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# Repertoires of Trust: The Practice of Trust in a Multinational Organization amid Political Conflict

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*Sociologists and other social scientists have recently renewed their interest in the concept of trust. Multidisciplinary studies have identified social psychological, economic, and structural determinants of trust; traced its development in interpersonal relationships; and explored its transformation in response to modernization. Drawing on ethnographic research at a multinational corporation operating in a politically charged environment, we reexamine these approaches to trust. We explore trust relations between Israeli and Jordanian managers in an Israeli–Jordanian industrial site. Trust, always tenuous in multinational collaboration, poses formidable challenges to this fragile relationship between former enemies. Comparing trust relations during normalization and political unrest provides a natural experiment for observing how forms of trust change in response to a transformed political environment. We show how Jordanians and Israelis apply different forms of trust alternately and interchangeably, transcending cultural dichotomies such as tradition and modernity and deviating from presupposed developmental paths. Following practice theory, our “trust repertoires” approach depicts actors as knowledgeable agents who select, compose, and apply different forms of trust as part of their cultural repertoires. By applying forms of trust, actors demarcate the boundaries of their social relationships. At the same time, actors’ strategies are inextricably intertwined with the power structure and political context. In the conclusion, we consider the implications of this analysis for control and coordination in the workplace, including labor process theories.*

The nature of trust has been a fundamental conundrum throughout the history of sociology (Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997). Recently, the concept of trust has drawn attention in other disciplines and in organizational studies

(Kramer and Cook 2004; McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer 2003; Rousseau et al. 1998). This invigorated interest in trust has several catalysts: the challenge of long-distance coordination of work in a growing global market, the

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emergence of new technologies and forms of exchange, corporate violations of trust, and declining trust in the professions (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; McEvily et al. 2003; Mechanic 1996). Trust is back on the sociological agenda in a new, multidisciplinary context.

In this new environment, scholars have revisited an old sociological question: What leads a person “to rely on another party and to take action in circumstances where such action makes one vulnerable to the other party?” (Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998:604). To answer this question, researchers have identified the determinants of trust, explored its various forms, and traced its development through interpersonal relationships. Despite differences in perspective and method, the primary focus of these approaches is on the factors shaping the truster’s behavior rather than on the actor’s own role in selecting and using forms of trust in actual social contexts.

In this article, we propose a new theoretical perspective on trust, which we call “trust repertoires.” Drawing on recent developments in practice theory (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and von Savigny 2001), particularly in repertoire theory (Silber 2003; Swidler 1986, 2003), we outline our “trust repertoires” approach, emphasizing three interrelated dimensions that shape the practice of trust. The first is agency, or the ability of social actors to choose and apply strategies of trust in different social contexts. The second dimension is the view of culture as a repertoire of symbols and practices from which forms of trust are selected, composed, and applied. The final dimension is power and the political context, which shapes both the choice and the meaning attached to a particular form of trust.

We have developed this perspective through a long-term ethnography of GlobeWear, a multinational Israeli textile corporation that relocated its production facilities to Jordan. This multinational business environment provides an ideal setting for examining trust, because nowhere is trust more essential than in sustaining a fragile collaboration between two former enemies. Data collection took place during the period of normalization of Israeli–Jordanian relations and during the political unrest of the Intifada el Aqsa. Comparing trust relations during normalization and political instability provides a natural experiment in which to observe

how forms of trust change in response to a transformed political environment. Political instability shifted working relationships and forced both sides to use different elements from their trust repertoires. We show how Jordanians and Israelis applied different forms of trust alternately and interchangeably, transcending cultural dichotomies such as tradition and modernity, and deviating from presupposed developmental paths.

### **APPROACHES TO TRUST: DETERMINANTS, DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS, AND CULTURAL SCRIPTS**

As the problem of trust, always at the heart of the classical problem of social order, has resurfaced, this renewed interest has led to myriad conceptions, definitions, and explanations of trust. Amid the many approaches that have proliferated, it is possible to identify three broad strands. A first strand treats trust as a unitary phenomenon with a stable meaning. The goal of this research is to identify the determinants of trust and mistrust, primarily through experiments and surveys.<sup>1</sup> Rational choice theorists, for example, locate trust in the rational egoist individual and identify the institutional mechanisms that would prevent opportunism (Dasgupta 1988; Ostrom 2003). Experimental social psychologists have devised variations on the prisoner’s dilemma to explore the conditions that foster or hinder trust, such as incentives and strategies, group size, communication, and third-party effects (for reviews of this research, see Cook and Cooper 2003; Ostrom 2003; Yamagishi 1995).

A second strand identifies the macrosocial determinants of trust, such as embeddedness in social networks (Coleman 1990; Granovetter 2002) or communal ties (Fukayama 1995; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000).

<sup>1</sup> There have also been a few studies using observations and interviews exploring how taxi drivers assess customers’ trustworthiness (Gambetta and Hamill 2005) and how herders in Kenya use fictive kin to solve agency problems (Ensminger 2001). However, most research on the determinants of trust has been quantitative.

A third strand distinguishes among types of trust, which vary over the course of interpersonal relationships. Among the various forms of trust researchers have identified, *calculative* and *normative* trust are considered the two major clusters of trusting behavior varying in scope and degree (i.e., varying in their “bandwidth”) (Lane 1998;<sup>2</sup> Rousseau et al. 1998). Calculative trust occurs in impersonal and instrumental interactions in which relationships are circumscribed, such as contracts, the market, and bureaucracies (Williamson 1993). Normative trust, in contrast, is more holistic and occurs in informal, emotionally charged personal relationships, such as friendships, families, and communities. Several researchers have characterized the development of trust as a sequential process in which the bandwidth of trust expands through repeated interactions and growing familiarity between parties, beginning with calculative trust and culminating in normative trust as relationships develop and deepen over time (Bigley and Pearce 1998; Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Rousseau et al. 1998).

In the context of a global economy and multinational corporations, still other researchers have viewed trust as culturally specific and have associated calculative and normative trust with Western and non-Western societies. In non-Western industrial settings, trust has been characterized as normative in contrast to formal and calculative forms of trust prevailing in Western industrial settings (Child and Mollering 2003). This argument is in line with a general tendency in sociology to link forms of trust to the transition from premodern to modern society (Seligman 1997). Giddens, for example, traces the transformation of trust from premodernity through the ascendance of experts and abstract systems associated with modernity to the “active trust” that occurs with the decline of expert power in late modernity (Giddens 1994; Lash 1994).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Lane proposes a third cluster called “cognitive-based trust,” which has been regarded as having too much overlap with norm-based trust to be considered a separate category (Grey and Garsten 2001).

<sup>3</sup> Scholars also disagree as to whether trust relations increase or recede with modernization (for contrasting views, see Giddens 1994 and Cook et al. 2005).

The studies of trust we reviewed depict the truster as the carrier of social and psychological modes of thinking and acting, as following developmental pathways, or as tied to cultural scripts. Running through these diverse studies is a common thread. As Child and Mollering (2003:73) note, “The truster can only draw on ‘given’ contextual variables (including her/his own personality and cognitive capability).” Instead of conceptualizing trust “as an activity for the truster,” most approaches treat trust as “a consequence of given factors.”

Our trust repertoires approach changes the direction of inquiry. Instead of viewing the truster’s behavior as a consequence of given factors, we treat the truster as an active, knowledgeable agent capable of applying forms of trust within changing social contexts. Rather than depicting cultures as independent variables shaping the truster’s behavior, we view culture as a repertoire of skills and habits actors use as resources for pursuing their goals and interests. This cultural repertoire encompasses diverse forms of trust, varying in scope and degree. We ask how actors use culture rather than how they are affected by it. Finally, we suggest that the truster’s choice of strategy both shapes and is shaped by the political context.

In the next section, we present our trust repertoire approach by focusing on its three interrelated components: agency, culture, and power structure and political context.

## REPERTOIRES OF TRUST: AGENCY, CULTURE, AND POWER

### AGENCY

The recent studies we described call attention to the multifaceted and contextual nature of trust. Many studies also acknowledge that actors play an active role in continually monitoring and assessing situations as well as other actors’ trustworthiness. However, we suggest that the very forms and categories of trust are themselves the result of active choices. In this article, we identify how both trusters and trustees impose, demand, resist, and alter forms of trust and manipulate their bandwidth. The goal of our approach is to make visible the processes that many studies of trust treat as a “black box.” We treat the actor as the engine of trust (Swidler 1986). Agency refers, then, to actors’ decisions to apply different forms of trust in diverse sit-

uations. Trusting is fueled by “emotional energy” (Collins 1994) and requires “knowledge of schemas, which means the ability to apply them to new contexts” (Sewell 1992:20).

Trusting behavior is more than a direct response to a particular incentive or a resource at risk: risk taking is also involved in the very act of selecting and applying a particular form and strategy of trust within a given social context. For example, applying a calculative form of trust to marriage and seeking a prenuptial agreement can reduce economic uncertainties, but it can also threaten the emotional foundation of the marriage and, consequently, might put the entire social relationship at risk.

Treating the actor as the engine of trust suggests that the developmental pathway from normative to calculative trust is but one among a number of possible scenarios. Indeed, this progression can occur. However, we are proposing that social actors complicate these processes. They are capable of shifting from one form of trust to another, using a particular form of trust sooner than expected or negotiating their strategies of trust as circumstances change. We therefore consider developmental patterns to be contingent upon agents’ strategic behavior within particular social contexts.

Thus, the practice of trust requires a wide range of social skills, cultural knowledge, and sensibility. In their mundane acts of performing trust, trusters assess situations, understand the broader social context, assess other participants’ views of their acts, and consider the nuances and gestures of trust performance.<sup>4</sup> Our use of the term “strategy” of trust refers to “a general way of organizing action . . . that might allow one to reach several different life goals” (Swidler 1986:277). Actors’ risk management requires social sensibility, skills, and habits necessary for assessing complex social contingencies and a wide range of perspectives.

<sup>4</sup> Trust is expressed in a wide range of speech acts: statements, verbal and nonverbal expressions, and bodily gestures. For further discussion of the performative dimension of trust, see Szerszynsky (1999). For other conversational and ethnographic approaches see West and Fenstermaker (2002) and Millman (1977).

## CULTURE

Our conception of trust as social practice treats the cultural tool kit of trust as more than a static entity containing “fixed” cultural codes and scripts from which actors simply pick and choose. In keeping with Sewell’s (1999:51) semiotic approach to culture, a cultural code “means more than being able to apply it mechanically in stereotyped situations—it also means having the ability to elaborate it, to modify or adapt its rules to novel circumstances.” Cultural repertoires of trust, therefore, are continuously refracted through human action and adjusted to particular social contexts.

Furthermore, we suggest that cultural repertoires of trust can transcend particular “cultures.” As Swidler (2003:23) suggests, “There are not simply different cultures: there are different ways of mobilizing and using culture, different ways of linking culture to action.” While acknowledging the possible role of “cultures” in shaping trusting behavior, we seek to shift the direction of inquiry by offering a bottom-up analysis of agents’ complex and dynamic use of “cultures” in the practice of trust. Such an inductive approach is particularly appropriate for global settings in which symbols and cultural objects go beyond national borders.

The most salient cultural dichotomy in the sociology of trust has been the modern–premodern divide, and many theorists have argued that trust changes with the transition from premodern to modern society (Lash 1994; Zucker 1986). In Giddens’s (1990) structuration approach, for example, “active trust” is restricted to modernity and late modernity. Giddens distinguishes between the reactive, premodern truster and the independent, autonomous modern truster. In contrast to the premodern truster, whose behavior is defined primarily by the system of kinship in which she or he is positioned, the modern truster creates trusting relations on the personal level of friendship (Giddens 1990; see also Luhmann 1988).

However, for some time, sociologists have challenged modernization theory. Recent scholarship also offers a more complex picture of social change. Using data from the World Values Survey, Inglehart and Baker (2000) reject deterministic views of modernization in favor of a more complex process of social change that allows for considerable path dependence. Moreover, Geertz (1978) challenges modern-

ization theory by showing that the bazaar economy shows some of the rationality and universalism believed to be uniquely characteristic of advanced economies (for a discussion, see Guillen n.d.).

Our own ethnographic research led us to question the assumed connection between forms of trust and modernization. First, both groups displayed orientations to trust that were inconsistent with images of Jordanians as “premodern” and Israelis as “modern” trusters. Second, shifting political and economic circumstances changed the trust-related expectations and behavior of both groups.

In short, our conception of trust accords with Giddens’s notion of trust as both given to and made by social agents. However, we seek to unleash the practice of trust from a priori ties to historical stages by viewing it as a social practice to be discovered empirically.

#### ***POWER STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CONTEXT***

Our notion of trust repertoires draws heavily on Swidler’s conception of “culture in action.” In addition, following Lamont (2004), we wish to give explicit attention to the dimension of power. In particular, we identify three ways in which strategies of trust are situated in an unequal power structure and a political context.

First, actors’ choice of strategy depends on the resources available to them. These resources include, for example, symbolic and material resources, professional knowledge and skills, and social position in familial, organizational, and communal settings. These factors can enable and constrain actors’ choice of repertoire or can provide them with cultural tools that increase their latitude in negotiation.

Second, actors’ forms and strategies of trust bear political meanings and consequences. Most “adequate” strategies of trust simply reinforce the status quo and reflect existing social boundaries. For example, most actors in Western cultures are sufficiently knowledgeable to apply normative trust in a familial context and calculative trust in formal encounters in business and bureaucratic settings. In many social contexts, however, using an “inappropriate” form of trust means redrawing social boundaries and redefining social relations and thus has far-reaching social implications. Moreover, we sug-

gest that in politically contested environments, the political meanings and consequences of actors’ forms and strategies of trust are intensified.

Third, the relationship between trust and control is situated, contextual, and emergent. Trust and control are typically viewed as orthogonal forms of social organization, as Cook (2005) observes. For example, Granovetter (2002) views trust as characteristic of horizontal relations, and views power and control as typical of vertical, asymmetrical relations. Recent studies on trust have also endorsed the view of trust and control as alternative mechanisms for absorbing uncertainty and reducing risk (Das and Teng 2001; Grey and Garsten 2001; Reed 2001). Within this framework, trust and control are inversely related: the wider the trustee’s scope and degree of trust, the weaker the truster’s level of control, and vice versa.

Consistent with this ostensibly stark contrast between trust and control, the study of work in organizations has been bifurcated into studies emphasizing trust and those emphasizing control. Trust-based studies have focused on the cooperative, consensual side of social life—a focus typically associated with the Durkheimian tradition—and have been relatively silent on problems of power and control (Stone 1952). Conversely, as Hodson (1999) notes,<sup>5</sup> labor process theory, beginning with Braverman’s (1974) classic work on the degradation of work, has focused almost exclusively on control—that is, on how management regulates labor under late capitalism. With the “second wave” of labor process theory came the recognition that control is not absolute, that it can exist in multiple and subtle forms (Edwards 1979; Friedman 1977), and that it typically occurs through worker consent rather than coercion (Burawoy 1979; see also Lincoln and Kalleberg 1985). Although the trend has been to give greater play to conflict and worker resistance, labor process theory—even in the more nuanced “second wave”—remained tied to a neo-Marxian tradition in

<sup>5</sup> Hodson’s focus is not on the inattention to trust in labor process theory, but rather on the neglect of the normative basis of organizational life in workplace studies. In this context, he points to the overemphasis on “forms of workplace control as determinants of workplace relations” (Hodson 1999:292).

which the central problematic remains that of control.

Our trust repertoire approach calls into question the view of trust and control as orthogonal. Both trust and control are part of a cultural repertoire, and both occur in asymmetrical relationships and among status equals (Cook 2005). Recent work on the labor process has noted that management can elicit workers' cooperation by demonstrating trustworthiness and winning the workers' trust (Hodson 2004). By the same token, workers may attempt to secure privileges by demonstrating to management that they are "trustworthy employees." In these cases, trust and control are so closely intertwined that the distinction between them becomes blurred. If we question a hard-and-fast distinction between trust and control, we must also question the bifurcation of research into trust-based studies and research on the labor process.

Rather than assume a priori that trust and control vary directly or inversely, we view them as concepts whose meaning is to be explored empirically. We consider the relations between trust and control to be contingent upon their meaning for the various participants in a given context. Normative trust, for instance, may signify for the truster weaker control over the trustee in one context but serve as the principal control mechanism in another. Providing an adequate account of actors' strategic behavior demands a fuller understanding of the local context, participants' positions and viewpoints, and the existing cultural repertoires of trust available to actors in the encounter.

In the following sections, we apply this approach to social relations in a joint venture between Israelis and Jordanians during both normalization and political unrest. Our analysis tells a different story than the scenarios suggested by some of the approaches we have reviewed. Following the developmental approach, we would expect both Israelis and Jordanians to begin with calculative trust, with the Israelis moving toward normative trust as relationships deepen over time. Giddens's (1994) and other essentialist approaches to culture would suggest that the "modern" Israelis would display calculative trust, whereas the ostensibly traditional Jordanians would use normative trust throughout the duration of the study. In contrast, we show that Israelis and Jordanians drew upon a broader cultural repertoire to use both forms

of trust interchangeably in different social contexts. We also show how their choice of strategy shapes and is shaped by the political context. By choosing a particular form of trust, actors define social relationships and demarcate social boundaries.

## METHODS

Our principal method is ethnographic research conducted at the Jordanian plants of a multinational corporation from 1999 through 2001. This field work included participant observation two to three days a week, on the shop floor and during management meetings and social encounters, as well as *in situ* interviews with Jordanian and Israeli managers

We investigated trust in this multicultural and multilingual setting using a careful, bottom-up grounded approach that generates theory from data (Emerson 2001; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Our "trust repertoire" theoretical approach entailed an *emic* research strategy focused on how trust is enacted locally. At the same time, we also situated actors' strategies of trust in the context of the social organization of production and the firm's work culture, as well as in the broader political context.

The field work focused on production, logistical, and planning managers at three different plants in the Jordanian production site: a total of 42 Jordanian managers and supervisors were regularly observed and interviewed during the two-year field research.

The Israeli-Jordanian context required using three languages. Some knowledge of Arabic was required to understand casual conversations between managers and workers on the shop floor. The language for scheduled interviews with Jordanian managers was English, which served as the *lingua franca* of the site. Use of English as a shared language is common in multinational corporations, where it is believed to promote efficiency (Piekkari and Zander 2005) and to appeal to English-speaking customers. Meetings and professional interactions between Israeli and Jordanian managers were conducted in English, as were the minutes and reports addressed to both sides. The interviews with the Israeli managers and the meetings including only Israelis were conducted in Hebrew. Because many of the Israeli managers knew a little Arabic, particularly those whose

families were from Middle Eastern countries, English, interspersed with Arabic, was used in informal conversations.

In addition, our ethnographic data include observations and interviews of two groups of Israeli managers. The first group consisted of four logistical and planning managers located in Jordan. The Israeli managers were observed and interviewed in their offices or on the shop floor, discussing various issues pertaining to their professional and personal experiences of working with their Jordanian counterparts. These discussions often continued during the evening over dinner or in the lobby of the hotel in which we stayed. The second group of Israelis included the divisional and operational managers and the headquarters-based planning, logistics, and quality control managers, who were observed during their visits to the Jordanian sites and during meetings they held with their Jordanian counterparts.

## SETTING AND BACKGROUND

### *A MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT*

The setting is a Jordanian textile factory of 2,500 workers, part of GlobeWear, a large Israeli-owned textile firm. GlobeWear was one of several Israeli textile concerns to relocate their production operations to Egypt and Jordan (Drori 2000) in the 1990s, as the Arab–Israeli peace process gained momentum, and the first to establish a plant in Medinat el Hasan, an industrial park in northern Jordan near Irbid that soon became an enclave of Jewish textile plants.

GlobeWear is a multinational corporation with gross sales of approximately \$500 million in 2000. The firm produces high-quality apparel (mainly underwear, leisurewear, baby clothes, and socks) for leading U.S. brands such as Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, and Donna Karan and retailers such as the Gap. GlobeWear maintains operations throughout the world. In addition to Israeli headquarters and the Jordanian site, GlobeWear also has production facilities in Egypt, China, Thailand, Romania, Bulgaria, and El Salvador. In many ways, GlobeWear is a typical multinational corporation seeking to reduce production costs in the growing global economy by relocating its operations from the core of the world system to the periphery

(Gereffi and Memdovic 2003). Furthermore, like other multinational firms throughout the world, GlobeWear operates in a highly competitive environment. The mid-1990s marked a radical change in the global competitive market as labor-intensive, low-skilled, low-wage producers from the Far East, Eastern Europe, and northern Africa began to compete vigorously within GlobeWear's niche. In response, GlobeWear expanded to Eastern Europe and reformulated its business strategy, closing unprofitable production lines and focusing on more sophisticated products for prestigious brand labels that brought higher profit margins.<sup>6</sup>

Geopolitical changes in the Middle East, particularly the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, created new opportunities for GlobeWear to relocate its production facilities. The availability of female labor in Jordan and Egypt, which was 10 times cheaper than in Israel, was particularly attractive. In addition, Jordan's proximity to the firm's headquarters in northern Israel made prospects for launching a Jordanian production site particularly appealing. GlobeWear's management expected that demands for communications, coordination, and control would be more manageable in Jordan than in more distant foreign locations where cheap labor was readily available.

### *ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE*

Jordan's geographic proximity to Israel and the demographic similarities of the Israeli and Jordanian workforces led GlobeWear to develop a form of management and control that was unique to Jordan. In contrast to GlobeWear's other subsidiaries, the Jordanian subsidiary was a "hybrid" structure in which the Jordanians occupied all managerial posts in the plant while Israelis were *in situ* advisors serving as consultants in production, planning, and quality control. In addition, Israeli division managers visited the Jordanian plants periodically for professional training and consultation. From the

<sup>6</sup> The positive response to GlobeWear's IPO and rising stock prices during the study period suggests that this strategy proved successful. However, it should be noted that the entire NASDAQ was rising during this period.



start, Israeli managers attempted to mold operations in Jordan to the modus operandi of its Israeli plants. Production technology was transferred from the Israeli to the Jordanian site, and the assembly lines at both sites were nearly identical. Cadres of Jordanian managers were trained in Israel before the Irbid plants opened, and newly recruited management staff participated in similar training.

Ownership of production operations in Jordan was also a hybrid partnership between a Jordanian holding company (49 percent) and GlobeWear, the Israeli concern (51 percent). The Jordanian company, the industrial park's major developer, dealt primarily with local institutions, whereas the Israeli concern ran the commercial aspects of the business.

The organizational structure was a strictly linear hierarchy of managers, supervisors, and seamstresses. Each of the two divisions—Men's Wear and Women's Wear—had its own production floor, with the local general manager maintaining overall responsibility and making decisions on such issues as the movement of workers and equipment, salaries, and remuneration.

The division of labor was well differentiated. The production and general managers coordinated operations with headquarters and had overall responsibility for shop floor activities. The supervisors were responsible for the daily management of the department, including meeting production quotas, discipline, and problem solving. The plant had formal bureaucratic rules regarding the division of tasks between managers and supervisors: the managers saw their roles as monitoring, trouble shooting, and communicating with headquarters "from the office," and they rarely interfered with the daily supervision of work on the shop floor.

Both workers and supervisors were young Palestinian women from villages and refugee camps, as was also the case in the Israeli plants. Most of the sewing machine operators were unmarried and experiencing work for wages for the first time. The supervisors were married women, and most viewed their jobs as long-term careers. At both sites, the managers were mostly men. However, unlike the Israeli site, at which managers were usually Israeli Jews, at the Jordanian location they were Jordanian Arabs of Palestinian origin. Most of the Israeli managers were chosen for their potential managerial skills:

one of the most important criteria for selection was having served as an officer in the Israeli army. Jordanian managers overseeing logistics, planning, and production generally had previous managerial experience (although usually not in textiles), and many came with higher levels of technical education.

#### ***THE PRODUCTION PROCESS ON THE SHOP FLOOR***

Raw materials, including fabrics and accessories, were transported by truck from Israel. After sewing and packaging had been completed in Jordan, the finished products were trucked back to Israel for shipment to GlobeWear's clients in Europe and the United States. At the production site, work followed what was known as the "bundle" system, in which predesigned components, packed in bundles of up to 50, were distributed by supervisors to sewing machine operators. After the sewing, the bundle was retied and the supervisor marked its completion on a form attached to the sewing machine. The supervisor then gave the sewing machine operator a new bundle and an update on her work progress in relation to her daily quota.

The production process was typical of assembly line plants in which technology, specialization, and work organization confine the worker to a machine and to repetitive, routine, and predetermined tasks (Drori 2000). The production floor was organized in long rows, and the seamstresses sat at their machines, one behind the other, joining pieces of garments given to them in bundles. The sewn pieces of garment went through a sequence of operations, each complementing the other, until the entire product was completed. Routinization was seen as the main driver of worker efficiency because it forced workers to develop a steady rhythm while focusing on a limited number of procedures and operations.

GlobeWear's managers initially believed that relocation to Jordan would require little or no adaptation of the production systems already established in Arab and Druze villages within Israel (Drori 2000). As an Israeli divisional manager noted, "The women have the same traditional mentality that we were used to dealing with at home. We know their sensitivities and have already tried every device to keep them

motivated.” However, although technology was easily exported from headquarters to the subsidiary, managerial practices on the shop floor were not easily transferred.

In Israel, managers had developed a paternalistic and familistic strategy to control Palestinian factory workers by incorporating the young women’s family structure into a Fordist organization of production. Because young women factory workers were under the strict control of the men in their families, it was the men who controlled absenteeism and turnover in the plant. With this in mind, managers often invited fathers and older brothers to the plant or visited them in the villages to win their trust. By discussing details of their daughters’ attendance and work, Israeli managers attempted to co-opt fathers and use them to control the job performance of workers on the shop floor.

This form of labor control, which Wolf (1992) refers to as “organizational patriarchy,” is widely accepted in industrial zones in East Asia, where it is often grounded in an ethnocentric view of local workers as premodern, traditional, and backward (Ong 1991).

At GlobeWear, this control strategy blurred the boundaries between family and work to the extent that managers adopted a paternalistic view of themselves as acting *in loco parentis*. Shabi, one of the plant managers, explained that “before coming here they [the young women workers] were shut in their homes and obeyed their fathers and mothers. So here I’m their father and the supervisors are their mothers.” Whether this attitude constitutes a full-fledged managerial ideology of “familistic paternalism,” as Cole (1979) suggests, or merely a “paternalistic mentality,” in Guillen’s (1994) terms, is open to interpretation. These terminological differences notwithstanding, it is clear that the Israelis justified “domination of the many by the few” (Bendix 1956) on paternalistic grounds.

Israeli managers viewed this mode of labor control as highly successful and made an effort to export it to Jordan. However, Jordanian managers rejected the use of patriarchal leverage and manipulation of familial roles, adhering strictly to a formal hierarchy of clearly defined roles. They adamantly resisted blurring the boundaries between family and work. Fathers and brothers were not allowed to intervene in daily

managerial decisions. As one of the first Jordanian managers trained in Israel observed, “Here, I’m the manager—not a father or brother. The workers respect and obey me because I’m the manager. . . . Unlike in Israel, they don’t argue or bargain with me about their quotas.”

In Jordan, the plant’s management structure was more hierarchical and formal than in Israel. As one of the production managers noted, “Discipline is very important to us. Observing the rules is critical for the workflow.” Although the Jordanian managers were, like the workers, Arabs of Palestinian origins, they were separated by a gulf of education and social class, a social distance managers sought to maintain.

### **SUBSIDIARY-HEADQUARTERS RELATIONS**

Israeli managers regularly visited Jordan to train, set production norms, and monitor production processes and logistics. Furthermore, Israeli senior staff, such as division and operations managers, quality assurance engineers, planners, and finance managers, traveled frequently between the concern’s headquarters in northern Israel and Irbid (approximately a three-hour drive, including the border stopover). To ensure control over the production process, the headquarters stationed Israeli quality controllers permanently in the plants.

Israelis supervised production through a coaching model, in which an Israeli manager accompanied his Jordanian counterpart throughout the entire workday, guiding him through the routine management of the shop floor. In addition, the Israeli coach was present at all meetings. To coordinate planning, the central planning units essentially “translated” business forecasts and actual customers’ orders into a comprehensive plan that specified how production was to be implemented. The local planning units followed the central planning units’ instructions and issued production plans to the respective plant at the site.

Israeli division managers facilitated decision making by forming ad hoc informal committees to deal with operation and production issues. The steering committee, consisting of the site general manager and the Israeli operations managers of the respective divisions, met occasionally at the request of at least one of the parties. Most meetings focused on issues such as organizational or operational changes, allo-

cation of resources, and introduction of new technologies (primarily sewing and information systems). Whenever organizational changes required a strategic management decision, the Israeli on the steering committee took the lead.

So far, we have described the mechanisms of coordination between headquarters and the subsidiary. In actual practice, however, the relationship between local managers and headquarters was more complex. Writing from a neo-institutional perspective, Kostova and Roth (2002) describe the position of foreign subsidiaries in a multinational corporation as one of *institutional duality*: they face isomorphic pressures from both the host country and the parent organization. According to Kostova and Roth, the degree to which subsidiaries will adopt practices mandated by headquarters depends on their level of dependence on headquarters' resources, their identification with or attachment to the parent organization, and most importantly, their trust that the parent organization will fulfill its commitments and act in good faith. As our analysis shows, the conflicting pressures of subsidiary managers intensified in a highly politically-contested environment in which Jordanian and Israeli managers represented two former enemy countries collaborating in a tense political climate.

### THE NORMALIZATION PHASE

The first period of contact between the Israeli and Jordanian managers (1998 to 2000) represents not only an encounter between two different cultures, each unfamiliar with the other, but also a new historical collaboration between two former enemies. In this political context, both parties approached the collaboration with considerable distrust as they attempted to define the boundaries of their relationships.

However, it would be misleading to presume that the deep-seated animosity between the former enemies entirely faded away during normalization. The ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict had a strong impact on public opinion in Jordan, where Palestinians are the majority. Outside the industrial yard, the general atmosphere ranged from cautious approval of the recent Israeli–industrial collaboration to strenuous objection. There were a number of anti-normalization demonstrations outside the plants. In downtown Irbid, anti-normalization graffiti

appeared on the walls. Furthermore, the Jordanian Engineering Association denounced Jordanian managers for collaborating with Israelis.

In 1998, the *Jordan Times* reported that members of the Jordanian business community resented what they called “U.S.–Israeli–Jordanian efforts to deliver an elusive peace [that had] divided much of Jordan’s disenfranchised population” (Alul 1998). On August 25 to 26, at a conference of anti-normalization activists from around the Arab world held in Amman, Abu Sukar, head of the Jordanian Professional Association’s Anti-Normalization Committee, argued that “after signing the [peace] treaty, Jordan politically marketed Israel in the Arab and Islamic world.” The speakers regarded Israel’s industries as part of economic imperialism, which might end with Israel’s purchase of Jordanian lands (Amr 2000).

However, the King of Jordan and the Jordanian government clearly supported the Israeli–Jordanian industrial collaboration. On August 28, 2000, two days after the anti-normalization conference, the Jordanian prime minister, Al Abur Raaghib, met with the council of trade unions. He asserted that “opposition to normalization has become an economic and social burden, and it has led to the flight of investments. . . . The unions do not legally have a right to denounce those cooperating with Israelis.”<sup>7</sup>

### CROSS PRESSURES AND MULTIPLE RISKS

From the outset, Jordanian managers were caught between local loyalties and their commitment to the workplace. As Maher, one of the Jordanian managers, explained: “I find that sometimes it is very hard to forget the history. I am a modern, educated man, and I want this place to succeed, and my mind should be clear about my relations with Israelis. I’m giving them my hospitality and trust even if I know that people point at me on the street.” Maher used

<sup>7</sup> This quotation appeared in Khilafah, [www.khilafah.com/summit/leaflets/0000905JordanPM%20final.htm](http://www.khilafah.com/summit/leaflets/0000905JordanPM%20final.htm), a Web site of the Liberation Party, an Islamic movement opposing Arab regimes deviating from Islamic law and associating with Western countries.

images of modernity, professionalism, and education as a shield against accusatory attitudes from fellow Jordanians. At the same time, Israeli managers were fully aware of the conflicting pressures facing their Jordanian counterparts. As Sami, an Israeli manager, noted, "We are working here in a very delicate environment; there are objections to our presence. The Jordanian Engineering Association even expelled the Jordanian engineers from their organization. Some elements in the community are also not so happy."

The Israelis' major concerns were with cost, output, and quality. However, because of the particular organizational structure of the Jordanian subsidiary, in which Jordanian managers occupied all levels of managerial positions, Jordanian managers still had direct control over the work process. Thus, the problem for Israeli managers was to supervise a production process they did not control directly. As Gabi, one of the Israeli managers noted:

They [the Jordanians] have their internal discretion [about whether] to adopt or reject our way of doing things. They have to take into consideration the people and their way of doing things. So, we have to accept it and to trust them that whatever action is taken, it will not harm the basics, namely costs, quality, and delivery time.

From an Israeli standpoint, this lack of complete control over local production put them at risk. Because the Jordanian managers exerted considerable control over resources (primarily labor) that the Israelis valued, the Israelis were forced to trust the Jordanians. As Gabi's comment indicates, the Jordanians' professional competence and ability to meet standards of quality production were a necessary condition for trustworthiness.

By the same token, the Jordanians were unable to determine how committed the Israelis were to the subsidiary. There was a risk that the Israelis would abandon the site if the Jordanians failed to meet their expectations. Failure to perform would not only cost the Jordanian managers their livelihoods, but it would invite further denunciations from the local community for their decision to enter into a relationship with such untrustworthy partners in the first place. As Abu-Fadi (the general manager) explained: "Money is not everything. I told them [the workers], 'We work for our self-respect and to prove

to our society and our families that we can make it.'"

### *THE JORDANIANS AND NORMATIVE TRUST*

During the period of normalization, the Jordanians displayed what scholars characterize (or caricature) as Arabs' "traditional," collectively-oriented behavior, deeply embedded in primary relational groups such as family, *hamula* (extended family), and community (for a review, see Drori 2000; see also Abu-Lughod 1986). The notion of hospitality, a positive stereotype of Arab culture, figured prominently in Jordanian rhetoric and was closely linked to emotion-based normative trust (Rousseau et al. 1998). "When I offer my friendship and hospitality, I have strong feelings for you, and my heart orders me to trust you. Sometimes I know that I shouldn't, but nevertheless I trust my Israeli friends," stated E'yad, one of the Jordanian plant managers.

The Jordanians' normative trust was reinforced by the informality and warm personal relationships that developed between the two parties during normalization. The Jordanians made considerable efforts to extend hospitality to their Israeli guests. They had frequent dinners at local restaurants and shared celebrations of personal events such as birthdays, weddings, and births involving exchanges of greetings and gifts. They also traveled together to famous tourist attractions in Jordan (e.g., the ancient Nabatic site of Petra). On these informal social occasions, Jordanians and Israelis could be observed joking, teasing each other, and even naughtily nibbling from one another's plates at a restaurant during dinner.

Given the informality outside the workplace, Jordanian managers tried to connect trust at work to social life outside it. (This strategy was in marked contrast to the formal boundaries between Jordanian managers and workers described previously.) In interactions with their Israeli counterparts, Jordanian managers made frequent references to "proper" normative behavior that included respect, honor, and solidarity. As the Jordanian general manager put it: "Here we respect each other: the workers honor the managers, and the managers honor the workers and their families. This is how we help each other, because it is our organization and every-

one is looking after the others as he looks after himself.”

### *THE ISRAELIS AND PATERNALISTIC CALCULATIVE TRUST*

The Israelis' trust during this period can best be described as *paternalistic calculative trust*. By contrast, the Jordanians clearly resisted this notion in favor of *normative trust*. Just as the Jordanian approach to trust reflected stereotypes about “traditional” societies, so the Israelis' calculative trust represented what has been described as a typical modern, rational, and professional attitude (Shenhav 1999). The Israelis viewed trust in conditional terms. As an Israeli manager suggested, “When you work on the edge, there is no such thing as unconditional trust. We have only conditional trust . . . based also on the principle of ‘seeing is believing.’” This evidence-based trust was the leitmotif of Israeli rhetoric, reflecting their vision of themselves as missionaries disseminating professional knowledge, rationality, and progress. As the Israeli Women's Wear Division Manager stated, “We have the professional clout and knowledge, and it is our duty and mission to disseminate it. Then the Jordanians have to follow suit.” The paternalistic calculative mode of trust entailed not only processes of adjustment on the part of the Jordanians, but also reindoctrination, as Haim, the Israeli Operations Manager of the Women's Wear Division, commented:

We look at the Jordanian counterpart as our youngest brothers. We coach them and trust that they will do and report in accordance with our standards. So after two years working with them, I know the boundaries of my trust. I know, for example, that I can trust my Jordanian counterpart with accurate reporting of what is done and he will work with me in the most transparent way.

The reference to the Jordanians as “youngest brothers” captures the somewhat paternalistic overtone of Haim's comment. At the same time, Israeli concerns were ultimately instrumental worries about meeting production schedules in the required quantity, mix, and quality. These concerns led to an emphasis on contractual obligations, division of tasks, formal procedures, and performance standards. Their paternalism notwithstanding, the Israelis emphasized formal procedures by adhering to headquarters' standardized professional forms and practices. To

increase the Jordanians' capacity to meet their obligations, the Israelis initiated several activities, most notably, recruiting a new generation of junior managers and sending Jordanians for brief training sessions in Israel. Haim explained the purpose of this training:

I want them to start from the basics, to put heavy emphasis on training production managers and following correct working procedures. In our trade [the routine] is obvious: getting orders, balancing production lines, following the flow of orders in the lines, quality control by the book, and closing orders to suit the customer's schedule. The moment they do so, they have my complete trust.

The Israelis were explicit about their calculative approach to trust, as indicated by the Men's Wear Division operations manager: “I believe that trust is best built and maintained on the basis of economic interests within an agreed-upon system of work. Then you don't need personal relations to create trust between each other.” In this vein, Yuval, an Israeli Quality Control Manager of the Women's Wear Division, described the turning point in his trust of his Jordanian counterparts: “I started trusting the Jordanians when I saw that they really care about quality and that they are implementing all the measures and procedures that we agreed upon.”

As Yuval indicates, Israeli trust relations centered on the Jordanians' ability to internalize and apply the necessary professional knowledge and ethos required for effective operation.

### *CONFLICTING STRATEGIES*

During this period, the Jordanians often associated trust with human motives and intentions rather than with an evaluation of professional competence and quality assurance. This Jordanian attitude clashed with the instrumental Israeli approach of competence-based trust (Mishra 1996). Production manager Gibril directly addressed this matter: “Trust is not only ‘perform perfectly and I will trust you’; trust is also a belief that you both share. This is how we look at it: we and the Israelis share trust because we are partners.” The Jordanians accepted Israeli professional authority. However, they believed that the Israeli “seeing is believing” calculative mode of trust (resulting from a fundamental uncertainty regarding Jordanian professional competence) led to an excessively tight form of

control. Jordanian planning manager Ramzi commented:

We work with the Israelis in a very open manner. We know that they are superior in terms of professionalism. Also, we all have clients and have to satisfy Victoria's Secret, Structure, or Gap. But they sometimes suffocate us; they don't fully trust that we will do our best. So they have all these procedures and practices that do not always fit to the situation here. What they are effective for is control, even if it is not apparent on the surface.

During the initial phase of establishing the Jordanian plant, local site managers often found it difficult to satisfy the Israeli division's production and quality demands. The Jordanians faced frequent complaints about shortages and delays. One of the Jordanians' reactive strategies was to expand the boundaries of relationships by blurring the line between the interpersonal and professional domains. By expanding the bandwidth of trust, the Jordanians sought to widen their leeway to negotiate and reduce the risks that ensued from failing to meet the Israelis' strict standards, thereby gaining some control over production. On these occasions, normative trust served as a form of resistance to the Israeli paternalistic calculative regime. As site manager Abu-Fadi said:

Trust is more than providing accessories on time, or completing orders on time. You can't reduce trusting relations to a single level. You know, for us trust is our honor and our obligation to GlobeWear. GlobeWear is both our lord and our guest. If they can't trust us, there is no point to any cooperation. That is why I place so much emphasis on good personal links between us. That is why I asked Gibril and Ramzi to take you to the restaurant in Garesh [an ancient Roman city] to get to know each other to help build better rapport. Here, we are all one big family, including the Israelis.

The Israelis did not rebuff the Jordanians' overtures. Rather, their response to the Jordanians' holistic strategy was to draw a strict line between their personal relations with their Jordanian partners and their professional role. As Dani, one of the planning managers, commented: "I am willing to share their work ethic and believe in its effectiveness provided that I see results. At the same time, on a personal level, after work, every time, when I'm staying at Irbid, my counterpart Abed is taking me for dinners." When the Jordanians attempted to expand the bandwidth of trust and to conflate personal with

professional boundaries, the Israelis countered by narrowing the bandwidth of trust and reasserting the strict separation of the two domains.

At times, these very different conceptions of boundaries led to misunderstandings. In their day-to-day interactions with the Jordanians, the Israelis were informal and jocular—even to the extent of teasing the Jordanians about their sex lives. For example, when a Jordanian who had two or three wives looked tired, the Israelis would tease him about how exhausted he must be after having had so much fun the night before. Israelis also joked that Jordanian factory workers should try on a piece of underwear that had come off the production line. Jordanian managers, however, were not amused by sexual humor about Jordanian women. But, when it came to work-related matters, the Israelis were blunt and direct, rarely hesitating to dispense harsh criticism. It was not uncommon to hear an Israeli tell a Jordanian manager that he had "really screwed up." Because Israeli managers drew a line between friendship and work, they would return to their jokes and humor the next day. Jordanians, whose managerial style was tactful, circumspect, and indirect, were put off by the Israelis' characteristically blunt, direct manner. Moreover, because Jordanians had a more collective notion of responsibility, blaming an individual manager for a mistake offended their sensibility. Finally, because they did not draw a line of demarcation between job and person, or role and self, the Jordanians often took Israeli criticisms as a personal affront.

The following incident illustrates this negotiation over social boundaries. Ramzi and Asia (planning managers) were struggling with a new information system provided by the Israelis for recording and monitoring incoming fabrics, accessories, and packaging material. Shmuelik, the Israeli planning manager who instructed the local Jordanian manager, commented on the Jordanians' inefficient use of the system. Asia, a local Jordanian manager, remarked, "You don't trust us unless we are working your way." Shmuelik replied: "This is why we computerize the shop floor and the inventory so we won't have to argue. It is not that I don't trust you. I will give you 1,000 dinars and know that you will give it back to me, but trust in work is following the system. There is no other way." By maintaining that the Jordanians could not be

trusted *professionally* unless they met formal standards of performance, Shmuelik attempted to divorce the personal from the professional. Abed, another Jordanian manager, countered that the professional actually depends on the personal: "The computer is one thing, but you also should know that because we trust each other and trust our friendship, we have a work ethic."

The strategies we have discussed were not covert. In fact, both Jordanians and Israelis were acutely aware of the strategies used by the other side, even to the extent of reflecting explicitly on the performances of the other. Consider, for example, the following incident. After work, a regular "rite" of Jordanian and Israeli managers was to go to dinner at various restaurants in Irbid, Garesh, or Aman. Their favorite place was a Lebanese restaurant in Garesh known for its Mediterranean food. The trip to Garesh always started with a tour of the ancient city, famous for its magnificent and well-preserved Roman antiquities. While sitting in the Roman amphitheater, Amos<sup>8</sup> and Gibril, Israeli and Jordanian managers, would often "perform" together, singing Um Kulthom (a popular Egyptian singer and cultural icon in the Arab world) songs for the enjoyment of the group.

One memorable singing session continued with Yaakov imitating Gibril, the Israeli Women's Wear Division manager. In a bass voice and with exaggerated hand movements, he jokingly said, "Gibril, every time I come to visit you, my hair is getting whiter. One more visit and I wouldn't be left with one black hair . . . Please, no excuses, just performance. You are like my brother, but I would fire my brother if he would not perform." After the burst of laughs, Amos began to imitate a few of his Jordanian peers, jokingly describing how they try to set him up by playing innocent or pretending they had never been asked to perform a task he would like them to do.

In this "play," both sides were not only knowledgeable about the strategies of trust used by the other player, but were also able to demonstrate this knowledge to their counterparts. By directing everyday conflict over the work process

into the realm of jokes and humor, Israeli managers were able to confront the Jordanians while diffusing the tension that may otherwise have resulted from such a confrontation. Moreover, the fact that the Jordanians enjoyed this caricature shows that they were able to distance themselves from their own performances (Goffman 1961). This incident shows that actors use cultural repertoires of trust reflectively. These acts on the "stage" of the amphitheater were part of an intricate and multilayered cultural performance.<sup>9</sup>

In summary, during normalization, Jordanian managers relied on normative modes of trust, whereas Israelis used paternalistic and calculative strategies, a situation that was soon to change. As we show in the next section, both parties were forced to revise their strategies in light of dramatic changes in the political climate.

### THE PHASE OF POLITICAL UNREST: REVERSAL OF STRATEGIES

The outbreak of the Intifada El-Aqsa (the Palestinian Uprising) in early October 2000 brought yet another cycle of fear, hatred, and bloodshed as it reignited the bitter conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians and enflamed the deeply rooted animosity between Arabs and Jews throughout the region. The Intifada and the ensuing events profoundly affected the general political climate surrounding GlobeWear. The textile industry, a forerunner of cooperation between the two countries, was hard hit, as demands to dismantle economic ties with Israel became part of the agenda put forth by Arabs supporting the Palestinians.

In Jordan, with its sizeable Palestinian population, calls for cutting all ties with Israel were particularly emphatic. The crisis also strained the network of personal contacts between Israelis and Jordanians. Although the border remained formally open and functioned as usual, the physical security of Israelis crossing into Jordan could no longer be taken for granted.

<sup>8</sup> Amos, like other Mizrahi Jews (Jews from a Moslem country of origin) among the Israeli managers, could joke and chant with the Jordanian managers in Arabic.

<sup>9</sup> For a rich discussion of the use of play in the work setting, see Roy (1958). However, here managers did not use play to cope with the monotony of the assembly line, but rather to demonstrate their awareness of the other players' strategies.

***CROSS PRESSURES AND MULTIPLE RISKS  
DURING POLITICAL TURMOIL***

During this phase of political unrest, both sides' strategies of trust changed considerably. The outbreak of violence tested the prevailing modus operandi of trust relations. Under the new political and security conditions, the Israelis were forced to transfer supervising, monitoring, and quality control to the Jordanians. Israelis now faced intensified risks to their safety as well as the economic risk that the plant might ultimately be forced to close. As David, the Israeli Men's Wear Division quality control manager, explained:

The crisis forced me to change the system of quality control. I decided to transfer all the responsibilities of the central quality unit to the plant managers. I even withdrew our quality controllers from Irbid and brought them back to Carmiel. I'm panicky and nervous because it's a gamble; if it doesn't work we will pay dearly.

Jordanian managers now faced two kinds of risk. First, the Israeli–Jordanian partnership became even more fragile—and considerably more dangerous—than it had been during normalization. For this reason, Jordanians feared that the Israelis would leave Jordan and close the operation as a result of deteriorating production and quality levels—to say nothing of risks to their safety. Second, the partnership with the Israelis—always a risky venture—actually became dangerous under the Intifada. Jordanians feared that if their joint venture with the Israelis came to an end, this outcome would not only cost them their livelihoods, but it would also incite further denunciations from the local community for betraying the Palestinian cause by collaborating with the enemy.

***THE ISRAELIS: FROM CALCULATIVE TO  
NORMATIVE TRUST***

In the midst of political unrest, both sides reshuffled their cultural tools and reversed their strategies. With the onset of the Intifada, the Israelis altered their managerial practices. Their management style shifted from monitoring and control to facilitation and support. Israeli managers viewed themselves, in one manager's words, as moving from a role of being the "ears and the eyes of the headquarters to the role of being the feet and the arms of the site."

Israelis served as intermediaries and facilitators in two ways. First, they defended the actions of the Jordanian managers to headquarters and explained the local constraints the Jordanians faced. For example, with the outbreak of the Intifada, the risks of working for GlobeWear intensified, and the site experienced difficulties recruiting labor, such as skilled seamstresses, and high turnover among trained production managers. As the site's advocates at headquarters, the Israelis' role was to explain these difficulties to management.

Second, acting on behalf of local managers, Israeli managers conveyed information about the needs of Jordanian operations. For example, they sought to ensure the timely shipment of cut fabric and accessories from Israel. One of the Israeli planning managers commented on this:

I'm spending my days in Carmiel, running errands for Ramzi [Jordanian planning manager], pushing and verifying that all they need for smooth production will be in place and in time. When I do it from here [Carmiel, the headquarters], it is much easier. I know the difficulties there from experience, and I ask the people here to take it into consideration.

Some Israeli managers believed that the role of facilitator practically made them Jordanian helpers. Yuval, one of the Israeli quality managers, jokingly commented: "Now we are working for the Jordanians. Things have reversed; we are their gofers."

As the dangers of crossing the border intensified during the Intifada, Israeli managers visited the site infrequently. They were forced to relinquish direct supervision and to entrust their Jordanian counterparts with oversight of the plant's daily operations. Not only did the Israelis depend economically on the Jordanians to oversee the plant, but they also depended on Jordanian managers to protect their lives during visits to Jordan. During one of their periodic visits to the site, for example, Israeli managers took a taxi to the plant. To reach the site, they had to pass through the Jordanian village of Karameh, which had formerly served as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters and was a frequent target of Israeli raids. When they reached the village, one Israeli commented facetiously that they were about to be killed by the Palestinians. His colleague replied, "Not to worry. Abu Fadi and Abu Omar



gave their word of honor that, as their guests, we would be safe.”

As a result of their double dependence on the Jordanians, the Israelis adopted the very form of trust that the Jordanians had once used: normative trust. Ironically, the Israelis came to rely on the strategy of trust they had once rebuffed and denigrated as a smokescreen for the Jordanians’ professional incompetence.

As the Israelis’ control over the production process weakened, calculative trust was no longer a viable strategy. Unable to supervise the Jordanians directly, Israelis became less concerned with the specifics of the Jordanians’ role performance. Rather, what mattered most to the Israelis was that the Jordanians would be sufficiently loyal to be entrusted with running the plant. Increasingly, the Israelis attempted to instill loyalty in their Jordanian counterparts so that the Jordanians could be trusted. As one manager observed:

We have difficulties reaching Irbid. We’re practically cut off, and it is hard to see what’s going on in the plants using the telephone. We withdrew, and now we don’t have a reliable end-of-the-line quality inspection. How can we trust the Jordanians now? I felt I need to speak with Abu-Fadi, or Iad, or Jamil [plant managers] and also with every junior manager I didn’t speak to before. I tell them, “Listen guys, I count on you to do the job properly. You have a word and you will live up to it. We are partners, one team, working for our company and share its fate.” Believe me, I have a full battery of pep talks.

The manipulative tone of this statement may indicate a cynical or, at the very least, opportunistic use of normative trust, which in turn might reflect underlying mistrust. In this case, it is hard to discern whether normative trust was accompanied by an “authentic” sense of trust or whether it was used opportunistically.

In other cases, Israeli efforts to cultivate the Jordanians’ loyalty and personal commitment seemed to be based on a genuine sense of friendship, as David’s statement indicates:

I’m building on the personal commitment of Abu-Fadi and the managers. I trust them on the basis of our personal friendship, and I know that they won’t let me down. You may call it emotional blackmail, but I hope that the feeling of personal obligation will result in more careful implementation of quality standards and procedures all over the plants, including in the lines.

### *THE JORDANIANS: FROM NORMATIVE TO CALCULATIVE TRUST*

Just as the Intifada forced the Israelis to adjust to a changed work environment, so did the uprising compel the Jordanian managers to adapt to an altered political landscape. The absence of divisional staff during the first few months of the crisis meant that the Jordanians had to assume unprecedented levels of managerial responsibility and professional autonomy. However, they did not have complete control over production. In fact, they were dependent on the Israelis for supplies. Looming in the background was the economic risk that the Israelis would abandon the site or be less than fully committed to a plant that was soon to close. The fact that the Jordanians had risked their lives for this dangerous collaboration only fueled their investment in GlobeWear’s success.

These new contingencies transformed the Jordanians’ relationship to the Israelis. Given their new autonomy from direct supervision, their goal was no longer to deflect Israeli criticism by appealing to personal loyalty. Safeguarding their newly found autonomy, and the prompt and efficient shipment of materials from headquarters, was now what mattered most.

Jordanian managers, therefore, adopted a mode of trust that reflected these changed circumstances: they moved from normative trust to a calculative, contractual mode of trust. Jordanian managers now trusted their Israeli counterparts only to the extent that the latter demonstrated competence and efficiency and, in a word, fulfilled their professional obligations. Monir, one of the plant managers, eloquently explained the change in the trusting relations and its rationale:

The war forced us to become more independent and to do much better than in times of peace. The situation helped us grow rapidly and forced us to be independent, as the division can’t help us. On the contrary, if they [the Israelis] interfere, that could ruin everything. So we took the responsibility upon ourselves and showed them that we can do it by ourselves. We now want them to adapt to the situation and to provide us all the material and the accessories we need and on time. Now they should follow the rules and regulations and overcome the problems. I can understand that they’re under pressure, but personal excuses don’t help us if the work here stops.

It was only a matter of time before the Jordanian managers began to criticize the Israelis openly for their apparent lack of organization and inefficiency. As Nabil commented:

We are working now according to the book, and the divisions' basic plans change too frequently. You [Israelis] are not organized and always interrupt the flow of work with urgent orders or completions [of former orders]. You [Israelis] are not meeting your commitments to supply us the necessary raw material and accessories. We are now working according to the book, and you should help us. This is the only way to satisfy our customers and to deal with the problems here.

The Israelis were not altogether comfortable with the Jordanians' new management style. Yaakov, the Israeli Women's Wear division's logistics and planning manager, had this to say about the role reversal:

Now they [the Jordanians] are killing me with all their requests and complaints about the difficulties we have here. The situation reversed; the student has become stricter than the teacher. I have Hussein [a Jordanian manager] who suddenly calls me and demands an answer and quick.

There was an additional reason for this reversal in modes of trust. With the Intifada, the configuration of risks changed for the Jordanians. On the one hand, they needed to maintain their business relationships with the Israelis who controlled necessary material resources. On the other hand, it had become increasingly dangerous to cultivate and maintain personal relationships with Israeli managers. The holistic strategy of trust based on personal ties and communal relations that the Jordanians had practiced during normalization was unsafe in the new political climate. If working with the Israelis posed the risk of disapproval from the community, it was even more risky for Jordanians to socialize with Israelis and invite them into their homes. For Jordanians, the "solution" to this predicament was to adopt a more impersonal mode of trust that allowed them to sever their personal ties but to retain their professional relations with Israelis.

The following event illustrates the Jordanians' attempt to redefine their relationships with Israelis as purely professional. This exchange took place after a long joint meeting in Carmiel (the GlobeWear headquarters). When an Israeli assistant manager waxed nostalgic about the warm personal ties that once existed between

Jordanians and Israelis and described their relationship as friendship, a Jordanian manager quickly "professionalized" the encounter by insisting that the relationship was purely professional and instrumental:

Gabi, the Israeli assistant operation manager of the Men's Wear Division, made a toast "to our friendship and partnership." For a moment he forgot that they don't drink wine. During the dinner, Nathan [an Israeli manager who worked closely with Abu-Fadi] started to reminisce about "the good old days" and how we cooperate so well and that even the Intifada will not break the friendship. Jibril looked at him soberly and said, "Leave the Intifada out of it. We are professionals and we will do our job, and you [the Israelis] just do what you should do, provide accessories and cut fabric on time." When I [the ethnographer in the field] asked Gabi about this attitude, he said, "To tell you the truth, I was quite surprised. But on second thought, I realized that because Jibril said what he said, I can trust him. If he would say 'I'm your friend and trust me, count on me etc.,' as I always heard before the Intifada, I would be suspicious."

In the midst of political turmoil, the pendulum swing of dependency and autonomy coincided with a switch in trust strategies between Israeli and Jordanian managers. On the Israeli side, political turmoil meant a loss of control over GlobeWear's daily operations, which were no longer in Israeli hands. As the Israelis' role changed from supervision to mediation, they became increasingly dependent on Jordanian management to oversee the plant's operations and to guarantee their safety. Consequently, Israeli managers adopted normative trust strategies, cultivating personal ties to elicit the Jordanians' cooperation. Conversely, as Jordanians repositioned themselves as autonomous actors working independently in a global international market, they adhered increasingly to formal professional procedures. This new professional ethos depersonalized the workplace by redefining the nature of their collaborative work with the Israelis and by demarcating a clear line between the personal and the professional. As the next section shows, by adopting calculative trust strategies, the Jordanians not only depersonalized the workplace but depoliticized it as well.

*POLITICIZATION, DEPOLITICIZATION, AND SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF TRUST*

During this heated climate of political unrest, Jordanians who continued their risky cooperation with Israelis at times experienced severe emotional and physical stress. As Nabil explained:

The situation is very bad. You know, we are mostly Palestinians in Irbid and our relatives are being killed by your army in Ramallah and Jenin and in Gaza. They [Jordanian workers] are afraid to be associated with Israelis. Yesterday, a worker came to me and asked to leave. I asked her why, and she told me, "My relative was killed in Gaza; I don't want to work for the Jews any more. Give me a letter, I want to be fired." I persuaded her to stay.

These dangers became visible when managers who were members of Jordan's Engineers Association were expelled from the association for maintaining relations with Israelis. In addition, a number of unions demonstrated outside the Medinat el Hasan gates against signs of Israeli presence. Shafer, another Jordanian manager, described the climate of growing local dismay with any form of Jordanian-Israeli collaboration:

I live with my family in a refugee camp. Some people came to my house and asked me to quit my job. My father-in-law also urged me to do so. I asked him who would provide for my family, him or the bums out there who only know how to instigate riots. It is not easy to live like this. People look at you with suspicion in their eyes and some even think you are a traitor.

Jordanian managers were forced by economic necessity to resist powerful pressures from their communities to quit their jobs. Torn between the duty to provide for their families and loyalty to their communities, Jordanian managers attempted to steer a course that would allow them to continue working amid this political turmoil. To cope with these conflicting cross-pressures, Jordanian managers drew a clear line of demarcation between politics and the workplace. By maintaining a "businesslike" demeanor, focusing on the task at hand, and defining their relationship to Israeli management as purely professional, Jordanian managers were able to continue to work in defiance of local threats. As Nabil noted:

We find it necessary to separate work from politics in the workplace. We don't allow any politics

to enter. We immediately stop [such talk]. We spend all our time on the job and concentrate on improving our work. This way workers know that they work for themselves and their families, and they keep their emotions and frustration with the political situation to themselves. . . . Here we motivate the workers [to work]; we talked about the situation among ourselves and we all support Abu-Fadi; nobody wants to quit. It is our factory, and we have the responsibility and the honor of running it. We have an obligation to GlobeWear to do our best. One should not mix war with work. It's not easy.

Calculative, competence-based trust served to depoliticize the workplace. At the same time, by distancing Jordanian workers from the Israeli headquarters, it also shielded them from external hostile interference and enhanced their professional autonomy.

Furthermore, separating work from politics allowed Jordanian workers to exhibit strong political hostility while retaining a considerable commitment to their work. By maintaining an attitude of "business as usual" toward their jobs, Jordanians could express their resentment toward the broader political situation while removing it from the workplace. Clearly, Jordanians did not allow such feelings to interfere with the work at the site, and their attitude remained primarily instrumental and task oriented. Jordanian managers were therefore positioned as gatekeepers, seeking to maintain clear boundaries between the professional and the political domains. This attitude allowed Jordanians to be loyal to both the Palestinian cause and the organization, and to retain their identities as both loyal Palestinians and loyal employees.

**CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION**

Our observations of trust relations in GlobeWear challenge several widely accepted assumptions about trust. These disparities call for a theoretical reorientation. To this end, we have outlined a repertoire approach to trust. At its center are three interrelated dimensions: agency, culture, and power relations.

*AGENCY*

Most approaches to trust have attempted to identify the conditions and forces that constrain trusting behavior. By contrast, we found that

Israeli and Jordanian managers actively chose forms of trust and continually negotiated over whether and how they would trust and be trusted by their counterparts. Their strategic use of trust was visible during their performances. Although both Jordanians and Israelis were clearly concerned with the economic risk at stake, they were also acutely attuned to the broader social meaning of their trusting behavior as well as to the perspectives of other participants. Typically, they adjusted their strategies of trust in response to these contingencies. In their attempt to professionalize their relationship with the Israelis, for example, the Jordanians considered not only economic risks and risks to their safety, but they also sought to balance their often conflicting identities as loyal Jordanians/Palestinians and loyal employees. Both Jordanians and Israelis used strategies of trust to demarcate social boundaries, whether to professionalize, personalize, or depoliticize relationships.

In contrast to approaches that view trust relations as unfolding in a linear developmental sequence, we have shown how Jordanians and Israelis actively manipulated their symbolic environment using forms and strategies of trust alternately and interchangeably. Trust may develop sequentially from calculative to normative trust as relationships deepen. However, this is but one of many paths that may be followed. The reversal of strategies during the Intifada attests to this point.

### **CULTURE**

Second, our work suggests a need to decouple strategies of trust from a strict division of culture into tradition or modernity. During normalization, Jordanians and Israelis might have seemed at first glance to be following a tradition/modernity cultural script, with Israelis using competence-based trust and Jordanians using a more traditional honor-based form. However, even during this period, Jordanians reflected upon and distanced themselves from these scripts (Goffman 1961). Moreover, during the Intifada, Israelis switched from competence-based to normative trust, and Jordanians switched from normative to competence-based strategies, thereby inverting stereotypes about “traditional” and “modern” cultures. How the Jordanians and Israelis used trust during polit-

ical unrest was not a mere reflection or replica (Sewell 1999) of how their counterparts had used these strategies during normalization. During normalization, the Jordanians used normative trust to deflect the criticism of the Israelis. However, during the Intifada, the Israelis used the same strategy to elicit the loyalty of the Jordanians, on whom they depended economically and for their safety. The meaning of a particular form of trust, then, depends on the specific context in which it is used and applied. These examples suggest a semiotic, dynamic view of culture rather than a conception of culture as a variable or a “thing” that constrains action. Actors carry a variety of forms of trust in their repertoire. For sociologists, a key question is how and why people choose a particular form of trust in a particular context.

### **POWER AND POLITICAL CONTEXT**

Our case suggests the need to bring power to the center of the analysis. In particular, we suggest three ways that power and the political context affect strategies of trust. First, actors’ ability to apply a given form of trust depends on the position they occupy and the resources at their disposal. For example, during normalization, Israelis controlled professional knowledge, technology, materials, and supplies and exercised considerable control over the production process. Thus, both the Israelis’ use of calculative trust and the Jordanians’ use of normative trust were a response to this imbalance of power. Conversely, during the period of political unrest, the Israelis’ power position weakened as the Jordanians gained increasing autonomy and control over production. Both the Israelis’ and the Jordanians’ reversal in strategies of trust corresponded to this change in the balance of power.

Second, forms of trust have a political meaning. The Jordanians’ use of calculative trust during the Intifada was a way of distancing themselves from the Israelis and depoliticizing the workplace. In so doing, the Jordanians attempted to strike a balance between national and professional identities.

Third, our data complicate the view of either a direct or an inverse relationship between trust and control. On the surface, it would seem that both Israelis and Jordanians adopted norma-

tive trust as a response to lack of control over the workplace, suggesting an inverse relationship. This is indeed one possible scenario. By the same token, however, both Israelis and Jordanians used calculative trust when they had greater control, suggesting that trust and control vary directly. However, when the use of strategies is examined closely, a much more complicated picture emerges. Consider, for example, the Jordanians' use of calculative trust when they had greater control over the workplace. In this case, control of the workplace was not their only consideration. In fact, the Jordanians used calculative trust to "professionalize" and depoliticize relations with Israeli managers—a response to political pressures from outside the workplace during the Intifada. Moreover, Jordanians' and Israelis' use of normative trust departs from the view, presented in the literature, that parties adopt normative trust as relationships deepen and the need for control diminishes. In contrast, both Israelis and Jordanians used normative trust strategically and demanded to be trusted as a way of reasserting the very control that had eluded them. In short, the complex relationships between forms of trust and control can only be understood by actually examining how these strategies are used and practiced in concrete social and political contexts.

Finally, both trust and control are situated, "positioned" practices (Reed 2001). Instead of identifying trust with cooperation and control with power, we suggest that power is implicated in both trust and control. For example, during normalization, the Jordanians often said they trusted the Israelis personally, invited the Israelis to their homes, and attempted to efface the boundaries between family and workplace. This strategy was normative trust, but it was also an effort on the part of a subordinate group to alter the balance of power and control in the relationship and deflect the Israelis' criticism. We are suggesting, then, that whether a given practice can be read as trust or control—or as both trust *and* control simultaneously—can only be understood by carefully examining the perspectives of the interactants and the context in which the practice takes shape.

Our view of both trust and control as part of a repertoire of organizational practices has not been the approach of the sociology of work, which remains divided into studies emphasizing

trust and studies of the labor process emphasizing control. However, both our trust repertoires approach and our data point to some new directions for research. Along with Bachmann, Knights, and Sydow (2001) and Reed (2001), we view the a priori distinction between trust and control as a false dichotomy. This consideration suggests that research on trust and studies of the labor process, instead of remaining bifurcated, should be in conversation.

The recent emphasis on agency, consciousness, and culture in labor process theory—as well as power—resonates with the "trust repertoires" approach of this study (Barley and Kunda 1992; Hodson 1999, 2004; Kunda 1992; Vallas 1999, 2003). This "third wave" of labor process theory may be read as incorporating trust into the strategy of "normative control," or the idea that management could more effectively regulate workers by attending to their thoughts and emotions and winning their loyalty and trust, a rhetoric popularized by the Human Relations movement (Barley and Kunda 1992; Kunda 1992). "Normative control" is, however, ultimately a "top down" move initiated from above to control the work force. Although this body of research comes close to merging the study of trust and control, regulating labor remains in the foreground. Our data suggest that strategies of trust can move in other directions: for example, workers also attempt to win the trust of management in an effort to influence managerial actions. They may use "normative trust" as a strategy to deflect criticism from management through appeals to personal loyalty. Workers may respond to managers' "normative control" strategies calculatively by insisting on concrete acts of good faith in the form of increased benefits, improved working conditions, or higher pay. Both management and workers are capable of using the rhetoric of trust and that of control in complex and strategic ways.

Although the specific story may vary in different arenas, we suggest that the repertoire approach to trust provides a general theoretical framework that can be applied to a wide variety of settings from love, marriage, and the family to the corporation and the economy. Applying calculative trust, for example, may have complex and unexpected ramifications. A choice of strategy may create the foundations for social collaboration, but it can also threaten to tear the very social fabric upon which trusting

relations depend. For these reasons, the meaning and consequence of trust cannot simply be assumed. Rather, how, why, and with what consequences actors use forms of trust are empirical questions that remain to be answered.

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