- o Creditmetrics allows for the calculation of credit losses due to defaults or any other credit risk changes impacting on rating classifications and bond prices.
- \circ Creditmetrics is based on the ratings transition matrix.
- \circ If we are able to create homogenous credit risk portfolios, we may only use the PDs.
- \circ In a portfolio with different independent debtors, we also need to take into account the correlation between these different credit risks.

- \circ Credit spreads of different issuers are correlated through time.
- \circ However, a good model for the default correlations across firms is still an open challenge for credit risk researchers.
- o Correlations across equities are considerably higher than observed default correlations.
- o **Two patterns** are found in time series of spreads:
- 1) Spreads vary smoothly along with general macroeconomic factors.

Cyclical correlation between defaults

2) Simultaneous jumps of credit spreads of several firms are common. This suggests that the sudden variation in the credit risk of one issuer, which causes an initial jump, can propagate to other issuers as well.

Default correlations:

Historically, defaults tended to cluster as the following examples from the USA show.

- Oil industry: 22 companies defaulted in 1982–1986.
- Railroad conglomerates: 1 default each year 1970–1977.
- Airlines: 3 defaults in $1970-1971$, 5 defaults in $1989-1990$.
- Thrifts (savings and loan crisis): 19 defaults in 1989–1990.
- Casinos/hotel chains: 10 defaults in 1990.
- Retailers: >20 defaults in 1990–1992.
- Construction/real estate: 4 defaults in 1992.

If defaults were indeed independent, such clusters of defaults should not occur.

Secondly, there also seems to be serial dependence in the default rates of subsequent years. A year with high default rates is more likely to be followed by another year with an above average default rate than to be followed by a low default rate. The same applies to low default rates.

Notation

Calculation of default correlations – different sources:

- Historically observed joint rating and default events: The obvious source of information on default correlation is the historical incidence of joint defaults of similar firms in a similar time frame. We used such data in Section 10.1.1 when we analysed the evidence for default dependency in aggregated historical US default rate data. Such data is objective and directly addresses the modelling problem. Unfortunately, because joint defaults are rare events, historical data on joint defaults is very sparse. To gain a statistically useful number of observations, long time ranges (several decades) have to be considered and the data must be aggregated across industries and countries. In the majority of cases direct data will therefore not be available.
- Credit spreads: Credit spreads contain much information about the default risk of traded bonds, and changes in credit spreads reflect changes in the markets' assessment of the riskiness of these investments. If the credit spreads of two obligors are strongly correlated it is likely that the defaults of these obligors are also correlated. Credit spreads have the further advantage that they reflect market information (therefore they already contain risk premia) and that they can be observed far more frequently than defaults. Disadvantages are problems with data availability, data quality (liquidity), and the fact that there is no theoretical justification for the size and strength of the link between credit spread correlation and default correlation.²

• Equity correlations: Equity price data is much more readily available and typically of better quality than credit spread data. Unfortunately, the connection between equity prices and credit risk is not obvious. This link can only be established by using a theoretical model, and we saw that these models have difficulties in explaining the credit spreads observed in the market. Consequently, a lot of pre-processing of the data is necessary until a statement about default correlations can be made.

\circ Credit Risk events as binomial draws – default or no default:

If defaults are independent and happen with probability p over the time horizon T, then the loss distribution of a portfolio of N loans is described by the binomial distribution function.

Definition 10.1 (binomial distribution) Consider a random experiment with success probability p which is repeated N times and let X be the number of successes observed. All repetitions are independent from each other. The binomial frequency function $b(n; N, p)$ gives the probability of observing $n \leq N$ successes. The binomial distribution function $B(n;N, p)$ gives the probability of observing less than or equal to n successes:

$$
b(n; N, p) := \mathbf{P}[X = n] = \binom{N}{n} p^n (1 - p)^{N-n} = \frac{N!}{n!(N-n)!} p^n (1 - p)^{N-n}
$$

$$
B(n; N, p) := \mathbf{P}[X \le n] = \sum_{m=0}^n \binom{N}{m} p^m (1 - p)^{N-m}.
$$

In our credit setting, the probability of exactly $X = n$ (with $n \le N$) defaults until time T is $b(n; N, p)$ and the probability of up to *n* defaults is $B(n; N, p)$.

Distribution of default losses under independence (number of obligors = 100 and p = 0,05)

Figure 10.5 Distribution of default losses under independence. Parameters: number of obligors $N = 100$, individual default probability $p = 5\%$

Source: Schonbucher, Philipp J. (2003), "Credit Derivatives Pricing Models – Models, Pricing and Implementation", Wiley.

 $\begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{5}{2} \end{pmatrix}$

- This example shows that the right tail of the distribution is very thin.
- The Credit-VaR corresponds to the number of defaults in the right tail of the density function, whose cumulative probability of default is equal to the degree of confidence.
- o For very high degrees of confidence and low PDs, the Credit-VaR is achieved at a low number of defaults: (see spreadsheet)
	- 99% VaR = 11 defaults
	- 99,9% VaR = 13 defaults
	- 99,99% VaR = 15 defaults

o The number of defaults corresponding to a Credit-VaR for very high degrees of confidence increases with the PD:

99.9% VaR levels of a portfolio of 100 independent obligors for different individual default **Figure 10.6** probabilities

Source: Schonbucher, Philipp J. (2003), "Credit Derivatives Pricing Models – Models, Pricing and Implementation", Wiley.

 $\left(\frac{1}{6}\right)$

 \circ The dispersion of the No. defaults distribution also increases with the PD:

 $\left\| \frac{1}{2} \right\|$

Perfectly Correlated Defaults

- With perfectly dependent or correlated defaults there are only two scenarios:
- (i) all loans default with a probability = *p*
- (ii) or no loans default with a probability = 1-*p*

Perfectly dependent defaults

But we need to assess what happens when defaults are partially correlated.

Source: Schonbucher, Philipp J. (2003), "Credit Derivatives Pricing Models – Models, Pricing and Implementation", Wiley.

o Probability of losses in a credit risk-bearing portfolio, with independent defaults, is the binomial frequency function:

The binomial expansion technique (BET) is a method used by the ratings agency Moody's to assess the default risk in bond and loan portfolios. It was one of the first attempts to quantify the risk of a portfolio of defaultable bonds. The method is not based upon a formal portfolio default risk model, it can be inaccurate and it is generally unsuitable for pricing, yet it has become something of a market standard in risk assessment and portfolio credit risk concentration terminology. 5

The BET is based upon the following observation. Assume we analyse a loan portfolio of $N = 100$ loans of the same size, with the same loss L in default and the same default probability $p = 5\%$. If the defaults of these obligors are independent, we know from the previous section that the loss distribution function is given by the binomial distribution function. The probability of a loss of exactly $X = nL$ (with $n \leq N$) until time T is (10.8):

$$
\mathbf{P}[X=nL] = \binom{N}{n} p^n (1-p)^{N-n} = \frac{N!}{n!(N-n)!} p^n (1-p)^{N-n} =: b(n;N,p).
$$

- \circ As previously referred, with perfectly dependent defaults there are only two scenarios:
- (i) all loans default with a probability = *p* => loss = *NL*
- (ii) or no loans default with a probability $= 1-p \Rightarrow$ loss $= 0$

Let us now consider the other extreme. If all defaults are perfectly dependent (*i.e.* either *all* or *none* of the obligors default), we have:

 $P[X > 0] = p = 5\% = P[X = NL],$
 $P[X = 0] = 1 - p = 95\% = P[X = 0].$

The key point to note here is that this can also be represented as a binomial distribution function with probability $p = 5\%$, but this time only *one* binomial draw is taken and the stakes are much higher: a loss of NL if the 5% event occurs.

o Probability of a loss *X* up to *x*, with perfect independence:

Thus we have the following results.

Perfect independence is $N = 100$ obligors with loss L and loss probability $p = 5\%$ each. The probability of a loss X of less than x is

$$
\mathbf{P}[X \le x] = B(n; N, p),
$$

where the parameters are:

 $-N = 100$; $- n = \lfloor x/L \rfloor$ ("rounding down", the largest integer less than or equal to x/L); $-p = 5\%.$ $\leftrightarrow x = nL \longrightarrow$ Loss (x) = No. of defaults x Loss with each default (LGD of each loan)

• Perfect dependence is equivalent to $N' = 1$ obligors with loss $L' = NL$ and loss probability $p = 5\%$. The probability of a loss X of less than x is

 $P[X \le x] = B(n'; N', p),$

where:

 $-N' = 1$, an adjusted number of obligors; $-n' = \lfloor x/L' \rfloor$ $-p = 5\%$.

- \circ Independence between defaults => N' = N, with loss amount from each default event $L' = L$.
- \circ Perfect dependence between defaults => N' = 1 with loss amount from each default event $L' = N \times L$.
- \circ It is convenient to calculate intermediate degrees of dependence assuming that we have $N' = D < N$ independent debtors with losses $L' = LN/D$ each.

o In a portfolio of *N* debtors with a total exposure of *K* and *p* as the average individual PD, the BET loss distribution with a diversity score *D* is:

$$
P^{BET}(x; N, K, D) := B(\lfloor x/L' \rfloor; D, p) \longrightarrow \text{from } P[X \le x] = B(n'; N', p)
$$

with $-N' = 1$, an adjusted number of obligations;
 $-n' = \lfloor x/L' \rfloor$
 $-p = 5\%$.

- \circ With N = 100:
	- $D = 100 \le -$ we have 100 independent debtors with potential losses of L each
	- $D = 50 \le -12$ we have 50 independent debtors with potential losses of 2L each
	- $D = 1 \le$ > we have perfect dependency between all exposures, with a potential losses of N x L

 \circ Lower diversity scores => less continuous distributions and higher probability attached to higher losses => more concentrated portfolios are riskier.

Figure 10.8 Loss exceedance probabilities for different diversity scores. Parameters: $N = 100$, $p = 5\%, D = 100, 50, 20, 5$ (solid, dashed, short dashed, dot dashed)

Source: Schonbucher, Philipp J. (2003), "Credit Derivatives Pricing Models – Models, Pricing and Implementation", Wiley.

- o Moody's starts by assuming perfect diversification (*D* = *N*).
- o *D* is adjusted according to:
- (i) Exposure sizes:
- Large exposures are penalized
- (ii) Industry diversification

(iii)Regional diversification

- \circ Defining t_1 and t_2 as the time to default of companies 1 and 2, respectively, if these variables are not normally distributed, we may transform them into new variables x_1 and x_2 :*
- where $x_1 = N^{-1}[Q_1(t_1)],$ $x_2 = N^{-1}[Q_2(t_2)]$
- Q_1 and Q_2 cumulative normal probability distributions for t_1 and t_2
- *N-1* inverse of the cumulative normal distribution

*Based on Hull (2018) (section 29.4)

- \circ x_1 and x_2 default threshold of each company, determined by the balance sheet structure, normally distributed, with zero mean and unit standard deviation
- \circ The joint distribution of x_1 and x_2 is a bivariate normal.

- \circ This assumption is convenient as it allows to characterize the joint distribution of t_1 and t_2 by the cumulative default probability distributions Q_1 and Q_2 , with a single correlation parameter between x_1 and x_2 – the copula correlation.
- \circ To avoid defining a different correlation between x_i and x_j for each pair of companies *i* and *j*, all default thresholds x_i are defined as a function of a common systematic factor, according to a one-factor model with random firm-factor disturbances: $x_i = a_i F + \sqrt{1 - a_i^2} Z_i$ with

 $F =$ the common or systematic risk factor – can be viewed as a business cycle indicator

- $Z_i \sim N(0,1)$, i.i.d. can be viewed as an idiosyncratic or firm-specific factor (e.g. quality of the management, level of innovation)
- a_i = constant parameters between -1 and +1 (sometimes approximated as the correlation of company i's equity returns with a well diversified market index).
- a_i * a_j = correlation between x_i and x_j

A default occurs until *T* when $N(x_i) < Q_i(T) \Leftrightarrow x_i < N^{-1}[Q_i(T)]$

 \circ With all loans having the same probability distributions of default and the same correlation

$$
a_{i} = \sqrt{\rho} \qquad Q(T \mid F) = N\left(\frac{N^{-1}[Q(T)] - \sqrt{\rho} F}{\sqrt{1 - \rho}}\right) \qquad Q_{i}(T \mid F) = N\left(\frac{N^{-1}[Q_{i}(T)] - a_{i} F}{\sqrt{1 - a_{i}^{2}}}\right)
$$

corresponds to the % defaults in a homogeneous portfolio by time T as a function of F.

- \circ ρ drives the weight of the idiosyncratic and systematic components:
- $-\rho$ = 0 => the business cycle is irrelevant to explain credit risk, i.e. the PD will not fluctuate.
- ρ = 1 => the business cycle is the only driver of defaults.

 \circ As F $\sim N(0,1)$, we are X% sure that F $> N^{-1}(1-X) = -N^{-1}(X)$

o We are X% sure that the percentage of losses over *T* years on a large homogeneous portfolio will be less than *V(X,T)*:

$$
V(X, T) = N\left(\frac{N^{-1}[Q(T)] + \sqrt{\rho} N^{-1}(X)}{\sqrt{1-\rho}}\right)
$$

- o Vasicek (1987) (published in Risk Magazine, in 2002, as "Loan Portfolio Value"): O. Vasicek, "Probability of Loss on a Loan Portfolio," Working Paper, KMV, 1987.
- \circ X very close to 1 => Worst Case Default Rate (WCDR)

o **Credit-VaR =** *WCDR* **x** *LGD x EAD*

M. B. Gordy, "A Risk-Factor Model Foundation for Ratings-Based Bank Capital Ratios," Journal of Financial Intermediation 12 (2003): 199-232.

- o Example Retail loan portfolio:
- Value = $100 \text{ M} \in$
- $1y PD = 2%$
- $\rho = 0.1$
- $RR = 60%$
- WCDR (99,9%):

$$
V(X, T) = N\left(\frac{N^{-1}[Q(T)] + \sqrt{\rho} N^{-1}(X)}{\sqrt{1 - \rho}}\right) \qquad V(0.999, 1) = N\left(\frac{N^{-1}(0.02) + \sqrt{0.1} N^{-1}(0.999)}{\sqrt{1 - 0.1}}\right) = 0.128
$$

- o 1y Credit-VaR = *WCDR* x *LGD* x *EAD* = 0.128 x (1- 0.6) x 100 M€ = 5.13 M€
- \circ 1y EL = PD x LGD x EAD = 0.02 x (1- 0.6) x 100 M€ = 0.8 M€
- \circ ρ = 0 => $V(X,T) = N(N^{-1}[Q(T)]) = Q(T) = PD =>Credit-VaR = EL$
- \circ ρ -> 1=> $V(X,T)$ -> $N(\infty)$ -> 1 => Credit-VaR -> LGD x EAD

 $\left| \frac{1}{2} \right|$

- Portfolio credit loss tends to 1 with the PD, regardless the level of confidence and the correlation coefficient.
- \circ For very high degrees of confidence (X), credit loss converges to 1 with the PD, following a concave curve, at a faster speed and from a higher value with higher correlations **VaR increases with the correlation**

\circ For lower degrees of confidence, credit loss converges slower to 1 with the PD.

- o Basel II allows banks to calculate their capital requirements for the different portfolios using internal estimates for PD and LGD, using regulatory formulas based on the WCDR and assuming different functions for the correlation coefficient.
- Corporate, Sovereign and Bank Exposures: $\rho = 0.12 \frac{1 \exp(-50 \times \text{PD})}{1 \exp(-50)} + 0.24 \left[1 \frac{1 \exp(-50 \times \text{PD})}{1 \exp(-50)} \right]$
- Capital Requirement: $EAD \times LGD \times (WCDR PD) \times MA$
- O Maturity Adjustment (MA): $MA = \frac{1 + (M 2.5) \times b}{1 1.5 \times b}$

 \circ Where $b = [0.11852 - 0.05478 \times \ln(\text{PD})]^2$, G is the inverse of N[] and M is the maturity.

Correlation (R) = 0.12
$$
\frac{(1 - e^{-50/PO})}{(1 - e^{-50})} + 0.24 \cdot \left(1 - \frac{(1 - e^{-50/PO})}{(1 - e^{-50})}\right)
$$

\n
$$
V(X, T) = N \left(\frac{N^{-1}[Q(T)] + \sqrt{\rho} N^{-1}(X)}{\sqrt{1 - \rho}}\right)
$$
\n
$$
\text{Matrix adjustment (b) = } \left[0.11852 - 0.05478 \cdot \ln(PD)\right]^2
$$
\n
$$
\text{Capital requirement}^{13,14}(K) = \left[LGD \cdot N \left[\frac{G(PD)}{\sqrt{(1 - R)}} + \sqrt{\frac{R}{1 - R}} \cdot G(0.999)\right] - PD \cdot LGD\right] \cdot \frac{(1 + (M - 2.5) \cdot b)}{(1 - 1.5 \cdot b)}
$$

Risk-weighted assets (RWA) = $K \cdot 12.5 \cdot EAD$