Static games of complete information: dominant strategies, dominated strategies, best responses and Nash Equilibrium in pure and mix strategies

Dynamic games with complete and perfect information: Sequentially Rational Equilibrium (SRE) and solution by backward induction 

Next, we covered general equilibrium in an economy with production, followed by introduction to market failures.

Finally, we covered externality, with an application about carbon tax from Golosov et al. (Econometrica, 2014): Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium. 

Extension to midterm question 1: computing the compensating variation (willingness to pay) for a food subsidy and compare to cash transfer. 

Application: Marion & Muehlegger (2011), Fuel Tax Incidence and Supply Conditions. 

Since I was travelling for a seminar on October 7, this class is recovered as follows:

- Production function

- Cost minimization

- Competitive firm and profit maximization