq 3$  is equivalent to buying 2 call options, 1 with strike price 2 and another with

strike price 4, and selling 2 call options with strike price 3. The payoff of buying 1 call option with strike price 2 and selling 1 call option with strike price 3 is  $(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, \dots)$  and the payoff of selling 1 call option with strike price 3 and buying 1 with strike price 4 is  $-(0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, \dots)$ . The remaining  $M$  contingent claims can be obtained in a similar manner.

2. Consider a model with power utility,  $u(C_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ , and  $\beta = 1$ . Assume that  $\ln\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right) \equiv \Delta c_{t+1}$  is normal distributed. Let  $m_{t+1}$  denote the stochastic discount factor.

(2 pts) a. Show that the ratio

$$\frac{\sigma(m_{t+1})}{E(m_{t+1})}$$

is approximately equal to  $\gamma\sigma(\Delta c_{t+1})$ .

Answer:

$$m_{t+1} = \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{-\gamma}$$

$\implies m_{t+1}$  is lognormal distributed

$$Em_{t+1} = e^{E(\log m_{t+1}) + 0.5\sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma^2(m_{t+1}) &= E(m_{t+1})^2 - (Em_{t+1})^2 \\ &= e^{2E(\log m_{t+1}) + 2\sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})} \\ &\quad - e^{2E(\log m_{t+1}) + \sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})} \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\sigma^2(m_{t+1})}{(E(m_{t+1}))^2} &= \frac{e^{2E(\log m_{t+1}) + 2\sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})} - e^{2E(\log m_{t+1}) + \sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})}}{e^{2E(\log m_{t+1}) + \sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})}} \\ &= e^{\sigma^2(\log m_{t+1})} - 1 \end{aligned}$$

Now use the approximation (first order Taylor approximation)

$$e^x \approx 1 + x$$

Replace above to get

$$\frac{\sigma^2(m_{t+1})}{(E(m_{t+1}))^2} \approx \sigma^2(\log m_{t+1}),$$

or

$$\frac{\sigma(m_{t+1})}{E(m_{t+1})} \approx \gamma\sigma(\Delta c_{t+1}).$$

(2 pts) b. Consider the market Sharpe ratio

$$\left| \frac{ER_m - R_f}{\sigma(R_m)} \right| \leq \frac{\sigma(m)}{E(m)}$$

where  $R_m$  is the return on the market portfolio. The postwar NYSE index excess return is around 8% per year, with standard deviation around 16%. The standard deviation of log consumption growth is about 1%. Is this a challenge to the model? Explain.

Answer:

$$0.5 = \frac{0.08}{0.16} = \frac{ER_m - R_f}{\sigma(R_m)} \leq \gamma\sigma(\Delta c_{t+1}) = 0.01\gamma$$

Need to assume that the relative risk aversion is extremely large, i.e.  $\gamma > 50$ .

(2 pts) c. Assume that  $E(\Delta c_{t+1}) = 2$ . What do the data and the model imply for the riskless interest rate? Discuss.

$$\left(R_{t+1}^f\right)^{-1} = E_t(m_{t+1})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \left(R_{t+1}^f\right)^{-1} &= E_t e^{\ln m_{t+1}} = E_t e^{\ln(C_{t+1}/C_t)^{-\gamma}} = E_t e^{-\gamma\Delta c_{t+1}} \\ &= e^{-\gamma E_t(\Delta c_{t+1}) + 0.5\gamma^2\sigma_t^2(\Delta c_{t+1})} \end{aligned}$$

or

$$-r_{t+1}^f \equiv -\ln R_{t+1}^f = -\gamma E_t(\Delta c_{t+1}) + 0.5\gamma^2\sigma_t^2(\Delta c_{t+1})$$

As  $\gamma$  is very large then fluctuations in  $E_t(\Delta c_{t+1})$  or  $\sigma_t^2(\Delta c_{t+1})$  lead to large fluctuations in  $r_{t+1}^f$  which is something we do not observe in the data. In the data the risk free interest rate is pretty stable.

3. Consider the Epstein and Zin utility model

$$V_t \equiv \left( (1-\beta)C_t^{1-\gamma} + \beta(H_t(V_{t+1}))^{1-\gamma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}$$

where,  $H_t(V_{t+1}) = (E_t V_{t+1}^{1-\alpha})^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$ .

(2 pts) a. Show that when  $\alpha = 0$  we have the usual standard time-separable expected discounted utility with discount factor  $\beta$  and risk aversion  $\gamma$ .

Answer:

$$\begin{aligned} (V_t)^{1-\gamma} &= (1-\beta)C_t^{1-\gamma} + \beta E_t(V_{t+1})^{1-\gamma} \\ &= (1-\beta)C_t^{1-\gamma} + \beta E_t \left\{ (1-\beta)C_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} + \beta E_{t+1}(V_{t+1})^{1-\gamma} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

By repeated substitution we obtain

$$(V_t)^{1-\gamma} = (1-\beta) \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s E_t C_{t+s}^{1-\gamma}.$$

$$\frac{(V_t)^{1-\gamma}}{(1-\beta)(1-\gamma)} = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s E_t \frac{C_{t+s}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}.$$

Now, the sequence  $\{C_0, C_1, \dots\}$  that maximizes the right hand side also maximizes the  $V_t$ .

(2 pts) b. The stochastic discount factor with the Epstein and Zin utility is

$$m_{t+1} = \beta^\theta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma\theta} R_{m,t+1}^{\theta-1}, \quad \theta = \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\gamma}.$$

Assume that  $\log\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right) \equiv \Delta c_{t+1}$  is normal distributed,  $\log(R_{m,t+1}) = r_{m,t+1}$  is normal distributed and they are independently distributed. What is the expression for the riskless interest rate?

Answer

$$\left(R_{t+1}^f\right)^{-1} = E_t \exp\left(\log\left(\beta^\theta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{-\gamma\theta} R_{m,t+1}^{\theta-1}\right)\right)$$

$$\left(R_{t+1}^f\right)^{-1} = e^{\log \beta^\theta} E_t e^{-\gamma\theta(\Delta c_{t+1})} E_t e^{-(1-\theta)r_{m,t+1}}$$

$$\left(R_{t+1}^f\right)^{-1} = e^{\log \beta^\theta} e^{-\gamma\theta E_t(\Delta c_{t+1}) + \frac{1}{2}(\gamma\theta)^2 \sigma^2(\Delta c_{t+1})} e^{-(1-\theta)E_t r_{m,t+1} + \frac{1}{2}(1-\theta)^2 \sigma^2(r_{m,t+1})}$$

$$r_{t+1}^f = -\theta \log \beta + \gamma\theta E_t(\Delta c_{t+1}) - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma\theta)^2 \sigma^2(\Delta c_{t+1}) + (1-\theta)E_t r_{m,t+1} - \frac{1}{2}(1-\theta)^2 \sigma^2(r_{m,t+1})$$

(2 pts) c. Can these preferences explain the risk free rate puzzle?

Answer:

Unlike in the power utility function, where the relative risk aversion (RRA) was  $\gamma$  and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) was  $\frac{1}{\gamma}$ , with these preferences the RRA and the IES are 2 separate parameters. RRA =  $\alpha$  and IES =  $\frac{1}{\gamma}$ . In this case by appropriately choosing these two parameters can have a high equity premium and a low and stable risk free rate.

(4 pts) 4. Let there be  $N$  assets with payoffs over  $S$  states of nature given by  $\mathbf{R}_n = (R_{n1}, R_{n2}, \dots, R_{nS}) \in \mathcal{R}^S$  for  $n = 1, \dots, N$ . Let asset prices  $\mathbf{P} = (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_N) \in \mathcal{R}^N$  be given by  $P_n = \sum_{s=1}^S \lambda_s R_{ns}$ , for some  $\lambda_s > 0$ ,  $s = 1, \dots, S$  and  $n = 1, \dots, N$ . Show that  $\mathbf{P}$  is arbitrage free. What is the relationship between the  $\lambda_s$  and the contingent claims?

Answer:

Suppose, to get a contradiction, that  $\mathbf{P}$  is not arbitrage free. Then there is a portfolio  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{R}^N$  with a cost  $\mathbf{y}\mathbf{P} \leq 0$  and returns  $\mathbf{y}\mathbf{R}_s \geq 0$  for all  $s = 1, \dots, S$ , with at least one strict inequality.

$$\mathbf{y}\mathbf{P} = \sum_{n=1}^N y_n P_n = \sum_{n=1}^N y_n \sum_{s=1}^S \lambda_s R_{ns} = \sum_{s=1}^S \lambda_s \sum_{n=1}^N y_n R_{ns} = \sum_{s=1}^S \lambda_s \mathbf{y}\mathbf{R}_s \leq 0$$

By assumption  $\mathbf{y}\mathbf{R}_s \geq 0$ , for all  $s = 1, \dots, S$  and strictly larger for at least one state  $s$ . Since  $\lambda_s > 0$ , for all  $s = 1, \dots, S$ , then  $\sum_{s=1}^S \lambda_s \mathbf{y}\mathbf{R}_s > 0$ , which is a contradiction.

The  $\lambda_s$  are the prices of the contingent claims, or the stochastic discount factor divided by the probability of the state.