

Ratemaking and Experience Rating

Master on Actuarial Science

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Proof (cont'd)

2nd part

$$\begin{aligned}V[\mu(\theta_j) - \beta \bar{X}_{.j}] &= E[V[\mu(\theta_j) - \beta \bar{X}_{.j} | \theta_j]] + V[E[\mu(\theta_j) - \beta \bar{X}_{.j} | \theta_j]] \\ &= \frac{\beta^2}{n} E[v(\theta)] + (1 - \beta)^2 V[\mu(\theta_j)]. \\ &= \frac{\beta^2}{n} v + (1 - \beta)^2 a. \\ V[\bar{X}_{.j} | \theta_j] &= \frac{1}{n} V[X_{ij} | \theta_j]\end{aligned}$$

Differentiating w.r.t. β and equating,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{2\beta}{n} v - 2(1 - \beta)a &= 0, \\ \beta^* &= \frac{a}{a + \frac{1}{n}v} = \frac{n}{n + v/a}\end{aligned}$$

Problem 1

Consider a motor insurance portfolio where the population is classified into categories A , B and C , respectively, where A is Good drivers, B is Bad drivers and C is Sports drivers. The population of drivers is split as follows: 70% is in category A , 25% in B and 5% in C . For each driver in category A , there is a probability of 0.75 of having no claims in a year, a probability of 0.2 of having one claim and a probability of 0.05 of having two or more claims in a year. For each driver in category B these probabilities are 0.25, 0.4 and 0.35, respectively. For each driver in category C these probabilities are 0.3, 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.

Risk parameter representing the kind of driver is denoted by θ , which is a realization of the random variable Θ . The insurer does not know the value of that parameter. Let X be the (observable) number of claims per year for a risk taken out at random from the whole portfolio. For a given $\Theta = \theta$ yearly observations X_1, X_2, \dots , make a random sample from risk X . The insurer finds crucial that the annual premium for a given risk might be adjusted by its claim record.

Consider a risk X taken out at random from the portfolio.

- 1 Calculate the mean and variance of X .
- 2 Compute the probability function of X .

Ratemaking and Experience Rating concepts, Recap...

Ratemaking portfolios/groups:

- Similar risks grouping in collectives of risks for ratemaking.

Tariff:

- Set of premia, for each risk in a (homogeneous) portfolio. A basic premium plus a system of *bonus* or *malus*.

Tariff structure:

- System of bonus/malus applied to a basic premium.

“Prior” and “Posterior” ratemaking:

- First rate following given *prior* variables, then make a *posterior re-evaluation/readjustment*, according to the reported accidents/claims by the risk/policy.

Bonus-malus systems, use of GLM's, ..

- Bonus systems are in general based on **claim counts**, not amounts. This is explained by the usual assumption of independence between **number** and **severity** of claims. The base model is Markovian.



Bonus-malus (or bonus) systems

- Common tariff in motor insurance;
- Usually based on a counting variable, not the amounts
- A Markov chain model (discret time) is often used:
- Basic idea:
 - year(s) with no claim: *bonus*
 - year with 1 claims: *malus*; 2 claims: + **malus**...
- Study *Long Term* behaviour



BMS as they should be: Bayesian analysis

Example

Observed distribution of third-party liability motor insurance claims

Mean: $\bar{x} = 0.1011$

Variance: $s^2 = 0.1074$

| Number of claims | Observed policies |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 0 | 96,978 |
| 1 | 9,240 |
| 2 | 704 |
| 3 | 43 |
| 4 | 9 |
| 5+ | 0 |
| Total | 106,974 |

Example

Non-contagious model: Poisson fit

| Number of claims | Observed policies | Poisson fit |
|------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| 0 | 96,978 | 96,689.6 |
| 1 | 9,240 | 9,773.5 |
| 2 | 704 | 493.9 |
| 3 | 43 | 16.6 |
| 4 | 9 | 0.4 |
| 5+ | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 106,974 | 106,974 |

Contagious model: Negative Binomial fit

Example

| Number of claims | Observed policies | Poisson fit | Negative Binomial fit |
|------------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| 0 | 96,978 | 96,689.6 | 96,985.5 |
| 1 | 9,240 | 9,773.5 | 9,222.5 |
| 2 | 704 | 493.9 | 711.7 |
| 3 | 43 | 16.6 | 50.7 |
| 4 | 9 | 0.4 | 3.6 |
| 5+ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 106,974 | 106,974 | 106,974 |



Example (Deaths by horse kicks in the ten corps of the Prussian Army, 1875-1894)

| N | Observed | Poisson | Neg Bin |
|--------------------|----------|---------|---------|
| 0 | 109 | 108.67 | 111.99 |
| 1 | 65 | 66.29 | 61.80 |
| 2 | 22 | 20.22 | 20.00 |
| 3 | 3 | 4.11 | 4.95 |
| 4 | 1 | 0.72 | 1.04 |
| 5+ | 0 | 0.00 | 0.22 |
| Total – Chi-Square | 200 | 0.33 | 1.24 |

Example (Optimal BMS with Negative Binomial model)

| Year | Claims | | | | |
|------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 0 | 100 | | | | |
| 1 | 94 | 153 | 211 | 269 | 329 |
| 2 | 89 | 144 | 199 | 255 | 310 |
| 3 | 84 | 137 | 189 | 241 | 294 |
| 4 | 80 | 130 | 179 | 229 | 279 |
| 5 | 76 | 123 | 171 | 218 | 266 |
| 6 | 73 | 118 | 163 | 208 | 253 |
| 7 | 69 | 113 | 156 | 199 | 242 |

Link with Credibility theory, **Credibility idea**:

$$Premium = (1 - z)(Population Pr.) + z(Individual Pr.)$$

Credibility is an exact rating formula for the Poisson-Gamma mix

- This **optimal BMS** is:
 - Fair (as it results from the application of Bayes theorem)
 - Financially balanced (the average income of the insurer stays at 100, year after year)
- BUT, It is not acceptable to regulators and managers, as the harsh penalties:
 - Encourage uninsured driving
 - Suggest *hit-and-run* behavior
 - Induce policyholders to leave the company after one accident

⇒ In practice, another approach, based on Markov Chains, is used

BMS as they are: definition of Markov Chain (MC) $\{Z_n\}$ is a discrete-time, non-homogeneous Markov Chain when Z is an infinite sequence of random variables Z_0, Z_1, \dots such that

- 1 Z_n denotes the state at time n , $n = 0, 1, 2, \dots$
- 2 Each Z_n is a discrete random variable that can take s values (s is the number of states)
- 3 All transition probabilities are history-independent:

$$\begin{aligned}P_{(n)}(i, j) &= \Pr[Z_{n+1}=j | Z_n = i, Z_{n-1} = i_{n-1}, \dots, M_0 = i_0] \\ &= \Pr[Z_{n+1}=j | Z_n = i]\end{aligned}$$

For all BMS applications, MC are homogeneous: $\mathbf{P}_n = \mathbf{P}$. We can have MC of order higher than 1. See Next example

Example (Centeno [2003])

A *Bonus* system in motor insurance, 3rd party liability (directly, the system is not pure Markovian, Markov of Order 2)

- 30% discount, no claim for 2 yrs.
- 15% malus, 1 claim
- 30% malus, 2 claims
- 45% malus, 3 claims
- 100% malus, 4 claims
- > 4, case by case...

Markovian, if classes are split (see later)

Commonly used Markovian BMS are (long term) stable. See next examples

Example (Markov chain, T&K, p.102, Ex. 2.2)

A particle travels through states $\{0, 1, 2\}$ according to a Markov chain

$$P = \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} & 0 & 1 & 2 \\ \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 1 \\ 2 \end{array} & \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1/2 & 1/2 \\ 1/2 & 0 & 1/2 \\ 1/2 & 1/2 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

$$P^2 = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{4} & \frac{1}{4} \\ \frac{1}{4} & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{4} \\ \frac{1}{4} & \frac{1}{4} & \frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}; P^3 = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{4} & \frac{3}{8} & \frac{3}{8} \\ \frac{3}{8} & \frac{1}{4} & \frac{3}{8} \\ \frac{3}{8} & \frac{3}{8} & \frac{1}{4} \end{bmatrix}; P^4 = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{3}{8} & \frac{5}{16} & \frac{5}{16} \\ \frac{5}{16} & \frac{3}{8} & \frac{5}{16} \\ \frac{5}{16} & \frac{5}{16} & \frac{3}{8} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$P^5 = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{5}{16} & \frac{11}{32} & \frac{11}{32} \\ \frac{11}{32} & \frac{5}{16} & \frac{11}{32} \\ \frac{11}{32} & \frac{11}{32} & \frac{5}{16} \end{bmatrix}; P^{10} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{171}{512} & \frac{341}{1024} & \frac{341}{1024} \\ \frac{341}{1024} & \frac{171}{512} & \frac{341}{1024} \\ \frac{341}{1024} & \frac{341}{1024} & \frac{171}{512} \end{bmatrix}$$

Example

Let a Markov chain with transition matrix:

$$P = \begin{array}{c} \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \\ \left(\begin{array}{cccccccc} 0 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\ 0.9 & 0.1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.9 & 0 & 0.1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.9 & 0 & 0 & 0.1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.9 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.9 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.1 & 0 \\ 0.9 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.1 \\ 0.9 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.1 \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

Example

Long term: $P^8 =$

$$\begin{bmatrix} .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \\ .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \\ .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \\ .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \\ .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \\ .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \\ .9 & .09 & .009 & .0009 & .00009 & 9.0 \times 10^{-6} & 1.0 \times 10^{-6} \end{bmatrix}$$

Example (Entry class: 5.)

Table 4.1 Transition rules for the scale $-1/\text{top}$.

| Starting level | Level occupied if claim is reported | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| | 0 | ≥ 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 1 | 0 | 5 |
| 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 3 | 2 | 5 |
| 4 | 3 | 5 |
| 5 | 4 | 5 |

Table 4.2 Transition rules for the scale $-1/+2$.

| Starting level | Level occupied if claim(s) is/are reported | | | |
|----------------|--|---|---|----------|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | ≥ 3 |
| 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 3 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 2 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 5 |

A posteriori ratemaking system, experience rating, is a *Bonus-malus* system if

- The rating periods are equal (1 year)
- The risks, policies, are divided into (finite) classes:

$$C_1, C_2, \dots, C_s; \quad \bigcup_i C_i = C; \quad C_i \cap C_j = \emptyset.$$

- No transitions within the year
- Position in Class in the year n depends on:
 - Position in $n - 1$, and
 - The year claim counts.

Composition of the B-S system:

- 1 A vector of *premia* (or multiplying factor, index)

$$\mathbf{b} = (b(1), b(2), \dots, b(s))$$

- 2 Transition rules among classes, in matrix:

$\mathbf{T} = [T_{ij}]$, each entry T_{ij} is a set of integers...

$$\mathbf{T} : \cup_{j=1}^s T_{ij} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}, T_{ij} \cap T_{ij'} = \emptyset, j \neq j'$$

- 3 Entry class, C_{i_0} is the same for all policies.



Further, $\mathbf{P}(\vartheta)$ is the one-step transition matrix, i.e.

$$\mathbf{P}(\vartheta) = \begin{pmatrix} p_{00}(\vartheta) & p_{01}(\vartheta) & \cdots & p_{0s}(\vartheta) \\ p_{10}(\vartheta) & p_{11}(\vartheta) & \cdots & p_{1s}(\vartheta) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ p_{s0}(\vartheta) & p_{s1}(\vartheta) & \cdots & p_{ss}(\vartheta) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$p_{(i,j)}(\lambda) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k(\lambda) t_{ij}(k), \quad i, j = 1, \dots, S,$$

$$\mathbf{P}_{T,\lambda} = [p_{(i,j)}(\lambda)]_{S \times S} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k(\lambda) \mathbf{T}_k$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} e^{-\lambda} \frac{\lambda^k}{k!} \mathbf{T}_k. \quad (\text{if Poisson})$$

- All B-S systems have (at least) a *bonus* class where a policy:
 - stays if keeps with no claims
 - goes, transits to, if has no claims
 - goes out, transits from (to another)
- That class is a periodic state
- If the Markov chain is irreducible, finite number of states, it will be aperiodic and stationary;
- Then, it exists a limit distribution, for a given λ

$$p_{T,\lambda}^{(\infty)}(j) = \lim_{n \uparrow \infty} p_{T,\lambda}^{(n)}(i, j).$$

If λ is considered to be the outcome of a r.v. with dist. $\pi(\lambda)$, usually

$$p_T^{(\infty)}(j) = \int_0^{\infty} p_{T,\lambda}^{(\infty)}(j) d\pi(\lambda) = E \left[p_{T,\lambda}^{(\infty)}(j) \right]$$

Remark: $p_T^{(\infty)}(j)$ is not got from the initial “mixed Poisson”.

Problem 2 (Problem 1 cont'd)

Consider a motor insurance portfolio where the population is classified into categories A , B and C , respectively, where A is Good drivers, B is Bad drivers and C is Sports drivers. The population of drivers is split as follows: 70% is in category A , 25% in B and 5% in C . For each driver in category A , there is a probability of 0.75 of having no claims in a year, a probability of 0.2 of having one claim and a probability of 0.05 of having two or more claims in a year. For each driver in category B these probabilities are 0.25, 0.4 and 0.35, respectively. For each driver in category C these probabilities are 0.3, 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.

Risk parameter representing the kind of driver is denoted by θ , which is a realization of the random variable Θ . The insurer does not know the value of that parameter. Let X be the (observable) number of claims per year for a risk taken out at random from the whole portfolio. For a given $\Theta = \theta$ yearly observations X_1, X_2, \dots , make a random sample from risk X . The insurer finds crucial that the annual premium for a given risk might be adjusted by its claim record.

Suppose that the insurer uses a Bonus-malus system based on the claims frequency to rate the risks of that portfolio. The system has simply three classes, numbered 1, 2 and 3 and ranked increasingly from low to higher risk.

- Lemaire's (1995):
 - *Relative Stationary Average Level (RSAL)*:

$$RSAL = \frac{SAP - mP}{MP - mP}$$

$$SAP = \sum_{j=1}^s b(j) p_T^{(\infty)}(j)$$

SAP: Stationary Average Premium, *mP*: minimum Premium,
MP: Max Premium

- Premium variation coefficient (VC):

$$VC = SDP / SAP$$

$$SDP = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^s b(j)^2 p_T^{(\infty)}(j) - SAP^2}$$

- Loimaranta's (1972) Efficiency. Elasticity of the average premium (Response to changes in frequency mean)

$$\eta(\lambda) = \frac{\frac{d SAP(\lambda)}{SAP}}{\frac{d\lambda}{\lambda}} = \frac{d \ln SAP(\lambda)}{d \ln \lambda}$$

If

$$\lambda \rightarrow \infty \Rightarrow SAP(\lambda) \rightarrow \max \{b(j)\} < \infty;$$

$$\lambda \rightarrow \infty \Rightarrow \eta(\lambda) \rightarrow 0; \quad \lambda \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \eta(\lambda) \rightarrow 0.$$

- Lemaire's (1985) *Transient Elasticity* (1st step analysis)

$$V_\lambda(j) = b(j) + \beta_j \sum_{k=1}^s p_{T,\lambda}(j, k) V_\lambda(k), \quad j = 1, \dots, s$$

- $V_\lambda(j)$: Expected present value to be paid by policy from C_j ;
- $\beta_j (< 1)$: Discount rate.



“Bonus hunger”

- Due to “claims frequency system”
- (Some?) Small accidents aren't reported;
 - It changes: the reported frequency and amounts dist's;
 - Decreases insurer's management costs;
 - “No-report” decision depends:
 - solely **on insuree**, and
 - his bonus class C_j ;
- Let x_j : Retention level (works like a “Franchise” not a “Deductible”);
- It's possible to find an optimal retention point: x_j^* (under some assumptions).



Optimal scale for limiting situation: $Q_0(\Delta) = \lim Q_n(\Delta)$, as $n \rightarrow \infty$

$$Q_0(\Delta) = E \left[(E(S|\lambda) - b(Z_T))^2 \right], S \stackrel{d}{=} S_n$$

$$b_T(j) = E[E(S|\lambda) | Z_T = j] = \frac{\int_0^\infty E(S|\lambda) p_{T,\lambda}^{(\infty)}(j) d\Pi(\lambda)}{p_T^{(\infty)}(j)}$$

If S_n depends only of λ and use $E(X_i)$ as monetary unit

$$b_T(j) = \frac{\int_0^\infty \lambda p_{T,\lambda}^{(\infty)}(j) d\Pi(\lambda)}{p_T^{(\infty)}(j)}$$

Efficiency Measure: $e(T) = E[b_T(Z_T)^2] = \sum_{j=1}^s b_T(j)^2 p_T^{(\infty)}(j)$

- Statistical modelling

- Model the pure premium
- Model the Conditional Expected Value:

$$E(Y|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p) = h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p, \beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_p)$$
$$Y = h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p, \beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_p) + \varepsilon$$

Y : endogenous variable, x_i : factor, exogenous, β_j : parameter

- Identify risk factors;
- Different sorts of variables: **Nominal** (binary: gender, good/bad risk), **ordinal/Categorical** (ranks: age, power groups), **discrete** (age, experience yrs, claim counts...), **continuous** (income, claim amounts)
- Data, Information must be (always) reliable, as simple as possible, clean, neat...
- Y : Pure premium, Factors: risk factors influencing:
 - E.g motor insurance: kms, traffic, driver's ability, power, vehicle type, driver's experience, geographical factors...

Deal with the experts about the factors influencing, gather information, data, manageable data. E.g., in motor insurance we can consider

- Past accident record
- kms driven
- Car owner (company/private)
- Use (business or private)
- Vehicle value
- Power (cm^3)
- Weight
- Driver's age
- Driving region (usual, city/countryside...)
- Multiple driver's?
- Vehicle age
- Years fo driver's expereince
- Car brand and/or model

- Gender
- Sort of insurance (third party, own damages)
- Driver's profession
- etc,...
-

Then, we have to make choices, run/test models...

- Built classes of factors. Often Class aggregation is needed
- Often we have many binary or rank variables, qualitative data

If dependent variable Y is:

- Binary: Model a *Logit* or *Probit*
- Counting data: *Poisson* model. Ex: Number of claims in a Bonus system
- Continuous data: *Gamma* model. Ex: Amount of claims
- Compound Poisson data: Ex: *Poisson-Gamma Tweedie* model for Aggregate claims data.
(*Tweedie* dist.family: $\text{Var}(Y) = a[E(Y)]^p$, $a, p > 0$ const.)

Let S be the Aggregate claims in one year, N be the annual number of claims and X be the amount of each claim.

$$E(S) = E(N)E(X), \text{ is the pure premium.}$$

We can consider modeling the two expectations separately.
Or not... Jørgensen & de Souza (1994).

Explanatory variables may affect the expected cost by simultaneously increasing or decreasing both the claim frequency and the average claim size.

In practice, some explanatory factors will have a greater impact on the frequency of claims than on their size, or the opposite.

It is also possible for certain factors, e.g. no-claims bonus, to affect the frequency of claims and the claim size in opposite directions.

In a portfolio we can consider different level factors influencing each (conditional) expectation, building a tariff, such that:

$$E(Y|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p) = h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p, \beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_p)$$

Specifying $h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p, \beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_p)$ may not be an easy task, where the x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p are the factors.

A tariff analysis is based on insurer's own data.

Steps:

- Postulate a distribution of Y according to its nature, as well as the factors (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p) ;
- Based on a sample for Y and (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p) choose the *best* $h(\cdot)$ and estimate $(\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_p)$;
- Hypothesis testing, for Y and (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p) .

We should consider:

- Existing information in the company;
- Used variables in other, previous, studies;
- Market used variables;
- Legal limitations.

Data:

- Must be reliable, objective;
- Number of variables must be adequate, no too long or too short;
- All information must cover an homogeneous period. Not too long periods, e.g.

Models:

- Additive models. ANOVA;
- Mutliplicative models, GLM, e.g. two rating factors:

$$\mu_{ij} = \gamma_0 \gamma_{1i} \gamma_{2j}$$

- Key ratio

$$Y_{ij} = X_{ij} / w_{ij}$$

- Mean of *key ratio*:

$$\mu_{ij} = E(Y_{ij}), \text{ with } w_{ij} = 1$$

- Multiplicative models, extension to *many* rating factors, M :

$$\mu_{1i_1, i_2, \dots, i_M} = \gamma_0 \gamma_{1i_1} \gamma_{2i_2} \times \dots \times \gamma_{Mi_M}$$

$\mu_{1i_1, i_2, \dots, i_M}$: Mean of dependent var. with M rating factors

M : Number of rating factors

γ_{ij} : Rating factor i in Class j

- Exponential dispersion models (EDM's) of GLM's generalise the normal distribution used in the linear models.

$$\text{Pure Premium} = \text{Claim frequency} \times \text{Claim severity}$$

For each of the two factors, we can have different rating factors, separately, since severity and frequency are independent.

Table 1.1 Rating factors in moped insurance

| Rating factor | Class | Class description |
|-----------------|-------|---|
| Vehicle class | 1 | Weight over 60 kg and more than two gears |
| | 2 | Other |
| Vehicle age | 1 | At most 1 year |
| | 2 | 2 years or more |
| Geographic zone | 1 | Central and semi-central parts of Sweden's three largest cities |
| | 2 | Suburbs and middle-sized towns |
| | 3 | Lesser towns, except those in 5 or 7 |
| | 4 | Small towns and countryside, except 5–7 |
| | 5 | Northern towns |
| | 6 | * Northern countryside |
| | 7 | Gotland (Sweden's largest island) |

Table 1.2 Key ratios in moped insurance (claim frequency per mille)

| Tariff cell | | | Duration | No. claims | Claim frequency | Claim severity | Pure premium | Actual premium |
|-------------|-----|------|----------|------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|
| Class | Age | Zone | | | | | | |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 62.9 | 17 | 270 | 18 256 | 4 936 | 2 049 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 112.9 | 7 | 62 | 13 632 | 845 | 1 230 |
| 1 | 1 | 3 | 133.1 | 9 | 68 | 20 877 | 1 411 | 762 |
| 1 | 1 | 4 | 376.6 | 7 | 19 | 13 045 | 242 | 396 |
| 1 | 1 | 5 | 9.4 | 0 | 0 | . | 0 | 990 |
| 1 | 1 | 6 | 70.8 | 1 | 14 | 15 000 | 212 | 594 |
| 1 | 1 | 7 | 4.4 | 1 | 228 | 8 018 | 1 829 | 396 |
| 1 | 2 | 1 | 352.1 | 52 | 148 | 8 232 | 1 216 | 1 229 |
| 1 | 2 | 2 | 840.1 | 69 | 82 | 7 418 | 609 | 738 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 378.3 | 75 | 54 | 7 318 | 398 | 457 |
| 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 505.3 | 136 | 25 | 6 922 | 171 | 238 |
| 1 | 2 | 5 | 114.1 | 2 | 18 | 11 131 | 195 | 594 |
| 1 | 2 | 6 | 810.9 | 14 | 17 | 5 970 | 103 | 356 |
| 1 | 2 | 7 | 62.3 | 1 | 16 | 6 500 | 104 | 238 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 191.6 | 43 | 224 | 7 754 | 1 740 | 1 024 |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | 237.3 | 34 | 143 | 6 933 | 993 | 615 |
| 2 | 1 | 3 | 162.4 | 11 | 68 | 4 402 | 298 | 381 |
| 2 | 1 | 4 | 446.5 | 8 | 18 | 8 214 | 147 | 198 |
| 2 | 1 | 5 | 13.2 | 0 | 0 | . | 0 | 495 |
| 2 | 1 | 6 | 82.8 | 3 | 36 | 5 830 | 211 | 297 |
| 2 | 1 | 7 | 14.5 | 0 | 0 | . | 0 | 198 |
| 2 | 2 | 1 | 844.8 | 94 | 111 | 4 728 | 526 | 614 |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 296.0 | 99 | 76 | 4 252 | 325 | 369 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 214.9 | 37 | 30 | 4 212 | 128 | 229 |
| 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 740.7 | 56 | 15 | 3 846 | 58 | 119 |
| 2 | 2 | 5 | 109.4 | 4 | 37 | 3 925 | 144 | 297 |
| 2 | 2 | 6 | 404.7 | 5 | 12 | 5 280 | 65 | 178 |
| 2 | 2 | 7 | 66.3 | 1 | 15 | 7 795 | 118 | 119 |

Table 1.3 Important key ratios

| Exposure w | Response X | Key ratio $Y \equiv X/w$ |
|------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Duration | Number of claims | Claim frequency |
| Duration | Claim cost | Pure premium |
| Number of claims | Claim cost | (Average) Claim severity |
| Earned premium | Claim cost | Loss ratio |
| Number of claims | Number of large claims | Proportion of large claims |

EDM's of GLM's

- Data, Key Ratios Obs org'zed in list form $(y_1, \dots, y_n)'$;
- Row i contains y_i , exposure weight w_i and rating factors ob's;

| Tariff cell i | Covariates | | | Duration (exposure) w_i | Claim frequency y_i |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Class x_{i1} | Age x_{i2} | Zone x_{i3} | | |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 62.9 | 270 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 112.9 | 62 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 133.1 | 68 |
| 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 376.6 | 19 |
| 5 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 9.4 | 0 |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 70.8 | 14 |
| 7 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4.4 | 228 |
| 8 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 352.1 | 148 |
| 9 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 840.1 | 82 |
| ⋮ | ⋮ | ⋮ | ⋮ | ⋮ | ⋮ |
| 21 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 14.5 | 0 |
| 22 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 844.8 | 111 |
| 23 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 296.0 | 76 |
| 24 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 214.9 | 30 |
| 25 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 740.7 | 15 |
| 26 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 109.4 | 37 |
| 27 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 404.7 | 12 |
| 28 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 66.3 | 15 |

- Prob'y dist of the Claim Frequency: Poisson, mixed Poisson.
Let X_i in cell i with w_i ,

$$X_i \sim \text{Poisson}(w_i \mu_i) \Rightarrow Y_i = X_i / w_i \sim \text{relative Poisson}$$

- Model for claim severity: Gamma, $X \sim \text{Gamma}(w\alpha, \beta)$

$$\Rightarrow Y = X / w \sim \text{Gamma}(w\alpha, w\beta), \quad E[X] = \alpha / \beta$$

- Tweedie models:

- EDM's that are scale invariant, those with variance function $v(\mu) = \mu^p$.
- If $1 < p < 2$ correspond to the Compound Poisson. Key ratio: Pure premium.
- Model altogether the pure premium, not claim counts and size separately.

Table 2.7 Moped insurance: relativities from a multiplicative Poisson GLM for claim frequency and a gamma GLM for claim severity

| Rating factor | Class | Duration | No. claims | Relativities, frequency | Relativities, severity | Relativities, pure premium |
|---------------|-------|----------|------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Vehicle class | 1 | 9833 | 391 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| | 2 | 8824 | 395 | 0.78 | 0.55 | 0.42 |
| Vehicle age | 1 | 1918 | 141 | 1.55 | 1.79 | 2.78 |
| | 2 | 16740 | 645 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Zone | 1 | 1451 | 206 | 7.10 | 1.21 | 8.62 |
| | 2 | 2486 | 209 | 4.17 | 1.07 | 4.48 |
| | 3 | 2889 | 132 | 2.23 | 1.07 | 2.38 |
| | 4 | 10069 | 207 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| | 5 | 246 | 6 | 1.20 | 1.21 | 1.46 |
| | 6 | 1369 | 23 | 0.79 | 0.98 | 0.78 |
| | 7 | 147 | 3 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 1.20 |

Table 2.8 Motorcycle insurance: rating factors and relativities in current tariff

| Rating factor | Class | Class description | Relativity |
|-----------------|-------|---|------------|
| Geographic zone | 1 | Central and semi-central parts of Sweden's three largest cities | 7.678 |
| | 2 | Suburbs plus middle-sized cities | 4.227 |
| | 3 | Lesser towns, except those in 5 or 7 | 1.336 |
| | 4 | Small towns and countryside, except 5-7 | 1.000 |
| | 5 | Northern towns | 1.734 |
| | 6 | Northern countryside | 1.402 |
| | 7 | Gotland (Sweden's largest island) | 1.402 |
| MC class | 1 | EV ratio -5 | 0.625 |
| | 2 | EV ratio 6-8 | 0.769 |
| | 3 | EV ratio 9-12 | 1.000 |
| | 4 | EV ratio 13-15 | 1.406 |
| | 5 | EV ratio 16-19 | 1.875 |
| | 6 | EV ratio 20-24 | 4.062 |
| | 7 | EV ratio 25- | 6.873 |
| Vehicle age | 1 | 0-1 years | 2.000 |
| | 2 | 2-4 years | 1.200 |
| | 3 | 5- years | 1.000 |
| Bonus class | 1 | 1-2 | 1.250 |
| | 2 | 3-4 | 1.125 |
| | 3 | 5-7 | 1.000 |