Conclusion

Liggins and Royster realized that the Clear Channel/AMFM divestiture was an unprecedented growth opportunity for their company. Urban stations, particularly those in the top 50 markets, rarely became available. Liggins and Royster, therefore, decided that Radio One should attempt to purchase 12 of the Clear Channel stations in the top 50 markets. The resulting larger national footprint would bring greater advertising revenue and serve as a more meaningful platform for the company's planned expansion into other forms of media, including cable, the recording industry, and the Internet.

Royster was uncertain how much the company should be willing to pay for the stations. Infinity Broadcasting paid \$1.4 billion, or about 21.5x 2000 BCF to acquire 18 stations from Clear Channel¹⁵ and Cox Radio paid about \$380 million, or about 18.4x 2000 BCF for 7 of the stations.¹⁶ The 12 stations Radio One targeted were of similar quality to those purchased by Infinity, and thus Royster anticipated offering at least 20x BCF.

In the weeks following Clear Channel's divestiture announcement, Radio One's stock increased from the mid-\$40s to as high as \$97 per share. At \$97 per share, Radio One was trading at nearly 30x's forward BCF. Exhibit 8 shows that the 30x multiple was substantially greater than the typical trading multiple for radio companies. Royster and Liggins attributed the stock price gains to the market's expectation that Radio One would submit a bid, and by early March 2000 analysts were speculating on the scope of Radio One's acquisition. In addition, Royster and Liggins were in negotiations with Davis Broadcasting for the purchase of 1 station in Charlotte, North Carolina, and 5 stations in Augusta, Georgia; and with Shirk, Inc. and IBL, LLC for the purchase of 3 stations in Indianapolis, Indiana. The proposed acquisitions, therefore, would add 21 stations.

Royster projected the performance of Radio One's stations and the 21 targeted stations. Those projections are contained in Exhibit 9. In addition to the information in Exhibit 9, Royster recognized that each targeted station would require about \$100,000 of capital expenditures each year. Also, Radio One would have to provide the stations with their initial working capital because the working capital of the targeted stations would not be sold to Radio One in the proposed asset sale.

Liggins and Royster wanted to gauge the purchase price range that would make sense. They wanted Radio One's offer price to be preemptive but not dilutive. At one extreme, to be preemptive, the price would have to exceed the stand-alone cash flow value of the targeted stations. At the other extreme, to avoid dilution, Radio One could afford to pay up to its 30x multiple.

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¹⁵Prudential Securities, Infinity Broadcasting, Equity Research Consumer Services Report dated May 16, 2000.

¹⁶Credit Suisse First Boston, Cox Radio Inc., Equity Research Report dated March 25, 2000.