CHAPTER 8

THE INSTRUMENTS OF TRADE POLICY

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Impact of protection

Introduction and motivation

- 2 parts:
 - Protection without IRS or IC (part 1)
 - Protection with IRS or IC (part 1)


Preliminaries

- Introduction to Open Economy Supply & Demand Analysis
- Start with Import Demand Curve
 - This tells us how much a nation would import for any given domestic price
 - Presumes imports and domestic production are perfect substitutes
 - Imports equal gap between domestic consumption and domestic production

Home's Import Demand

Left panel is std S & D diagram; Right panel is the import D-cur we want to derive.

- 1. At P_0 , Demand exceeds supply in Home market, hence demand for imports, $D_0 S_0$.
- 2. Rise in Price to P_1 , reduces Home excess demand, lowers import demand to $D_1 S_1$.
- 3. Further rise in Price to P₂, eliminates Excess Demand, reduces import demand to 0.•The MD curve plots all the levels of import demand for each price in the Home market.
- 4. Result is a downward-sloping Import Demand Curve, MD, for Home Country.




XS = MS curve

- Do Export Supply Curve = Home's import supply curve.
 - This tells us how much a nation would export for any given domestic price


Foreign's Export Supply

Left panel is std S & D diagram; Right panel is the Export D-cur we want to derive.

- 1. Can perform similar exercise for Foreign. Quote foreign price in Home currency.
- 2. At P_0 , Foreign Demand equals Supply so no exports of good are available.
- 3. As Prices rise, Foreign Demand less than Supply so exports of good are available.
- 4. Result is an upward-sloping Export Supply Curve, XS, from Foreign country.




World Partial Equilibrium




The 3-panel diagram

- Combining the 3 diagrams lets us see the international price and the price in both importer and exporter markets.
- The FT price is P_w, defined by point 1.



Tariff: Positive effects

- A tariff drives a 'wedge' between the price in the exporters market and the price in the importer's market. $P_{importer} = P_{exporter} + T$, where T is the tariff (specific tariff, not ad valorem)
 - (Discuss: Specific vs. ad valorem)
- T lowers imports=exports; raises price in Home & lowers it in Foreign



Measuring Amount of Protection

- "Height of the average tariff" is a measure of how much price interference exists in country's tariff schedule.
- Unweighted Average Nominal Tariff rate:
 - Does not take into account relative importance of each good.
 Tends to overstate true height of average tariff.
- Weighted Average Nominal Tariff rate:
 - Each good's tariff is weighted by the importance of the good in the bundle of imports. Tends to be biased downwards.
- Prohibitive Nominal Tariff rate:
 - Tariff rate so high it prevents imports from coming into country.
- Effective Rate of Protection (ERP):
 - Change in the value-added of an industry (relative to free trade) due to imposition of a tariff structure on intermediate & final products.


Nominal (t) and Effective (g) Tariff rates

	U.S.		E.U.		Japan	
Rates as of 1984	t	g	t	g	t	g
Agriculture/Forestry/Fish	1.8	1.9	4.9	4.1	18.4	21.4
Food/beverages/tobacco	4.7	10.2	10.1	17.8	25.4	50.3
Wearing Apparel	22.7	43.3	13.4	19.3	13.8	42.2
Footwear	8.8	15.4	11.6	20.1	15.7	50.0
Furniture & Fixtures	4.1	5.5	5.6	11.3	5.1	10.3
Chemicals	2.4	3.7	8.0	11.7	4.8	6.4
Glass & Glass Products	6.2	9.8	7.7	12.2	5.1	8.1
Iron & Steel	3.6	6.2	4.7	11.6	2.8	4.3
Electrical machinery	4.4	6.3	7.9	10.8	4.3	6.7
Simple Average Tariff	4.7	7.8	6.1	8.7	6.1	10.0

Source: Deardorf & Stern, The Effects of the Tokyo Round and the Structure of Protection

Tariff: Welfare effects (Home)

- NB: Home now has 2 prices:
 - Domestic price that Home firms & cons'rs see.
 - Border price that the nation actually pays to foreigners.
 - Gap is the T; paid to Home govt
- The domestic price rise:
 - harms cons'rs by blue area
 - Helps firms by spotted blue area
- The govt collects tariff revenue equal to imports times T; the shaded area.
- Politics of protection:
 - Often winners (firms) from protection are better organised than the losers (cons'rs).



= consumer loss (a + b + c + d)= producer gain (a)= government revenue gain (c + e)


Tariff: Net effects (Home)

DWL

- The loss to domestic consumers that is not offset by gains to firms or govt revenue are b+d
- Called 'dead weight loss', or Harberger triangles.
- Efficiency loss.


ToT gain.

- Home gets its imports for less and this is a gain for nation as a whole.
- The direct source of this ToT gain is that the govt is, in effect, passing some of the tax burden on to foreigners. (incidence).




Tariff: Small country fiction

- The ToT effect maybe relatively small for small countries.
 - In reality, this depends upon the product.
 - Switzerland is small for oil, but big for, say, watches, banks & drug companies.
 - A Swiss tariff on cars would be partial absorbed by foreign car producers
 - This is a ToT effect
- Nevertheless, small country fiction is a useful abstraction.
 - Eliminates ToT effects & thus make T unambiguously bad for Home. (undergrads).
- Δ CS=-(a+b+c+d); Δ PS=a; Δ Rev=c. Net is negative = -b-d.




The naïve case for free trade

- FT & efficiency
 - Small nations unambiguously gain from removing tariffs
 - e.g. Hong Kong & Singapore have basically zero tariffs.
 - Basis of naïve statement by some: 'Unilateral liberalisation is always good'



Export subsidy


- What happens when Home subsidies the export of its good?
- Subsidy lowers the world price of the export to P_s^* , while Home firms see P_s^* plus the subsidy, i.e. P_s .
- Home welfare effects:
 - Δ CS=-(a+b), Δ PS=+(a+b+c), cost of subsidy= b+c+d+e+f+g.
 - Net Loss = (b+d+e+f+g)
 - = DWL (b+d) + ToT loss (e+f+g)



Export tax like import tariff, G.E.

- This is called 'Lerner's symmetry'
- The basic point is almost trivial.
- With two goods and only relative prices mattering, the impact on the relative price of raising the numerator is the same as lowering the denominator.
- Import tariff raises the internal price of imports relative to exports.
- Export tax lowers the internal price of exports to imports (since now domestic export firm sell less abroad and more at home, so home price falls).
- In the diagram ...

1. World rel.price = national budget line for imports & exports. Make the small country assumption so we can ignore ToT effects.




Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs)

- Bit of history on terminology.
- Most common form of a Non-Tariff Barrier is a QR=quantitative restriction.
 - an import quota is one common QR, it restricts the quantity of good imported.
 - Requiring an import license is a common means of implementing.
- Import Quota
 - Restricts quantity of good imported during a year.
 - Effect is to increase home price of the good over free trade.
 - Market effects identical to a specific tariff (if perfect competition).
 - In fact, any quota can be mimicked by an equivalent tariff, so we often speak of the 'tariff-equivalent' of the QR.
 - Welfare effects differ because gov't does not necessarily receive revenue as under a tariff.
 - 'Quota rents'= buy low, sell high.
 - Depends who has the rights to the import licenses
 - Govt may gain revenue if auctions off import licenses,
 - otherwise additional revenue received by domestic imports, or foreign exporters.
- Other types of QRs (many illegal now under the WTO; called 'grey area' measures under the GATT)
 - Voluntary Export Restraint (VER's)
 - Foreign supplier "voluntarily" agrees to restrict quantity imported.
 - Usually a political agreement so Home does not look protectionist.
 - Market effects identical to an import quota, but welfare effects differ as foreign firms receive additional profit, Home gov't receives nothing.
 - VRAs, OMA
- Application: How economic sanctions can make the target regime rich.

Import quota (small nation fiction)

- Home welfare effects:
 - Δ CS=-(a+b+c+d), Δ PS=+(a), quota rents= c.
 - DWL = -(b+d) if quota
 rents stay at home and (b+c+d) if foreigners get
 them.
- Policies where forigners get the rents:
 - VER=Voluntary export restraints,
 VRA=Voluntary restraint agreement,
 OMA=orderly marketing arrangements, etc.
- Often rents used to buy off or appease Foreign opposition.



= producer gain (a)


= quota rents (c)

NTBs & corruption

- Any time imports are constrained, a buy-low-sell-high opportunity arises.
- With a tariff, govt exploits this
- With NTBs, who knows?
 - Invitation to corruption of domestic govt officials who allocate the import licenses or other control devices, foreign export firms, domestic smugglers, etc.
- Lack of transparency
 - How much protection is provided?
- Domestic industry prefers due to certainty of import level.

Less naive case for free trade

- The ToT gain for Home is matched exactly by the ToT loss for Foreign.
- Both Home and Foreign experience DWL.
- Suppose another market where Home exports and Foreign imports.
- If Home and Foreign impose tariffs on each others exports, then both removing them at same time will make both nations better off by the amt of the DWL.
- MTN are like 'passing parade parable'



'dynamic' GFT


- These efficiency gains are multiplied by other gains such as increased economies of scale, and proinvestment effects.
- Working these out can be complex, but basic idea is simple.
- Improved 'static' efficiency improves a nation's investment climate, so more investment gets done.
- The initial static GFT is multiplied by trade-induced investment-led growth.

Political argument

- Protection is a way of allocating resources in the economy, i.e. influencing production and dist'n of welfare.
- Markets are imperfect so there may be an economic argument for protection, but politicians are also imperfect, so the question is:
 - Which is more imperfect? Politically chosen import prices, or market chosen?
- Powerful special interest groups often manage to get govts to put in policies that help few rich and harm many less rich consumers.
 - They often use populist arguments and play of ignorance of voters.

Arguments against FT


- ToT argument.
 - A country can improve welfare if foreign nations do not retaliate.
- Domestic market failures;
 - Since mkts are imperfect, mkt production level may not be socially optimal.
 - D-curve gives the marg'l priv benefit of produciton.
 - Social benefit may be higher than this.
- Bottom panel shows an example.
 - Protection that raises output to S2
 will have extra gains for area c.




End

MD curve (welfare)


- Left panel is a std S&D.
- What happens if price rises from P' to P"?
- Home consumers lose A+B+C+D; Home firms gain A; net Lose is B+C+D (in left panel)
- This exactly equals C+E in the right panel.



Welfare & Import demand curve




Export supply curve (XS = MS)



Import demand curve (MD)

- Left panel is std S&D.
- What happens if price $< P^*$? Home has a positive import demand.
- The MD curve plots all the levels of import demand for each price in the Home market.



Export supply curve (XS=MS)

- Left panel is std S&D for Foreign nation (the exporter).
- Foreign has surplus production for prices above P*.
- The MS curve plots all the levels of export supply for each price in the Foreign market.

